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INTRODUCTION7P IS Article explores the relationship of property division and ali-
mony in addressing the need for spousal support at divorce. The
facts of the following hypothetical help set the stage for the inquiry. As-
sume that Marsha and Joe, married for seventeen years, contemplate sep-
aration and divorce. They have two children, ages twelve and nine.
Their financial circumstances are better than those of the average divorc-
ing couple.' Because of good fortune and an austere family budget, they
1. See infra notes 342-45 and accompanying text.
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have accumulated a more than modest amount of real and personal prop-
erty. Moreover, Joe earns $50,000 per year in an upper-level manage-
ment position. Marsha has interrupted her work outside the home for
significant time periods and now earns $14,000 per year in a part-time
position as a computer programmer. The couple agree that Marsha will
have custody of the children, and they reach a figure on child support.
Like most couples, Joe and Marsha try to execute a separation agree-
ment to settle the economic consequences of their divorce. In this case,
since the couple have agreed on child support, their chief economic con-
cerns are their arrangements concerning property division and spousal
support. Like all couples negotiating a separation agreement, Marsha
and Joe "bargain in the shadow"2 of their state's law on property division
and alimony.
There are two reasons Marsha might expect an unequal division of
property in her favor. First, because of their relative incomes, divorce
will have a greater financial impact on Marsha than on Joe. Therefore,
to soften the economic impact of divorce, Marsha might expect to receive
a larger portion of the marital assets. Second, most state statutes on
property division authorize the use of property division to alleviate
postdivorce need.' Marsha, in reliance on the statute, might expect that
her financial circumstances, as compared to Joe's, would lead a court to
divide available property unequally in her favor.
Despite the logic of her position, she is likely to be disappointed. Even
if her state's property statute authorizes the division of property to allevi-
ate need, experience indicates that Marsha should probably expect, at
best, only an equal division of the property available for distribution.4
Although alimony likewise is available in most states, Marsha probably
should expect either a modest, short-term alimony award or no award at
all.5 Despite the economic disparity between the two, this sketch out-
lines the shadow in which these parties are most likely to bargain.
In the hypothetical, divorce leaves Marsha in greater financial distress
than Joe, and in this respect, the hypothetical is realistic. Numerous
studies report that divorce leaves the wife at a severe economic disadvan-
tage and explain the coining of the phrase "the feminization of poverty." 6
Across the country, various groups are studying the economic straits of
2. For the development of this phrase, see Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
3. See infra note 70.
4. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 79 for studies on alimony. See infra Section II for property division
in states whose statutes authorize its use to address need.
6. For studies of the "feminization of poverty," see for example, Burke, The Femini-
zation of Poverty: Is This Happening in Iowa?, Iowa Commission on the Status of Wo-
men (1984); Fuchs, The Feminization of Poverty, National Bureau of Economic
Research (June, 1986); Gregory & Kaplan, The Feminization of Poverty: An Update,
Wider Opportunities for Women, Inc. (Dec. 1983); Report of the Task Force on the
Feminization of Poverty, Office of Lt. Governor Leo McCarthy, Sacramento, California,
The Feminization of Poverty: Issues and Answers (Jan. 1985). See also infra note 394.
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divorced women and the children for whom they usually retain primary
custodial responsibility.7 The need for these studies follows decades of
divorce reform that sought to make divorce operate more fairly.8 The
goal of alleviating the injustices wrought by a narrow concept of marital
property partially motivated this reform.9 Despite the reformers' success
in expanding the concept of marital property, 10 the aftermath of reform
has left women and children as a new class of victims.
This Article focuses on property division at divorce and explores the
role it should have played in averting economic inequality at divorce. In
particular, the Article examines the relationship between property divi-
sion and alimony in accommodating postdivorce spousal need. If one of
the functions of property division is to address need, then property divi-
sion shares a common function with alimony. If property division and
alimony share the function of addressing need by providing postdivorce
support, then the presence of both kinds of statutes poses a question in
instances in which there is both available property and postdivorce in-
come: should the court try to address the need with an unequal division
of property, an alimony award, or some combination of the two?
In Part I, the Article reviews the development of equitable distribution
statutes in separate property states." This review links the divorce re-
form movement to the incorporation of need factors into equitable distri-
bution statutes. Part II focuses on six states that incorporate need
factors into their property division statutes. This Part analyzes selected
cases from those states and categorizes the results according to each
court's treatment of the need factors. Additionally, in Part II, the Arti-
cle synthesizes the results to suggest some explanations for the underu-
tilization of the need factors in property division statutes. In Part III,
the Article offers some recommendations to focus courts' attention on
need in decisions concerning property division. Other recommendations
in Part III require legislative action to redress the inattention to need.
This Article concludes that explanations for the underutilization of the
need factors imply that perhaps the central impediment to implementing
7. For statistics on which spouse retains custody, see infra note 369 and accompany-
ing text.
8. See infra note 42.
9. See infra note 44.
10. See infra notes 191-222 and accompanying text for a discussion of the success of
contribution in classifying property as marital at the cost of diverting attention from need
in distributing the available property.
11. In separate property states, each spouse owns the property titled in his or her
name. In community property states, the marital unit owns at least the assets acquired
during the marriage by the efforts of one or both spouses. See W. McClanahan, Commu-
nity Property in the United States, §§ 2.36-2.39, at 45-54 (1982).
This Article traces the impact of reform on the treatment of need factors in equitable
distribution states. To a greater degree than the separate property states, the community
property states included need factors in their property division statutes before the divorce
reform of the 1960's. Therefore, the study concentrates on the equitable distribution stat-
utes of separate property states, specifically, Arkansas, Connecticut, Montana, New
York, North Carolina and Wisconsin. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
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the relationship between property division and alimony is a lack of con-
sensus on what constitutes "need."
I. THE INCORPORATION OF NEED FACTORS INTO EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION STATUTES: DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PROPERTY DIVISION TO
ADDRESS NEED
A. History of the Use of Factors Addressing Need: The Role of
Property Division in Divorce Reform
In the wake of divorce reform, almost all separate property states have
enacted statutes that give their respective courts the power to divide
property at divorce. 2 All of these states also have provided for the
awarding of alimony or maintenance 13 at divorce. 4 Though the distinc-
tion has never been clean, 5 these states, like community property states,
historically have recognized a difference in the function of property divi-
sion and alimony. Alleviating postdivorce need was not a central func-
tion of property division. In separate property states, courts awarded
property at divorce to "unscramble" and sever the property relationship
between the parties. Property awards at divorce in community property
states distributed the property owned by the marital unit.' 6 On the other
hand, courts in both separate and community property states awarded
alimony for support of entitled spouses.' 7 The statutes on which these
12. Among the separate property states, only Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi have
not enacted equitable distribution statutes. See L. Golden, Equitable Distribution of
Property Appendix A, at 283-327 (1983); see e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-472 (Law. Co-
op. Cum. Supp. 1987). Although the divorce reform of the 1960's and 1970's accelerated
the enactment of statutes authorizing property awards at divorce in separate property
states, it did not initiate this movement. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
Principles of sharing property at divorce had made inroads into title theory even before
the widespread enactment of equitable distribution statutes. See generally Comment, The
Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L.
Rev. 1269 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Sharing Principles]. Some states gave their
courts the equitable power to divide property in the 1930's. Note, Equitable Distribution
vs. Fixed Rules Marital Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act, 23
B.C.L. Rev. 761, 762 n.5 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Equitable vs. Fixed Rules].
13. For a tabulation of alimony statutes, see Freed and Walker, Family Law in the
Fifty States An Overview, 20 Fain. L.Q. 439, 494-95 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Overview].
Many states now use the word "maintenance" rather than "alimony" to refer to
postdivorce spousal support. See e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B (6) (McKinney
1986). This Article uses the word "alimony" unless referring to a specific statute that
uses the word "maintenance."
14. For examples of alimony statutes, see infra note 73.
15. See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
16. In the earlier version of his treatise, Professor Clark distinguished the tasks at
divorce in separate and community property states by describing the process of "un-
scrambling" ownership interests in the separate property states and "dividing" the com-
munity in the community property states. See H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations
in the United States 450 (1968).
17. For an explanation of the distinction between property division and alimony, see
2 H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 179-80 (2d ed. 1987).
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alimony awards were based suggested a number of justifications for the
awards, 8 but the dominant justification was to accommodate economic
need.19 Alimony statutes reflected this goal by directing the court to con-
sider factors like a spouse's age, health, and ability to earn income. 20
Until the enactment of equitable distribution statutes, the departure
from the historic distinction between property division and alimony in
separate property states occurred gradually.21 Early in the history of di-
vorce provisions in separate property states,22 some of these jurisdictions
authorized the division of property to effectuate an award of alimony.23
In this way, the separate property states recognized that property divi-
sion might accomplish one goal of alimony by supporting a needy spouse.
Some of this recognition was statutory.24 Other separate property states
developed common law principles that in effect used an award of prop-
erty to support a needy spouse and ameliorate the harshness of the lack
of adequate property provisions.2 5
Community property states also gradually recognized the ability of
property division to address need. If property division merely divided
assets at divorce, a property division statute would include only historical
factors of the marriage.2 6 If only alimony provided for support, only an
18. Professor Judith Areen found that the factors listed in the alimony statutes re-
flected five goals: to punish for fault in the marital breakup; to accommodate need; to
maintain the status of the recipient spouse; to rehabilitate; and to recognize contributions
to the marriage. J. Areen, Cases and Materials on Family Law 593-95 (2d ed. 1985).
19. The observation of one commentator, for example, underscores the dominance of
this function of alimony. In his work on community property law, Mr. McClanahan
justified the existence of alimony in community property states by the recognition that
the division of the marital property could not satisfy economic need. Almost all of the
community property states also enacted alimony statutes. W. McClanahan, Community
Property Law in the United States, § 12:3, at 526 (1982).
20. See, eg., infra note 294 for the Connecticut alimony statute.
21. See generally, Comment, Sharing Principles, supra note 12, at 1278-80.
22. Id. at 1283-84, 1303-05.
23. For specific examples that developed later, see, for example, Ohio's statute, which
even in its current form treats both alimony and the distribution of property under the
topic of alimony. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1987).
Three commentators describe the use of property division as support in Massachusetts
before the enactment of equitable distribution provisions. See Inker, Walsh, and Per-
occhi, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory Scheme in Massachusetts,
II Fam. L.Q. 59, 64-65 (1977).
24. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1987); Comment, Sharing
Principles, supra note 12, at 1299-1303.
25. Certain of the separate property states developed well-defined common law doc-
trines for circumventing title theory. See 1 J. McCahey, Valuation and Distribution of
Marital Property § 3.07, at 3-35 (1985), for a description of resulting trust, special equi-
ties, and foregone career opportunities as techniques to avoid the lack of statutory au-
thority to divide property.
26. In community property states, the marital unit acquires property. Divorce
presents the occasion to determine what property belongs to the marriage and to divide it.
If that were all that a statute sought to accomplish, a court need only determine the
property, total its value, and award each spouse a portion. To accomplish this narrow
function of property division, only factors concerning the history of the marriage, such as
length of marriage; contributions during the marriage, both financial and non-financial;
[Vol. 56
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alimony statute would include factors concerning a spouse's need."' The
statutes of most of the community property states, however, always em-
powered their courts to address need at divorce when dividing prop-
erty.28 Instead of considering only length of the marriage and
contributions to and dissipation of assets, these statutes also directed
courts to consider "the conditions in which [the parties] will be left." '29
Unlike the separate property states, the occasion for using property to
address need was the division of the property of the marital unit. By
directing courts to consider future need in dividing the community's
property, however, the community property states, like the separate
property states, recognized the use of property to support a needy spouse.
The divorce reform movement of the 1960's, although largely focused
on the elimination of fault,30 sought to promote the role of property divi-
and dissipation of the assets of the marriage, would be relevant. By reviewing these fac-
tors, a court can determine how much and for how long each spouse had helped acquire
the assets available for division. A court can determine, conversely, whether, and if so, to
what extent, either spouse had dissipated the assets. The future needs of the spouses
would have nothing to do with this determination if a community property state viewed
property division this narrowly.
27. See Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change."
A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983
Wis. L. Rev. 789, 809-10, for a description of the factors on apportionment included in
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (the "UMDA") as factors reflecting either an
"historical assessment of the conduct and characteristics of the marital relationship" or
"the need concept." it at 809. In an analysis of the North Carolina statute, Professor
Sharp characterizes the discretionary factors as need and condition factors, compensatory
factors, and distributional factors. Sharp, The Partnership Idea" The Development of
Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 195, 250-54 (1987).
28. A summary of community property statutes in 1931 reported that most of these
states provided for a "just" division of the community property at divorce. See 2 C.
Vernier, American Family Laws § 96, at 215-23 (1932).
29. See id at 220 (summarizing the Nevada statute).
30. The pernicious role that fault had played in the process of divorce probably made
its elimination a top priority of most reformers. Professor Weitzman describes early re-
form efforts in L. Weitzman, Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic
Consequences for Women and Children in America 16-26 (1985). In 1966, the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws appointed a committee that began work on what eventu-
ally became the UMDA. One of the coreporters on the first committee was Professor
Robert Levy. At an early stage, Professor Levy identified elimination of fault as a central
theme of divorce reform. See R Levy, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation: A
Preliminary Analysis 10 (1967). Since the use of fault grounds had led to widespread
collusion and perjury, the elimination of fault naturally headed many reformers' lists.
See Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath,
56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1987).
Another important goal of reform was to make the laws regulating divorce gender-
neutral. The memorandum supporting the 1980 legislation in New York reflects this
goal: "Purpose of Bil: The bill has basically two purposes: First: to eliminate unconsti-
tutional sex distinctions in child and spousal support statutes by amending related stat-
utes primarily in the domestic relations law and family court act." Memorandum in
Support of Legislation, New York State Assembly (1980) reprinted in Foster, Commen-
tary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 83-84 (198 1) [hereinafter Memo-
randum in Support of Legislation].
Other goals of divorce reform are treated infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
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sion laws to address postdivorce need. The reformers' preference for
property division instead of alimony to address postdivorce need cen-
tered on one feature: the different treatment accorded property division
and alimony in divorce litigation. In many states, courts have the statu-
tory power to modify an award of alimony on proof of a substantial
change of circumstances since the original award.3 If, for example, the
need for support increases significantly, the court has the power to in-
crease the award. A property award, on the other hand, rarely is modifi-
able.3" At times, this wooden distinction between property and alimony
awards ignores a functional identity between the two.33 When property
awards function as support, the need to modify the property award may
arise.34 Nevertheless, commentators involved in the reform movement
apparently assumed that property awards would remain nonmodifiable
and extolled the virtues of property division as the superior means of
making economic adjustments at divorce largely on the basis of its
nonmodifiability.35
31. 2 H. Clark, supra note 17, at 272-73.
32. Id. at 455-56.
33. In the earlier edition of his hornbook, Professor Clark described the problem:
The distinction between payments of alimony and of property with respect to
the courts' power to modify would make sense if the division of property were
in fact just that. None of the policy reasons favoring modification apply to a
division of property. It should be final when made if it seeks only to give each
spouse what is equitably or legally his. The distinction is fictional, however, in
those states where the division of property serves the same function as alimony,
and where the same criteria are used in dividing the property as are used in
establishing the level of alimony. If both types of payment serve the same pur-
pose, both should be modifiable. A fortiori lump sum alimony payable in in-
stallments should be modifiable.
H. Clark, supra note 16, at 455 (footnotes omitted). For his later treatment of this issue,
see 2 H. Clark, supra note 17, at 180-83; see also infra note 339 and accompanying text.
34. Reform left property to perform the support function of alimony without any
provisions for modifiability. See infra notes 335-40 and accompanying text. On at least
two occasions, however, an appellate judge in New York, applying the state's equitable
distribution statute, recognized that an award under its equitable distribution statute
might be modifiable. In O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals held that a medical license could
be marital property that could form the basis of a distributive award. Id. at 586-88, 489
N.E.2d at 717-18, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49. Justice Meyer noted in his concurring opinion
that the distributive award in that case should be subject to revision if the predictions
about the husband's earnings on which the award was based proved inaccurate. Id. at
592, 489 N.E.2d at 720-21, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52 (Meyer, J., concurring).
Also, in Wenzel v. Wenzel, 122 Misc. 2d 1001, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984), the husband
was incarcerated as the result of a conviction for the attempted murder of his wife. The
court awarded all of the marital property to the wife, including the pension earned
through the husband's employment. Id. at 1006-11, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 835-38. The court
provided that the husband could apply for a modification of the distribution of the pen-
sion upon his release from prison. Id. at 1006, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 835. Both of these cases
acknowledge, at least in theory, the modifiability of property awards in equitable
distribution.
35. E.g., Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 Williamette L.J. 413 (1976):
The amalgamation of alimony and property settlement has been promoted by
the desire to constitute divorce so that it brings about a final and definite termi-
[Vol. 56
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The virtues of nonmodifiability have long been recognized.36
Nonmodifiability brings finality at least to one aspect of the relationship,
and ending a source of controversy between the ex-spouses is certainly a
legitimate goal.3 7 Moreover, for psychological reasons, reformers have
favored procedures that end as much contact between the parties as pos-
sible in order to cut the emotional ties and leave the parties free to form
other, more enduring relationships. This goal of finality has obvious fi-
nancial implications as well. Because property awards traditionally have
been nonmodifiable, each spouse knows his or her financial circum-
stances in relation to the property distribution. Confident that those ar-
rangements are not subject to change, each spouse may make financial
plans, plans that might include assuming new family commitments.3 8
Considerations of judicial economy also figure into the preference for
property awards and the failure to recognize that there might be occa-
sions when such awards ought to be modifiable.3 9 The judiciary com-
monly complains that family law litigation absorbs too much time.'
Others, however, point to inequities resulting from speedy, final resolu-
tions to argue that such time investments are necessary."'
In addition to promoting property division to address need, reformers
sought to insure that at divorce both spouses would share in the assets of
nation of the relationship between the parties. As the view that dissolution of a
marriage should clear the way for establishment of a new family gains ground,
the tendency to eliminate as much as possible future obligations between ex-
spouses also increases in strength, and the courts welcome the opportunity to
ease the burden of post-divorce litigation over enforcement or modification of
alimony claims.
Id at 425.
36. E.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 43 Wis. 197, 209 (1877) (because division of estate "is
essentially a complete and permanent provision, in lieu of the transitory provision of
alimony, the statute makes it final by withholding the power of revision over it").
37. See Rheinstein, supra note 35, at 433.
38. See id
39. See id Professor Levy identified another legitimate objective: trying to eliminate
opportunities for the parties to harass each other. See R. Levy, supra note 30, at 159-60.
40. At least one judge, however, has chastized the judiciary for begrudging family
litigation the time it consumes:
One of the paradoxes of our present legal system is that it is accepted practice to
tie up a court for days while a gaggle of professional medical witnesses expound
to ajury on just how devastating or just how trivial a personal injury may be, all
to the personal enrichment of the trial lawyers involved, yet at the same time we
begrudge the judicial resources necessary for careful and reasoned judgments in
this most delicate field-the break up of a marriage with its resulting trauma
and troublesome fiscal aftermath.... The wheels of justice will not come to a
screeching halt if 2 years hence another 15 minutes of valuable court time is
comsumed [sic] in bringing the court up to date on the fiscal condition of the
parties [to the case].
Brantner v. Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 422, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638-39 (1977).
41. Professor Weitzman has concluded that the obsession with speedy resolutions has
led to the forced sales of marital residences when the circumstances obviously warranted
the postponing of the sale out of consideration for the need of a custodial parent to con-
tinue to reside there with the children. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 369.
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the marriage.42 In separate property states, title largely controlled the
disposition of property at divorce.43 Property laws often ignored the con-
tributions made by the nontitled spouse, frequently the wife not em-
ployed outside the home or employed at a lesser income." If the
nonfinancial contributions of the wife were recognized in the acquisition
of property, too often it was only by the grace of the income-earner who
titled the property jointly. The traditional housewife had been a fre-
quent and tragic victim of the separate property regime when the in-
come-earning husband titled the property accumulated during the
marriage only in his name.4 6 Therefore, the reformers urged that contri-
bution as a homemaker be included as a discretionary factor in the divi-
sion of property.47 In this way, the reformers strove to make clear that
nonfinancial contribution was just as important to the marriage as finan-
cial contribution.
Another relevant, but less central, theme of the reformers was the re-
42. As early as 1963, a presidential commission urged that:
[d]uring marriage, each spouse should have a legally defined substantial right in
the earnings of the other, in the real and personal property acquired through
those earnings, and in their management. Such a right should be legally recog-
nized as surviving the marriage in the event of its termination by divorce, annul-
ment, or death.
American Women: Report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women 47
(1963) [hereinafter American Women].
43. See supra note 12 for recognition of inroads into title theory. See also infra note
69 for recognition of the varied development of these inroads in several states.
44. An infamous case illustrating the inequities of the former system is Fischer v.
Wirth, 38 A.D.2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (3d Dep't 1971). In that case, the wife used her
earnings for family expenses while the husband used his earnings to accumulate real and
personal property in his name only. The court found that the wife had no equitable claim
on this property. Id. at 611-612, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 310-11. At the divorce, the court held
that the wife had no legal claim to the savings or to the house. Id. For other references
to the inequities, see Report of the Task Force on Family Law and Policy to the Citizens'
Advisory Council on the Status of Women (1968) [hereinafter Report of the Task Force];
R. Levy, supra note 30, at 165-66. In 1963, an earlier commission recommended that
legislatures change property rules. See American Women, supra note 42 at 47; see also
Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 Tul.
L. Rev. 21, 22 (1974) (reports early movements for legislative reform of separate property
inequities).
45. If only one spouse furnished the financial consideration for the property but
placed title in both names, many separate property jurisdictions relied on a presumption
of gift to recognize the property interests of the nonfurnishing spouse. See, e.g., Mims v.
Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 53, 286 S.E.2d 779, 787-88 (1982); Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 528-
29, 347 A.2d 477, 480-81 (1975).
46. A fascinating account of the divorce reform movement appears in Fineman, supra
note 27. Professor Fineman, however, posits that reform's focus on the traditional house-
wife resulted in legislation that failed to address the circumstances of other victims of
divorce. Id. at 853-67.
47. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's provisions on property
division recognize homemaker contribution as a factor to consider in the division of prop-
erty. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. For the history of the alternative provi-
sions on the division of property, see infra note 396.
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definition of alimony.48 In light of postreform experience,4 9 it is interest-
ing to keep in mind just what the new legislation did with regard to ali-
mony. The most significant statement about alimony made by the
reformers was the introduction of the concept that alimony could be both
rehabilitative and temporary.5" With the introduction of rehabilitative,
temporary alimony,51 the reformers acknowledged the goal of two self-
sufficient spouses upon dissolution. Actual self-sufficiency was not the
case in the majority of dissolving marriages.52 Rather, the available sta-
tistics demonstrated the continuing economic disparities between men
and women and the greater needs of women caused by career sacrifices
and childcare responsibilities. Self-sufficiency, then, was more useful as a
goal than as a reflection of the actual economic position of men and wo-
men at divorce.5" Nevertheless, the legitimacy of self-sufficiency, at least
as a goal, resulted in the addition of the concepts of temporary, rehabili-
tative alimony.
B. Treatment of Property Under the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act: Property Division as the Functional
Equivalent of Alimony
In the 1960's, the divorce reform movement led both the community
property and separate property states to continue to blur the historic dis-
tinction between property division and alimony by recognizing more ex-
plicitly the role of property division to provide support.' Motivated in
48. See generally R. Levy, supra note 30, at 140-64.
49. See infra note 55.
50. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides:
The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time the court
deems just... after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including...
his ability to meet his needs independently, and the extent to which a provision
for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian; [and]
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment ....
Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1973).
51. Certainly in some states the concept of temporary alimony was a new one. See.
e.g., Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1981).
52. See infra notes 364-72 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 364-72 and accompanying text.
54. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 17, at 181-82; R. Levy, supra note 30, at 167-69 (ex-
pressing Professor Levy's concurrence in this observation as he drafted the working man-
uscript for the UMDA).
As Professor Rheinstein has pointed out, the availability of a lump sum award of ali-
mony further blurs the distinction between property and alimony awards. Rheinstein,
supra note 35, at 424. The courts, for example, can redistibute property while purport-
ing to make an award of alimony. Id
This problem of distinguishing between awards of property and alimony has plagued
the interpretation of agreements dividing property and recognizing alimony. See, eg.,
Note, Alimony and Property Settlement Provisions Distinguished in Illinois, 44 Il. L. Rev.
382, 383 (1949).
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part by inadequate alimony awards," the drafters of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (the "UMDA")5 6 continued this blurring pro-
cess.57 Professor Robert Levy, the author of the monograph that
preceded the drafting of the UMDA, suggested that the discretionary
factors for property division should encourage judges to use property to
accommodate need.58 The legislation that took shape both encourages
55. The phenomenon of declining alimony awards, see generally Weitzman & Dixon,
The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 Fam. L.Q. 141 (1980)
(U.S. study); Goodman, Property Law Following Dissolution of Marriage: Is There a Fu-
ture for Judicial Discretion?, 13 Fed. L. Rev. 131, 143 (1982) (Australian study), left some
reformers searching for other ways to provide for postdivorce need. Id. at 137-46. See,
e.g., Rheinstein, supra note 35, at 416-18 (implying that the inadequacy of alimony in
part gave rise to an increased demand for property sharing). For example, in part out of
regard for the inadequacy of alimony, the 1968 Task Force on Family Law and Policy
recommended equitable, instead of equal, division of property at divorce. See Report of
the Task Force, supra note 44, at 5-6. For a discussion of the controversy over the superi-
ority of equal versus equitable distribution, see infra notes 175-90 and 387-95 and accom-
panying text. The Task Force noted that the economic dependency of one spouse might
require an unequal distribution of property to accommodate postdivorce need. See Re-
port of the Task Force, supra note 44, at 5-6.
There was by no means a consensus, however, on the reasons why the Commissioners
included need factors in § 307. Some reformers believed that traditional alimony had
outlived its usefulness. E.g., R. Levy, supra note 30, at 140-47. For these people, reform
of property division was justified for reasons other than as a substitute for alimony. At
least one commentator posited that the inclusion of the need factors reflects an outdated
reference to fault grounds for divorce and that equal distribution of property without
regard to future need should accompany the advent of no-fault divorce. McKnight, Fain-
ily Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 80 & nn.104-06 (1975) (citing McKnight & Raggio, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34 (1972)). But see infra notes 357-61 and
accompanying text (criticizing the linking of no-fault divorce and economic responsibility
after divorce).
56. 9A U.L.A. at 147 (1973). For a history of the committee appointed by the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, see
Foster, Divorce Reform and the Uniform Act, 18 S.D.L. Rev. 572 (1973).
Some furor attended the drafting of the UMDA. For a history of the controversy, see
Zuckman, The ABA Family Law Section v. The NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation and
Forced Reconciliation over the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 Cath. U.L. Rev. 61
(1974). Heaping opprobrium on the Act, Professor Foster gave it a "made in California"
label and charged that the Act relied on sociological materials to the exclusion of legal
analysis. Foster, supra, at 576.
57. R. Levy, supra note 30, at 169. One indication of the completeness of this blur-
ring process appears in the Table of Contents of the Preliminary Analysis. See id. at ii.
The Table lists alimony and property considerations under the single heading, "Property
Arrangements." Id. Likewise, the Commissioners in their note on the final version refer
to agreements that treat both property and maintenance as "property settlement agree-
ments." Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 306 comment, 9A U.L.A. 217 (1973). This no-
menclature ignores the historic distinction between separation agreements and property
settlements. The phrase "separation agreement" historically refers to an agreement that
provided for future support, while "property settlement" provided for the disposition of
property. Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and
the State, 59 N.C.L. Rev. 819, 826 (1981). By entitling an agreement on either topic
"property settlement," the commissioners reflected in yet another way the amalgamation
of property and alimony.
58. See R. Levy, supra note 30, at 167.
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the use of property provision to provide support and promotes property
division as superior to alimony to accomplish this task.
1. Recognition of the Use of Property Division as Support
The reformers urged courts to use property division for support in a
number of ways. 9 First, the drafters of the UMDA incorporated numer-
ous need-related factors to guide judges in division of the available prop-
erty at divorce. For example, section 307(a) of Alternative A of the
UMDA ° lists numerous factors to guide judicial discretion in making
the apportionment of property:
the duration of the marriage, any prior marriage of either party, any
antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupa-
tion, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability,
estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions,
whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance,
and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and
income. The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation
of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreci-
ation in value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse
as a homemaker or to the family unit.6 '
Almost all of these factors look to the postdivorce economic future of
the spouses rather than to the history of the marriage. By focusing on
the future circumstances of the parties, the drafters demonstrated their
desire to accommodate need through the apportionment of property.
The drafters also indicated that property was to perform a support
function by including similar factors in the property division and mainte-
nance statutes. The factors listed in section 307 that focus on the pro-
spective needs of the parties are strikingly similar to those factors listed
in section 308 as appropriate to the determination of the proper amount
59. See, e.g., Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri,
41 Mo. L. Rev. 165, 175-76 (1976) (urging the Missouri judiciary to consider future need
as it divides property).
60. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 307(a) Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1973).
Alternative A of § 307(a) recommends that all property of the spouses, not just the prop-
erty acquired during the marriage, be distributed at divorce: "[iln a proceeding for disso-
lution of a marriage... the court... shall... finally equitably apportion between the
parties the property and assets belonging to either or both however and whenever ac-
quired .. " Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 307(a) Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 238 (1973).
In other words, Alternative A provides for the division of all the property owned at
divorce, not just the acquests of the marriage. See W. McClanahan, supra note 19,
§ 14.2, at 623-25. The term "acquests" refers to property acquired by either spouse by
onerous title or for a consideration. Id at § 2.28, at 39. The term includes property
acquired during the marriage except property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or de-
scent. Id at 622 n.5. The term "nonacquests," then, refers to property either acquired
before the marriage or acquired during the marriage, but only by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent.
For a discussion of the all-property versus acquests controversy, see infra notes 396-98
and accompanying text.
61. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 307(a) Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1973).
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of maintenance.62 This overlap indicates that courts may address future
need either by property division or by an award of maintenance.
2. Superiority of Property Division over Alimony for Support
The drafters of the UMDA63 not only encouraged the use of property
division for support but also promoted it as superior to alimony for ac-
complishing this task. The strongest indicator of the UMDA's prefer-
ence for the division of property lies in the explanation of the relationship
between the property division and maintenance provisions. As the Com-
missioners wrote, "[t]he dual intention of this section [on maintenance]
and Section 307 [on distribution of property] is to encourage the court to
provide for the financial needs of the spouses by property disposition
rather than by an award of maintenance."'
The final version of the UMDA underscores this expressed preference
for property division over maintenance by placing the provision for prop-
erty division before the provision for maintenance.65 In addition, the
provision on maintenance directs that, procedurally, the division of prop-
erty precede any award of maintenance. A court should not order main-
tenance until it determines that "the spouse seeking maintenance...
62. The discretionary factors in § 308 provide for the consideration of the following
factors:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, his ability to meet his needs independently, and
the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party
includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1973); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 61 (containing excerpt from § 307(a)).
63. The drafters of the UMDA were not the only reformers urging the replacement of
alimony with property division. For example, as early as 1968, the Task Force on Family
Law & Policy acknowledged the desirability of eliminating alimony when the dissolving
family had sufficient property to substitute. Report of the Task Force, supra note 44, at 8.
Other reformers recognized that "[t]he economic consequences of divorce depend in large
measure upon the marital property system adopted by a particular state." Foster &
Freed, Marital Property and the Chancellor's Foot, 10 Fam. L. Q. 55, 57 (1976).
The shape of divorce reform in the United States also had foreign counterparts. For
example, the blurring of alimony and property occurred in Great Britain as well. One
commentator welcomed the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act of 1970, which
reformed legislation in Great Britain, in part because it "further [eroded] the distinction
between provisions of income and adjustment of property" and recognized the link be-
tween maintenance and property. Miller, Maintenance and Property, 87 L.Q. Rev. 66, 85
(1971).
64. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 308 comment, 9A U.L.A. 348 (1973).
65. See id. at § 307 Alternatives A and B & § 308, 9A U.L.A. 238-39, 347-48 (1973).
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lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs.""
In sum, the UMDA drafters adopted factors like those used in ali-
mony statutes as guides to the division of property and directed the re-
viewing court to accomplish the purposes of alimony using property
division before turning to the more traditional means. The message of
reform could not have been clearer: property division should perform a
support function and is superior to alimony for this task. Property
should take over the function of alimony when sufficient property exists.
The future needs of an economically dependent spouse should figure
foremost in decisions about the division of property, not only in decisions
about alimony.
C. Recognition in Equitable Distribution Statutes
The reform movement and the influence of the UMDA 67 led separate
property states68 to enact equitable distribution statutes that do not per-
petuate this historic distinction between property division and alimony.69
These statutes usually list factors to guide the court in dividing the avail-
able property. Of the forty equitable distribution statutes in separate
property states and the District of Columbia, twenty-eight include fac-
tors that take into account not only the acquisition of the property but
also the needs of the spouses.7"
66. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1973).
67. Although the UMDA has been adopted in only eight states, it has undeniably
influenced other states. Professor Glendon credits the UMDA for the concept of marital
property, Glendon, supra note 44, at 33-34, a concept that appears in most of the equita-
ble distribution statutes of the separate property states. See infra note 84. For an exam-
ple of the influence of the UMDA on a state that did not adopt it, compare Unif.
Marriage & Div. Act § 307 Alternative B, 9A U.L.A. 239 (1973), with Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981).
68. Some community property states likewise have statutes that authorize the equita-
ble distribution of property at divorce. Because of the different history of separate and
community property states in including need factors in these statutes, supra text accom-
panying notes 21-66, however, this Article focuses only on selected separate property
states.
69. In some separate property states, the enactment of these statutes was the first
authorization for any award of property at divorce other than the recognition of legal or
equitable title. For example, as Professor Sharp points out in an analysis of the North
Carolina statute and cases, North Carolina law reflected pure title theory probably more
clearly than any other state. Sharp, supra note 27, at 196-97. In other states, the passage
of equitable distribution statutes did not work so dramatic a change. Cf Scheible, Mari-
tal Property in Tennessee: An Evolution, Not a Revolution, 15 Mem. St. U.L Rev. 475,
553 (1985); Note, Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Florida's Need for
an Equitable Distribution Statute, 8 Nova L.J. 71, 72 (1983). In all the separate property
states, equitable distribution statutes encompassed the most significant property interests
attaching by virtue of the marriage. Professor Prager characterizes the enactment of stat-
utes with the property division schemes of the UMDA as the recognition of a "sharing-
based" philosophy of marital property. Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Mar-
ital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (1977).
70. The citations in this Article reflect statutes published as of October, 1987. The
citations to the property division statutes which contain the discretionary factors relating
to need are as follows: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (Cum. Supp. 1985); Colo. Rev. Stat.
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These statutes address need by requiring consideration of factors such
as age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, voca-
tional skills, and the like.7' While these statutes also include non-need
factors, primarily contribution, as appropriate to the property division,
they emphasize the need factors.72 Moreover, many of these statutes,
such as the UMDA, promote property division as superior to alimony for
support by directing that property division precede and supplant the ali-
mony award wherever possible.73 In many of the states that do not ad-
§ 14-10-113 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81 (West 1986);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 1513 (1981); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-910 (1981); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 580-47 (1985); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, para. 503 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1987); Ind.
Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 598.21 (West
1981 & Cum. Supp. 1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1610 (1983 & Supp. 1986); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 403.190 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1987); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
19, § 722-A (1981 & Supp. 1987); Md. Fain. Law Code Ann. § 8-205 (1984 & Cum.
Supp. 1987); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208 § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1988);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.58 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1988); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 452.330
(Vernon 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202 (1987); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B
(McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3105.18 (An-
derson Supp. 1987); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 401 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-7-472 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (Supp. 1987);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 751 (Cum. Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp.
1987); W. Va. Code § 48-2-32 (1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981); Wyo. Stat.
§ 20-2-114 (1987).
71. These factors will be referred to in this Article as the need factors.
72. See infra note 84.
73. For example, the Montana property legislation provides that "[i]n making appor-
tionment, the court shall consider ... whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in
addition to maintenance." Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202 (1) (1987). The maintenance
statute provides that "the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it
finds that the spouse seeking maintenance... lacks sufficient property to provide for his
reasonable needs." Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-203(1)(a) (1987). Likewise, the Connecticut
alimony statute directs the court to consider "the award, if any, which the court may
make pursuant to [the property division statute]." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-82
(West 1986).
The New York maintenance statute directs the court considering maintenance to pay
attention to "whether the party in whose favor maintenance is granted lacks sufficient
property and income to provide for his or her reasonable needs" and to "the income and
property of the respective parties including marital property distributed pursuant to [the
property division statute]." N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(6) (McKinney 1986). The
memorandum from Governor Hugh L. Carey regarding the New York legislation recog-
nizes this preference for property division. In it, Governor Carey observed that the legis-
lation directed that "[u]pon [a marriage's] dissolution, property accumulated during the
marriage should be distributed in a manner which reflects the individual needs and cir-
cumstances of the parties." Memorandum Filed with Assembly Bill Number 6200-A, at
608, Executive Chamber, State of New York (June 22, 1980). This observation explicitly
recognizes the use of property to address need. Other material accompanying the legisla-
tion, however, contains observations that subtly undercut this use of property. In the
supporting memorandum, for example, the drafters observed that "[u]pon the dissolution
of a marriage there should be an equitable distribution of all family assets accumulated
during the marriage and maintenance should rest on the economic basis of reasonable
needs and the ability to pay." Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 30, at
11. This isolation of the functions of property division and maintenance undermines the
recognition of their functional identity. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
The influence of this preference for property division to satisfy need also appears proce-
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dress statutorily the interplay of property and alimony, case law has
partially filled the void and directs the same outcome.74 These responses
to reform suggest widespread concurrence in the notion that property
division should support needy spouses and that property division is pref-
erable to alimony in performing this function." Neither the drafters of
the UMDA nor other reformers detailed how property division would
provide support,7 6 but the inclusion of need factors in property division
statutes certainly underscored that it should.
The enactment in separate property states of property division statutes
containing need factors should have lessened postdivorce need. Divorce
reform, however, has left this goal unfulfilled. Despite the number of
separate property states that have statutes that direct their courts to con-
sider need in dividing property, courts appear unwilling to use these dis-
cretionary factors.7 7 Instead, the traditional distinction between
property division and alimony persists.7" By ignoring the factors relating
to need, courts continue to unscramble ownership in property division
and address need, if at all, only through awards of alimony."9 Indeed, a
durally in the statutes of some states that direct the court to award property without
regard to alimony and to consider in a subsequent proceeding whether the property
award warrants a change in the prior alimony award. The North Carolina statute, for
example, directs the court to make the equitable distribution of property "without regard
to alimony .... After the determination of an equitable distribution, the court, upon
request of either party, shall consider whether an order for alimony or child support
should be modified or vacated .... N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20() (1987). Subsection (f)
lends support to the use of property to accomplish all the economic goals of the state; the
property award determines the existence and extent of the alimony award. This provision
has been interpreted to mean that the court must divide property without regard to ali-
mony, reevaluating the alimony award, if necessary, in light of the distribution of prop-
erty, McIntosh v. McIntosh, 74 N.C. App. 554, 556, 328 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1985), and that
if the court is considering a motion for both alimony and property distribution, the court
must first divide the property. Talent v. Talent, 76 N.C. App. 545, 556, 334 S.E.2d 256,
263 (1985).
74. For example, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 584-86, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716,
498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1985), the court recognized that the purpose of equitable distri-
bution is to eliminate economic dependence. In this way, the court recognized property's
support function. See also Spadaro v. New York City Police Dept. Pension Serv., 115
Misc. 2d 494, 497, 454 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (1982) (like New Jersey's statute, New York's
statute recognizes that the division of assets is preferable to maintenance).
75. The inclusion of the need factors has prompted one observer to describe the ac-
commodation of future needs as a primary goal in many equitable distribution states.
Golden, supra note 12, § 8.20, at 268. Also, in Professor Foster's explication of the new
act, he predicted that factors focusing on need-duration of marriage, age, and health-
would be dominant factors in long marriages or marriages involving the elderly or dis-
abled. See Foster, supra note 51, at 34. Experience has not borne out this prediction on
the division of property.
76. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 144 for cases from this study in which the disposition left one of the
parties, usually the wife, in need.
78. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
79. Alimony awards probably have never been as significant in numbers of recipients
or amount received as the public has perceived them to be. See generally Weitzman &
Dixon, supra note 55. For some explanations for the myth, see B. Babcock, A. Freed-
man, E. Norton, & S. Ross, Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies 693
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
number of studies conclude that whether by inadequate property or ali-
mony awards, courts are failing to address need.8 0 With the recognition
of growing postdivorce need in mind, this Article examines the use of the
need factors in dividing property in selected separate property states.
II. STUDY OF THE NEED FACTORS IN PROPERTY DIVISION
STATUTES: THE CONTINUED DISTINCTION OF PROPERTY
DIVISION AND ALIMONY
A. Equitable Distribution Statutes Most Clearly
Reflecting Need Factors
The first step in this study was selecting states on which to focus. In
order to evaluate the use of the need factors contained in property divi-
sion statutes, the study narrowed the field to those states that include the
most factors addressing postdivorce need in their property division stat-
utes. A comparison found eighteen states similar in their depth of atten-
tion to need, or to the postdivorce circumstances of the spouses. 8I These
(1975). Nevertheless, studies of alimony reveal declining awards. For example, Professor
Weitzman's study of divorce in California revealed a decline in alimony from 20% to
15% in the short period from 1968 to 1972. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 167. No-
fault divorce went into effiect in California in 1970. Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608,
1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3323-25. These numbers assume even more significance when one
realizes that there has also been a shift from permanent awards to transitional awards.
By 1977, two-thirds of the alimony awards in the study were transitional, limited awards.
The average duration of these awards was only two years. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at
164-65. The group of people that experienced the most decline in alimony awards after
no-fault legislation was divorcing mothers with custody of preschool children. Id. at 186.
This pattern has repeated itself in every study. An earlier study had reported an even
greater drop in another county in California-50% between 1968 and 1976. Seal, A Dec-
ade of No-Fault Divorce: What It Has Meant Financially for Women in California, 1
Fam. Advoc. No. 4, 10, 11-12 (1979). Across the country, a study in Vermont reported a
decline in alimony awards so that between 1982 and 1983, only 7% of divorced persons
received alimony awards. Wishik, Economics Of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 Faro.
L.Q. 79, 85 (1986). Only 2% of those divorced persons received awards of unlimited
duration. Id. Likewise, in the Midwest, another study reported that alimony awards in
Ohio declined from 20% in 1965 to 16% in 1978. McGraw, Stern & Davis, A Case
Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 J. Fam. L. 443, 473 (1981-82). The
authors of this study, however, did not find a causal relationship between no-fault divorce
and declining alimony awards. Id. at 473.
80. See, eg., McGraw, Sterin & Davis, supra note 79, at 476 (study in Ohio);
McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and
Children, 21 Fam. L.Q. 351, 404-05 (1987) (study in New Haven, Connecticut); Seal,
supra note 79, at 13 (earlier study of the effect of no-fault legislation in California);
Wishik, supra note 79, at 100 (study in Vermont). See generally L. Weitzman, supra note
30, at 323-56 (comprehensive study focusing on California records but with clear national
implications).
81. For a discussion of statutory factors that address need, see infra note 84. For a
list of the statutes of the twenty-eight jurisdictions that recognize need as appropriate to
decisions on dividing property at divorce, see supra note 70. From those twenty-eight
jurisdictions, the following jurisdictions paid the most statutory attention to need in their
property division statutes: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
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eighteen states listed in their property division statutes all the factors
traditionally appearing in alimony statutes-factors like age, health, in-
come-as bases for dividing property. 2
The study further narrowed the universe of eighteen states to derive a
manageable sample.8 3 The study focused on six of these eighteen
states-Arkansas, Connecticut, Montana, New York, North Carolina,
and Wisconsinu4 -for several reasons. Three of these six states-Arkan-
sas, North Carolina, and Wisconsin-are equitable distribution states
82. See infra note 84.
83. Because of the enormity of the task of conducting a comprehensive study of the
relevant case law in eighteen states, the focus of this study had to be narrowed. The six
states in the study were chosen, in part, because each has a body of case law that is
comprehensive but not so vast as to preclude a study of all relevant cases. The author
believes that this and other criteria, see text accompanying notes 84-93, used to select the
six states make the chosen sample a representative one.
84. The following are the relevant portions of the property division statutes from the
six states in this study. The need factors are highlighted:
Arkansas
(A) At the time a divorce decree is entered:
(1) All marital property shall be distributed one-half (1/2) to each party
unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable, in which event the court
shall make some other division that the court deems equitable taking into con-
sideration (1) the length of the marriage; (2) age. health, and station in life of
the parties; (3) occupation of the parties; (4) amount and sources of income;
(5) vocational skills; (6) employability; (7) estate, liabilities, and needs of each
party and opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income;
(8) contribution of each party in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of
marital property, including services as a homemaker, and (9) the federal in-
come tax consequences of the Court's division of property. When property is
divided pursuant to the foregoing considerations the court must state its basis
and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally between the parties
and such basis and reasons should be recited in the order entered in said matter.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
Connecticut
In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the
court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in
subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the
causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the
age. health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportu-
nity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall
also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preserva-
tion or appreciation in value of their respective estates.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986) (emphasis added).
Montana
In making apportionment, the court shall consider the duration of the marriage
and prior marriage of either party; the age health, station, occupation, amount
and sources of income, vocational skills employability, estate liabilities, and
needs of each of the parties; custodial provisions; whether the apportionment is in
lieu of or in addition to maintenance," and the opportunity of each for future
acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the con-
tribution or dissipation of value of the respective estates and the contribution of
a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit.




In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the
court shall consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the
time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to
use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage
as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, includ-
ing joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, par-
ent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the
other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability
of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference
by the other party;
(10) the tax consequences to each party;
(11) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(12) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial
action without fair consideration;
(13) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d) (McKinney 1986) (emphasis added).
North Carolina
There shall be an equal division by using net value of marital property unless
the court determines that an equal division is not equitable. If the court deter-
mines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide the marital
property equitably. Factors the court shall consider under this subsection are
as follows:
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of
property is to become effective;
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage;
(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of
both parties;
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to
occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;
(5) The expectation of nonvested pension, retirement, or other deferred com-
pensation rights, which is separate property;
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, includ-
ing joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof,
as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker;
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or
develop the career potential of the other spouse;
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which
occurs during the course of the marriage;
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a busi-
ness, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such
asset or interest, intact and free from any claim or interference by the other
party;
(11) The tax consequences to each party;
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that follow a statutory presumption of equal division. 5 These states
(1 la) Acts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or expand; or to
waste, neglect, devalue or convert such marital property, during the period after
separation of the parties and before the time of distribution; and
(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 (c)(1987) (emphasis added).
W/isconsin
The court shall presume that all ...property [other than acquests] is to be
divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without re-
gard to marital misconduct after considering:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(2r) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to division by
the court.
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate eco-
nomic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care
services.
(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earn-
ing power of the other.
(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational background,
training, employment skills, work experience length of absence from the job mar-
ket, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-support-
ing at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the
marriage.
(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for
a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
(8) The amount and duration of an order under t 76Z26 granting mainte-
nance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support payments
under s. 76Z261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such payments.
(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits,
vested or unvested, and future interests.
(10) The tax consequences to each party.
(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage
concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be
binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where
the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall
presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to
be relevant.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981) (emphasis added).
85. The Arkansas statute provides: "All marital property shall be distributed one-
half (1/2) to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable ....
When property is divided pursuant to the foregoing considerations the court must state
its basis and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally.. . ." Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 34-1214(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
The North Carolina statute provides: "There shall be an equal division by using net
value of marital property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equita-
ble." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (1987).
The Wisconsin statute provides:
Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during
the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have
been paid for by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property
of such party and may not be subjected to a property division under this section
except upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship
on the other party or on the children of the marriage, and in that event the
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were chosen in part to form a basis for comparison of the effect of a
presumption of equal distribution with the effect of authority to make an
equitable distribution of property.
A number of factors figured into the selection of the other three states.
Montana adopted the UMDA in 197686 and therefore provides a com-
parison of several years' experience under the UMDA with more recent
enactments of nonUMDA jurisdictions. The study included a UMDA
state not only because the legislative commentary on the UMDA is com-
plete, but also because the UMDA most clearly articulates the legislative
philosophy behind the relationship between division of property and ali-
mony.87 New York, because of the numbers of cases reaching the courts
of that state, provides a useful basis to assess the use of the need factors
under a more recent enactment."8 Finally, Connecticut remains one of
the few states that considers traditional marital fault as a basis for mak-
ing the property determination.89 This feature of Connecticut's statute
urged its inclusion.
The property statutes from these six states include as many factors
relating to future need as those of any state.9" By including factors such
as age, health, and income, these states show as much concern that prop-
erty division alleviate postdivorce economic burdens as that shown by
the statutes of any state.91 Therefore, one would expect to find in these
states as much use of property division to accommodate postdivorce need
as in any state with a property division statute.
Because the statutes of these states, like the other twelve states fully
incorporating need factors into their property division statutes, reflect a
concern for postdivorce need, one would expect to find awards in these
states deviating from equal divisions of property in favor of the more
court may divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable manner. The
court shall presume that all other property is to be divided equally between the
parties ....
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981).
Wisconsin's statute explicitly authorizes the court to consider the discretionary factors
in deciding whether to alter the equal division. See supra note 84. Even without explicit
statutory authorization, however, the courts use the discretionary factors in equal divi-
sion states to decide whether to honor the presumption. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 314
N.C. 80, 88, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985); see also Sharp, supra note 27, at 245.
86. Montana's version of the UMDA became effective January 1, 1976. Ch. 536,
§ 46, 1975 Mont. Laws 1514, 1533.
87. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
88. New York enacted its statute in 1980. 1980 N.Y. Laws, ch. 281 (eff. June 19,
1980). The most recent equitable distribution statute of any other state was enacted in
South Carolina in 1986. 1986 South Carolina Acts No. 522 § 1.
89. The Connecticut statute allows the court in making the property division to con-
sider "the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation."
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986). For a tabulation of statutes and refer-
ences to fault in property division, see 1987 Overview, supra note 13, at 483.
90. Compare, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-05-24 (1981) with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-
1214(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985) and Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986).
91. Compare, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.105 (1984) with Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-
202(a) (1987) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (1987).
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needy spouse. After all, the primary legislative reason to opt for equita-
ble, rather than equal, division is to reserve discretion to divide the prop-
erty unequally in the face of meritorious facts. Indeed, some of the
lobbyists for equitable division argued that the most compelling facts jus-
tifying unequal division of property were the disparate economic posi-
tions of men and women at divorce and the greater need of women.92
The legislatures of the states in this study opted for equitable, as opposed
to equal, distribution.93 Just as important, these states recognized need
as a factor to be weighed when dividing the property. For all these rea-
sons, one would expect to find deviations from equal divisions to address
need as much in these states as in any of the eighteen states that fully
address need in their property division statutes.
B. Cases Construed Under these Statutes
With the sample group thus defined, the study then canvassed the re-
ported cases of the six states94 and examined selected cases to determine
92. For example, the Task Force on Family Law and Policy recommended equitable,
instead of equal, distribution in its 1968 report based, in part, on the greater need of
women at divorce. Report of the Task Force, supra note 44, at 5-6. Acknowledging the
recommendation of the Task Force, the drafters of the UMDA recommended equitable
distribution, with Professor R. Levy noting that, "ilt seems clear that the time is not yet
ripe to insist upon a '50-50 formula.'" R. Levy, supra note 30, at 167.
Likewise, some of the women's groups in Pennsylvania that lobbied for equitable distri-
bution considered that equitable distribution would enable wives to receive property
awards of greater than half the property available for distribution when warranted.
Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 Farn. L.Q. 229, 230 (1981).
93. The six states in the study opted for equitable distribution. Three of the states-
Arkansas, North Carolina, and Wisconsin-however, enacted presumptions of equal di-
vision. See supra note 85. All six states, however, recognized need as appropriate to
consider in deciding how to divide the property. See supra note 84. Therefore, equal
presumption states should deviate from equal division just as states without the presump-
tion, simply on fewer occasions.
94. Except for the few reported lower court opinions from New York, the study relies
on appellate opinions, fully recognizing their limitations. As commentators have ob-
served, reliance on appellate cases is sometimes misleading because appealed cases gener-
ally involve persons in above average socioeconomic statuses. Eg., B. Babcock, A.
Freedman, E. Norton, & S. Ross, supra note 79, at 693. The goal of this study, however,
is to determine what philosophy, if any, these jurisdictions have developed for the use of
the need factors. For that purpose, the analyses in the appellate opinions are instructive
because appellate opinions, rather than trial court opinions, are more likely to contain an
explanation of the state's philosophy on a given topic.
Moreover, several features of appealed cases make focus on these cases a more efficient
measure of the use of the need factors. First, if courts are using the need factors, that use
should appear among appealed cases because they tend to involve more assets than are
involved in the average divorce. Iad When a court is faced with the difficult task of
dividing few assets, it is troubling but perhaps not surprising to find that the court does
not analyze carefully whether the division comports with the philosophy embodied in the
property division statute. Id When property holdings are scarce, judges may be more
likely to conclude that there is little the award can do to alleviate need and therefore do
not even make the attempt. Accordingly, courts trying to divide meager holdings might
rely on equal divisions or other formulas without analyzing the various goals of the prop-
erty division statute. See e.g., Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Caro-
lina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 247, 271 (1983) (warning that a narrow
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how the need factors fared in states that gave the most statutory atten-
tion to need in property division.95 The study included 138 cases and
fifty-five cumulate years of experience with the need factors in the six
states of this study.9 6 For statistical purposes, the study defined three
categories of cases according to their dispositions of property: 97 cases in
which either the lower or reviewing court addressed need98 and relied
classification of property available for distributuion thwarts some of the legislative goals
behind equitable distribution statutes). Because the appealed cases involve more assets,
however, one legitimately can have higher expectations of judicial respect for the statu-
tory policy.
A second reason that use of the need factors should surface among the appealed cases,
if at all, involves the nature of the facts of appealed cases. The appealed cases involve
contested suits in which at least one of the parties thinks that the facts are compelling
enough to warrant reversal. Since the facts tend to be unusual, one can legitimately ex-
pect to find more dispositions departing from the norm among the appealed cases. For
both these reasons-the greater assets involved and the unusual facts of the cases-one
should find a higher instance of courts heeding the statutory directives in the appealed
cases, rather than in cases stipulated or otherwise not appealed. One would expect the
inattention to be even greater among stipulated cases or cases with insufficient property
or with factors too commonplace to warrant an appeal.
As the results of this study show, however, courts pay little attention to need, even
among the appealed cases. Moreover, as this study shows, the reviewing courts provide
little encouragement to use these discretionary factors. See infra note 144. Therefore,
there is no reason to believe that the lower courts will start to use the need factors with-
out some impetus-either in the form of legislative action or direction from the reviewing
courts. See infra notes 410, 411 and accompanying text.
95. Several criteria guided the selection of cases for this part ofthe study. The study
examined reported cases and analyzed attention to need as demonstrated by the lower
court and recorded in the reviewing court's opinion, or as reflected only by the reviewing
court's analysis. For this part of the study, the tabulations include only those cases in
which the division of property was in issue. This factor excluded cases in which the only
issues were the classification or valuation of the property.
Another factor that excluded a number of cases was the requirement that the case
report sufficient facts to enable a determination of whether the parties had disparate fi-
nancial circumstances. Since one tabulation involved the conclusion that the division left
one of the parties in need, the study analyzed a case for use in these tabulations only if the
reported case recited sufficient facts to draw a conclusion.
96. The study included cases reported in the 6 states through June, 1987. Of the
universe of cases, 138 met the requirements of this study. See supra notes 94-95. The
figure of 55 years is derived from a tally of the years between 1987 and the effective date
of the need factors in each of the 6 states in the study. The Arkansas factors went into
effect in 1979, No. 705, 1979 Ark. Acts 1552, 1557; the Connecticut factors in 1973, No.
373, Preface, 1973 Conn. Act 677 (Reg. Sess.); the Montana factors in 1976, ch. 536,
§ 46, 1975 Mont. Laws 1533; the New York factors in 1980, ch. 281, § 9, 1980 N.Y.
Laws 1227-32; the North Carolina factors in 1981, ch. 815, § 7, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws
1186; and the Wisconsin factors in 1978, ch. 105, § 62, 1977 Wis. Laws 579.
97. The study determined the categories by the disposition in the reported case. A
number of these cases involved remands by the reviewing court. They nevertheless were
included as long as the reason for the remand did not involve an issue that questioned the
propriety of the proportionate division of property.
98. The study defines "addressing need" as either (1) affirming an unequal division of
the available property or an award of nonacquests in favor of the economically weaker
spouse; (2) reversing or modifying an award of greater than one-half the available prop-
erty for the economically stronger spouse; (3) or reversing or modifying an equal division
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primarily on one or more of the need factors;9 9 cases in which the lower
or reviewing court addressed need but relied primarily on other fac-
tors;l °° and cases in which the disposition left a party in need.tOt The
following sections analyze the cases in these categories and confirm the
of property so as to favor the economically weaker spouse. For a definition of the term
"acquests," see supra note 60.
This definition of "addressing need" warrants several explanations. The study relies on
the court's determination of property available for distribution to categorize a division as
equal or unequal. For example, if the court categorized property as nonmarital even
though part of the property debt was reduced with marital funds, that property is not
"available" property for the purposes of this study. See, e.g., Bagwell v. Bagwell, 282
Ark. 403, 404, 668 S.W.2d 949, 951 (1984).
Also, for the purposes of these tabulations, the study defines an equal division of prop-
erty as an award of 41%-59% of the available property. An unequal division of property,
then, was an award of 60% or greater of the available property. Other studies likewise
define equal and unequal divisions of property. See e.g., Wishik, supra note 79, at 90.
For a number of reasons, the study does not include a delayed sale of the marital home
as a disposition "addressing need." First, the study treats the relationship of property
division and alimony and therefore focuses on spousal need in the division of property. A
delayed sale of the marital home is almost always justified because of the needs of chil-
dren. See, e.g., Damiano v. Damiano, 94 A.D.2d 132, 135,463 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (1983).
Second, the delayed sale of the home recognizes only the right of possession and in that
sense is not a division of property. See id, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 479 (holding that home is to
be divided when the youngest child reaches 21). Moreover, the instances of delayed sale
of the home were not frequent enough to be statistically significant.
99. In assessing reliance on the need factors, the study includes cases in which the
reviewing court noted the lower court's reliance on these factors and those in which the
reviewing court independently referred to those factors. See infra note 103.
100. In assessing the failure to rely on the need factors, the study includes those cases
in which the reviewing court failed to note the lower court's reliance on these factors or
failed to make its own reference to those factors. See infra note 129.
101. The conclusion that the property division left one party in need involved a
number of considerations. For example, the study found a spouse "in need" if, from the
reported facts, there appeared to be a significant difference between the financial circum-
stances of the two. See, eg., Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 7, 495 A.2d 704, 708 (1985) (court
recognized the disparity in incomes between the husband and wife); Benjamin v. Benja-
min, 189 Mont. 158, 159, 615 P.2d 218, 219 (1980) (facts revealed husband's earnings
were twice those of wife). The spouse with fewer economic resources was considered the
spouse in need. In most cases, the source of the conclusion was the difference in the
postdivorce earnings of the two. The study looks at the kind of work in which each
spouse was engaged during the marriage and at the time of divorce to draw conclusions
about disparities between incomes. For example, in Oster v. Oster, 186 Mont. 160, 606
P.2d 1075 (1980), the husband ran a family farm, and the wife had been a homemaker
and had cared for the children. See 606 P.2d at 1076. In addition, at least according to
her evidence, the wife had also assisted in some of the duties on the farm. The order at
divorce enabled the husband to retain the ranch, paying the wife 9.135% of the value of
the marital assets. See 606 P.2d at 1077. The study concluded that the wife was left in
need because the facts indicated that she had not developed any skills during the mar-
riage.
The conclusion that one spouse was left in need does not take into account any award
of alimony. Any attempt to address the disparity through alimony is irrelevant to this
thesis. Part of the thesis of this Article is that divorce reform promoted property division
as the preferable method of making economic adjustments at divorce. See supra notes 30,
31-41, 42-53 and accompanying text. The surveyed states, by including need-based fac-
tors in their property division statutes, reflect this philosophy. See supra notes 67-80 and
accompanying text. Therefore, the study's conclusion that one spouse was left in need by
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hypothesis that courts have failed to use property division to address
postdivorce need, despite legislative indication to do so.
1. Cases Reflecting a Reliance on the Need Factors
in Property Division
The first category contains cases that addressed need and revealed a
reliance, at least in part, on need factors to support the disposition. 102 In
these cases, the need of one of the spouses, rather than contribution or
some other non-need factor, supported the disposition. As the presence
of cases in this category reveals, some courts on occasion do address need
by relying on one or more of the relevant discretionary factors. The
study's most significant tabulation, however, is the number of these cases.
In only thirty-four of the one-hundred-thirty-eight surveyed cases did the
lower or reviewing court address need and make its disposition on that
basis. 103 Moreover, one state-Montana-accounted for twenty-one of
the property division rests on the fact that a court did not address the economic disparity
by an award of property.
Another consideration is important in this tabulation. The cases in which one spouse
was left in need are not necessarily cases in which the lower and reviewing courts inap-
propriately failed to accommodate the economic disparity. For instance, in a few cases,
the division appeared to rest almost exclusively on the short duration of the marriage. In
some of these cases, perhaps even with greater attention to need the court would have
divided the property in the same way. However, since the study examines the inattention
to the need factors, it includes all cases in which one party appears to have greater need
which the division of property failed to address.
102. See supra notes 98-99.
103. In the following cases the courts addressed need and based their decisions on one
or more of the need factors:
Arkansas: Cantrell v. Cantrell, 10 Ark. App. 357, 664 S.W.2d 493 (1984).
Connecticut: Krause v. Krause, 189 Conn. 570, 456 A.2d 1204 (1983); Tutalo v.
Tutalo, 187 Conn. 249, 445 A.2d 598 (1982); McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 440
A.2d 274 (1982); Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 440 A.2d 878 (1981); Lombardi v.
Lombardi, 5 Conn. App. 147, 497 A.2d 52 (1985); Fisher v. Fisher, 4 Conn. App. 97, 492
A.2d 525 (1985).
Montana: Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279 (Mont. 1986); In re Marriage of Childers,
700 P.2d 594 (Mont. 1985); In re Marriage of King, 700 P.2d 591 (Mont. 1985); Vance v.
Vance, 204 Mont. 267, 664 P.2d 907 (1983); Schultz v. Schultz, 203 Mont. 473, 662 P.2d
286 (1983); Wallace v. Wallace, 203 Mont. 255, 661 P.2d 455 (1983); Kowis v. Kowis,
202 Mont. 371, 658 P.2d 1084 (1983); In re Marriage of Gauthier, 201 Mont. 320, 654
P.2d 517 (1982); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 200 Mont. 178, 651 P.2d 29 (1982); Hecht v.
Hecht, 199 Mont. 363, 649 P.2d 1257 (1982); Cranmore v. Cranmore, 199 Mont. 283,
649 P.2d 441 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 198 Mont. 51, 643 P.2d 604 (1982); Lupo v. Lupo,
197 Mont. 290, 642 P.2d 1056 (1982); Creon v. Creon, 195 Mont. 254, 635 P.2d 1308
(1981); In re Marriage of Jensen, 631 P.2d 700 (Mont. 1981); Tefft v. Tefft, 628 P.2d 1094
(Mont. 1981); Karr v. Karr, 628 P.2d 267 (Mont. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 625 P.2d 1159 (Mont. 1981); Smith v. Smith, 622 P.2d
1022 (Mont. 1981); Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 603 P.2d 259 (1979); In re Marriage
of Berthiaume, 173 Mont. 421, 567 P.2d 1388 (1977).
New York- Erdheim v. Erdheim, 119 A.D.2d 623, 501 N.Y.S.2d 77, appeal denied, 68
N.Y.2d 607, 498 N.E.2d 433, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1986); Cunningham v. Cunningham,
105 A.D.2d 997, 482 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1984).
North Carolina: Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App. 353, 352 S.E.2d 869 (1987); Bradley v.
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these cases, while the other thirteen are distributed among the remaining
five states.
In twenty-nine of these cases, the reviewing court merely affirmed an
award addressing need on the basis of the need factors. " The reviewing
court rarely reversed a lower court in order to make a division based on
the need factors. Only five of those cases included in this category '05
involved a reviewing court reversing or modifying the decision of the
lower court because of inadequate attention to these discretionary fac-
tors. Four of the cases come from Montana;1 06 the other, from Connecti-
cut.107 In only one of those five cases did the disposition by the reviewing
court indicate that the revised award should grant more than half the
available property to the more needy spouse.10 8 In this case, from Mon-
tana, the appellate court remanded to the trial court and, in effect, or-
dered an unequal division of property for the wife after noting the
disparity between the wife's and husband's abilities to earn income."
In light of the number of equitable distribution cases reaching the ap-
Bradley, 78 N.C. App. 150, 336 S.E.2d 658 (1985); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 76 N.C. App.
391, 333 S.E.2d 312 (1985).
Wisconsin: Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 342 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
104. Arkansas: Cantrell v. Cantrell, 10 Ark. App. 357, 664 S.W.2d 493 (1984).
Connecticut Krause v. Krause, 189 Conn. 570, 456 A.2d 1204 (1983); Tutalo v.
Tutalo, 187 Conn. 249, 445 A.2d 598 (1982); Venuti v. Venuti, 185 Conn. 156, 440 A.2d
878 (1981); Lombardi v. Lombardi, 5 Conn. App. 147, 497 A.2d 52 (1985); Fisher v.
Fisher, 4 Conn. App. 97, 492 A.2d 525 (1985).
Montana: Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279 (Mont. 1986); In re Marriage of Childers,
700 P.2d 594 (Mont. 1985); In re Marriage of King, 700 P.2d 591 (Mont. 1985); Vance v.
Vance, 204 Mont. 267, 664 P.2d 907 (1983); Schultz v. Schultz, 203 Mont. 473, 662 P.2d
286 (1983); Wallace v. Wallace, 203 Mont. 255, 661 P.2d 455 (1983); Kowis v. Kowis,
202 Mont 371, 658 P.2d 1084 (1983); In re Marriage of Gauthier, 201 Mont. 320, 654
P.2d 517 (1982); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 200 Mont. 178, 651 P.2d 29 (1982); Hecht v.
Hecht, 199 Mont. 363, 649 P.2d 1257 (1982); Cranmore v. Cranmore, 199 Mont. 283,
649 P.2d 441 (1982); Lupo v. Lupo, 197 Mont. 290, 642 P.2d 1056 (1982); Creon v.
Creon, 195 Mont. 254, 635 P.2d 1308 (1981); In re Marriage of Jensen, 631 P.2d 700
(Mont. 1981); Karr v. Karr, 628 P.2d 267 (Mont. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 625 P.2d 1159 (Mont. 1981); Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont.
418, 603 P.2d 259 (1979).
New York- Erdheim v. Erdheim, 119 A.D.2d 623, 501 N.Y.S.2d 77, appeal denied, 68
N.Y.2d 607, 498 N.E.2d 433, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1986); Cunningham v. Cunningham,
105 A.D.2d 997, 482 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1984).
North Carolina: Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App. 353, 352 S.E.2d 869 (1987); Bradley v.
Bradley, 78 N.C. App. 150, 336 S.E.2d 658 (1985); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 76 N.C. App.
391, 333 S.E.2d 312 (1985).
FWsconsin: Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 342 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
105. Connecticut: McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 440 A.2d 274 (1982); Montana:
Lewis v. Lewis, 198 Mont. 51, 643 P.2d 604 (1982); Tetft v. Tefft, 628 P.2d 1094 (Mont.
1981); Smith v. Smith, 622 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1981); In re Marriage of Berthiaume, 173
Mont. 421, 567 P.2d 1388 (1977).
106. Lewis v. Lewis, 198 Mont. 51, 643 P.2d 604 (1982); Tefft v. Teift, 628 P.2d 1094
(Mont. 1981); Smith v. Smith, 622 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1981); In re Marriage of
Berthiaume, 173 Mont. 421, 567 P.2d 1388 (1977).
107. McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 440 A.2d 274 (1982).
108. Smith v. Smith, 622 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1981).
109. Id. at 1024.
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pellate courts in these six states, the figures are telling.110 The factors
relating to need-age, health, income, vocational skills, and the like-
figured in dispositions that addressed need in only thirty-four cases of the
hundreds of cases in each of these states. These numbers confirm that
courts are not using property division to address disparities between the
spouses that leave them in unequal financial positions at divorce.
a. Circumstances for Recognition of Need
Even more significant than the numbers are the circumstances in
which the reviewing courts found it appropriate to refer to the factors
relating to need.111 Analysis of the cases reveals that a simple disparity
in the economic circumstances of the two parties rarely suffices for a
property disposition that recognizes that disparity.112 Unless the dispar-
ity is the product of extraordinary circumstances, the courts appear re-
luctant to base an award of greater than half the property or an award of
nonmarital property on need.
Most often, the reviewing court highlighted the poor health of the
spouse receiving the greater award of property. 113 In Arkansas' only ap-
pellate case in which the court relied on one of the need factors, the court
approved an unequal division for a blind husband, indicating his greater
need.' 14 Among the three North Carolina cases fitting this category, two
involved wives in poor health--one with chronic ill health"' and the
other with multiple sclerosis. 16 In both of these states, the statutes con-
tain a presumption of equal division. 117 The message these decisions
110. The study revealed that over one thousand equitable distribution cases reached
the reviewing courts in these states since their adoption of equitable distribution statutes.
111. Again, the cases reviewed here include those in which the reviewing court relied
on the lower court's references and those in which the reviewing court referred to various
factors independently of the lower court's analysis.
112. Only in some Montana cases does a simple disparity in economic circumstances
between the two parties suffice as a justification for either an unequal division or an award
of nonmarital property. E.g., Vance v. Vance, 204 Mont. 267, 664 P.2d 907 (1983);
Hecht v. Hecht, '199 Mont. 363, 649 P.2d 1257 (1982); Creon v. Creon, 195 Mont. 254,
635 P.2d 1308 (1981); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 625 P.2d 1159 (Mont. 1981); Bailey v.
Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 603 P.2d 259 (1979); see infra note 286 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Cantrell, 10 Ark. App. 357, 664 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (1984);
Wallace v. Wallace, 203 Mont. 255, 661 P.2d 455, 457 (1983); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 200
Mont. 178, 651 P.2d 29, 31 (1982); Cranmore v. Cranmore, 199 Mont. 283, 649 P.2d 441,
443-44 (1982); Lupo v. Lupo, 197 Mont. 290, 642 P.2d 1056, 1057 (1982); In re Marriage
of Jensen, 631 P.2d 700, 703 (Mont. 1981); Bradley v. Bradley, 78 N.C. App. 150, 154,
336 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1985); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 76 N.C. App. 391, 392-93, 333 S.E.2d
312, 312-13 (1985).
114. Cantrell v. Cantrell, 10 Ark. App. 357, 664 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1984). The court
also noted the wife's lack of contributions. Id. at 495.
115. Appelbe v. Appelbe, 76 N.C. App. 391, 333 S.E.2d 312 (1985).
116. Bradley v. Bradley, 78 N.C. App. 150, 336 S.E.2d 658 (1985).
117. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)
(1984 & Supp. 1985). These statutes also, however, include a number of factors relating
to the postdissolution circumstances of the parties. See supra note 84.
The appealed cases in North Carolina may not provide a clear picture of the current
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send to the lower courts about the relevance of need is that usually only
extraordinary circumstances involving health warrant a departure from
an equal division of property.' 18
Another circumstance that results in unequal divisions is misconduct
connected with the litigation. For instance, that a husband has been un-
cooperative in the litigation, on occasion, has justified an award of
greater than half the available property to the wife in need.1 9 In some of
these cases, however, need alone could have justified the dispositions.1 20
b. Other Characteristics: Only Slight Deviation from Equal Division
Cases addressing need and basing a property division award primarily
on one of the need factors prompt a few other observations. The deci-
sions reviewing unequal divisions of property often include so few facts
that it is impossible to determine how unequal the division was. When
the reviewing court's opinion does set out the proportions, however, the
facts reveal that the deviation from an equal division is slight and merely
symbolic-usually from a fifty-fifty division to a sixty-forty division. 21
The cases also reveal that when the award deviates dramatically from an
equal division, there was usually some explanation for the award other
than postdissolution need.' 22
appellate philosophy on which occasions require departure from an equal division in
favor of the more needy spouse. Many of the cases involve a remand with instructions to
the trial court to support more explicitly the unequal division. See infra note 173. The
North Carolina courts' struggle to develop a cohesive philosophy of equitable distribution
is due, in part, to the sudden change equitable distribution worked in North Carolina
divorce practice. See Sharp, supra note 27, at 196-97. In one recent North Carolina case,
the court suggested that custody of a minor child alone might support an unequal divi-
sion of property. Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 260, 343 S.E.2d 595, 599
(1986). This statement may reflect a greater willingness to depart from an equal division
than earlier cases demonstrate.
118. Professor Fineman concludes that the focus on equality may mean that "only the
greatly disadvantaged-the polar model of the victim-will have a chance at deviation"
from an equal division. Fineman, supra note 27, at 840.
119. See Karr v. Karr, 628 P.2d 267 (Mont. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982);
Erdheim v. Erdheim, 119 A.D.2d 623, 501 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1986), appeal denied, 68 N.Y.2d
607, 498 N.E.2d 433, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1986).
120. In one Montana case in which the court found the husband evasive, the appellate
court justified the unequal award by observing not only the need of the wife but the
gambling of the husband. In re Marriage of King, 700 P.2d 591, 593 (Mont. 1985).
121. See eg., Lupo v. Lupo, 197 Mont. 290, 642 P.2d 1056, 1057 (1982) (60% - 40%
division in favor of wife; wife in poor health); Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App. 353, 352
S.E.2d 869, 875 (1987) (60%-40% division; disparate incomes); Haugan v. Haugan, 117
Wis. 2d 200, 220, 343 N.W.2d 796, 806 (1984) (slightly unequal for wife with debts to
husband). Probably in most of the cases, the record would establish that there was insuf-
ficient property to compensate fully for postdissolution need: no matter how unequally
the court divided the property, the more needy spouse would continue to have need. See
infra notes 342-47 and accompanying text.
122. See, eg., Karr v. Karr, 628 P.2d 267 (Mont. 1981) (affirming trial court award of
bulk of available property to wife based on finding that husband was evasive and untrust-
worthy), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 625 P.2d 1159 (Mont.
1981) (awarding bulk of estate to wife who had owned much property before the mar-
riage, though had put it in joint names); Erdheim v. Erdheim, 119 A.D.2d 623, 501
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c. Absence of Theoretical Basis
One other observation about the cases using the need factors is in or-
der. The cases in this category justify the division of property based on
the need of one of the spouses by referring to one or more of the factors
like age, health, income, or vocational skills. The analysis in these cases,
however, rarely relates the goal of addressing need to the philosphy be-
hind property division.123 Instead, the court merely acknowledges the
need, and usually some other factor, in making the disposition.124
This failure to explain the relationship between addressing need and
dividing property at divorce contrasts dramatically with the analyses in
other cases. When non-need factors, such as contribution, are the basis
for the unequal division, it is common to find the courts explaining at
some length the relationship between contribution and division of prop-
erty at divorce. 125 In these cases, the analysis commonly refers to the
partnership theory underlying equitable distribution1 26 or to the recogni-
N.Y.S.2d 77 (approving trial court's award to wife of 60% of available property plus
marital residence based on findings that husband was uncooperative and was depressing
his income), appeal denied, 68 N.Y.2d 608, 498 N.E.2d 433, 506 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1986).
Again, only in Montana do the reported cases reveal a significantly unequal disposition
justified predominantly on need. See, eg., Hecht v. Hecht, 199 Mont. 363, 649 P.2d 1257
(1982) (disposition of 75% of available property to wife in light of great disparity in
incomes and foregone career opportunities).
123. In states other than Montana, opinions only occasionally refer to the philosophy
linking property division and the accommodation of need. For example, in Coffey v.
Coffey, 119 A.D.2d 620, 623, 501 N.Y.S.2d 74, 77 (1986), an appellate court modified an
equal division with directions to award the husband more of the property. The facts of
the case imply that the husband, who had custody of the four children, had greater need.
See id. at 621, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 76. In justifying its disposition, the court, quoting Gover-
nor Carey's memorandum, noted that equitable distribution does not require an equal
division but a division that addresses the needs of the parties. Id. at 622, 501 N.Y.S.2d at
77.
Among the Montana cases one finds more than an occasional explanation of the rela-
tionship of property division and postdivorce need. For example, in Vance v. Vance, 204
Mont. 267, 664 P.2d 907 (1983), the husband contested an award to the wife of some
premarital property. The court upheld the disposition explaining that marriage was more
than a business relationship and that property awards needed to compensate women for
the disadvantage they faced in the "amounts and sources of income." 664 P.2d at 912.
See also In re Marriage of Laster, 197 Mont. 470, 480, 643 P.2d 597, 603 (1982) (pension
deemed marital property, and marital property substituted for maintenance); Nunnally v.
Nunnally, 625 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Mont. 1981) (greater need of wife justified property divi-
sion that obviated need for maintenance).
124. See, e.g., McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 440 A.2d 274 (1982); Cunningham
v. Cunningham, 105 A.D.2d 997, 482 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1984).
125. See, eg., Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d 299, 302-08, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455, 458-62
(1985), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986); Steinke v. Steinke,
126 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 376 N.W.2d 839, 843 (1985).
126. See, e.g., Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 95-100, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 488-91
(1983) (discussing partnership premise and contributions); Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C.App.




tion of the value of the homemaker's services.127
In contrast, in cases in which need supports the award, the analyses
offer no explanation that links addressing need to any theory of equitable
distribution. Such judicial reticence, especially in light of the numerous
references to the relationship between contribution and property divi-
sion, subtly instructs the lower courts that no such relationship exists.
This lesson, in turn, helps perpetuate the failure to address postdissolu-
tion need through the division of property.
2. Cases Addressing Need with Primary Reliance
on Some Other Factor
In the second category of cases, the courts appear to address need by
relying primarily on a factor other than one of the need factors-most
often, on contribution-to justify the disposition. This category, there-
fore, includes only those cases in which the reported facts reveal (1) par-
ties in disparate financial circumstances and (2) a disposition that
appeared to address that disparity.1 21
Only twenty-eight cases qualified for this category. 29 They reflected a
financial disparity between the parties and a disposition that appears to
address this disparity, such as an award of more than half the property to
the more needy spouse, but relied primarily on a factor other than one of
the need factors to explain this result. Two states, Connecticut and Mon-
127. See, eg., Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d 299, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1985), aff'd, 69
N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986).
128. See supra notes 98-99.
129. The twenty-eight cases in this category include: Arkansas: Bachman v. Bach-
man, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981); Pennybaker v. Pennybaker, 14 Ark. App. 251,
687 S.W.2d 524 (1985).
Connecticut Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 462 A.2d 1060 (1983); Sweet v. Sweet,
190 Conn. 657, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983); Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 460 A.2d 1302
(1983); Kroop v. Kroop, 186 Conn. 211, 440 A.2d 293 (1982); Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn.
191, 440 A.2d 283 (1982); Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 427 A.2d 432 (1980); Bratz
v. Bratz, 4 Conn. App. 504, 495 A.2d 292 (1985); Stearns v. Stearns, 4 Conn. App. 323,
494 A.2d 595 (1985); Szilagyi v. Szilagyi, 3 Conn. App. 25, 484 A.2d 469 (1984); Ehren-
kranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 479 A.2d 826 (1984).
Montana In re Marriage of Tonne, 733 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1987); In re Marriage of
Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79 (Mont. 1985); In re Marriage of Keepers, 691 P.2d 810 (Mont. 1984);
In re Marriage of Merry, 689 P.2d 1250 (Mont. 1984); Larson v. Larson, 200 Mont. 134,
649 P.2d 1351 (1982); Herron v. Herron, 186 Mont. 396, 608 P.2d 97 (1980); Kaasa v.
Kaasa, 181 Mont. 18, 591 P.2d I110 (1979); In re Marriage of Brown, 179 Mont. 417,
587 P.2d 361 (1978).
New York-- Coffey v. Coffey, 119 A.D.2d 620, 501 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Kutanovski v.
Kutanovski, 109 A.D.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985), order vacated on other grounds,
120 A.D.2d 571, 502 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1986); Ward v. Ward, 101 A.D.2d 1006, 476
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1984), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 805, 498 N.E.2d 431, 506 N.Y.S.2d
867 (1986), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504 N.E.2d 397 (1987); Wenzel v. Wenzel, 122
Misc. 2d 1001, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984); Ettinger v. Ettinger, 107 Misc. 2d 675, 435
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1981).
North Carolina" Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987).
Wisconsin: Arneson v. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (1984); Thorpe v.
Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189, 321 N.W.2d 237 (1981).
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tana, account for eighteen of the cases, while the other ten are distributed
among the remaining four states.
a. Reversing or Modifying an Award for an Economically
Stronger Spouse
One way these cases appear to address the financial disparity between
the parties is by reversing or modifying an award of more than half the
available property to the less needy spouse.13" In a number of cases, even
though one of the spouses was more needy than the other, the courts
took this action with little or no acknowledgement of the parties' circum-
stances.13 1 Unlike the cases in the first category, the cases in this cate-
gory largely ignore need, relying instead on some other factor. To
illustrate, when the facts presented a wife without earnings and a hus-
band with an annual income of $82,000, the Arkansas Supreme Court
justified its reversal of the lower court's award denying the wife any part
of a trust or pension plan by noting only the wife's contribution as home-
maker, not her need.1 32 The facts of the case and the need factors in the
Arkansas statute presented the occasion for the court to acknowledge
need in its disposition. Instead, the court, in its reversal, relied on the
wife's contribution.
b. Reversing Equal Divisions
Cases reversing equal divisions of property also appear to have ad-
dressed the financial disparity between the parties. Unlike the cases in
the first category, however, the courts here relied not on need, but pri-
marily on a non-need factor.133 Even when the facts in the cases revealed
a special need by one of the parties, the courts were reluctant to name the
130. E.g., Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981) (reversing lower
court finding that wife was not entitled to certain assets); Ward v. Ward, 101 A.D.2d
1006, 476 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1984) (modifying judgment granting more property to hus-
band), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 805, 498 N.E.2d 431, 506 N.Y.S.2d 867, appeal de-
nied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504 N.E.2d 397 (1987); Arneson v. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355
N.W.2d 16 (1984) (remanding unequal division for husband and directing court to ex-
plain departure from equal division by reference to more of the statutory factors); Thorpe
v. Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189, 321 N.W.2d 237 (1982) (giving wife maintenance award in
addition to share of property).
131. E.g., Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701 (1981); Ward v. Ward,
101 A.D.2d 1006, 476 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1984), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 805, 498 N.E.2d
431, 506 N.Y.S.2d 867, appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504 N.E.2d 397 (1987); Arneson v.
Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (1984); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189,
321 N.W.2d 237 (1982).
132. Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 28, 621 S.W.2d 701, 704 (1981). Certainly
the wife's contribution may have entitled her to an award greater than what she received
from the trial court. The point is, however, that courts appear reluctant to use need in
order to justify an unequal disposition.
133. See, e.g., Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 109 A.D.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985),
vacated on other grounds, 120 A.D.2d 571, 502 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1986); see also infra notes
140-43 (Connecticut cases using fault to justify unequal divisions in favor of the wife
when need appeared to be a sufficient explanation).
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apparent need as the basis for their decisions. 34 For example, even when
one spouse clearly had greater need because of custodial responsibilities
and health problems, the court seized on the source of the assets and on
contribution to avoid basing its decision on the spouse's apparent
need. 35
c. Affirming Unequal Divisions or Awards of Nonacquests for the
Economically Weaker Spouse
Finally, some of the cases appear to address the financial disparity be-
tween the parties by alfirming unequal divisions of property for the eco-
nomically weaker spouse or by awarding that party some available
nonacquests. In these cases the courts also relied on non-need factors,
even though need was apparent.' 36 To illustrate, even in a case in which
the wife was sixty-seven and unemployable, the rationale for the unequal
division in her favor was not her need but her contribution as a home-
maker and as an assistant in the family business.'3 7 Similarly, in those
states with statutory authority to award nonacquests to the nontitled
spouse, 138 appellate courts often avoided discussions of apparent need in
134. See, e.g., Pennybaker v. Pennybaker, 14 Ark. App. 251, 687 S.W.2d 524 (1985)
(focus on contributions rather than disparity in incomes); Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn.
491,460 A.2d 1302 (1983) (discussion of need only in relation to attorney's fees); Herron
v. Herron, 186 Mont. 396, 608 P.2d 97 (1986) (focus on character of property rather than
disability, income capacity and custodial responsibility of wife).
135. See Herron v. Herron, 186 Mont. 396, 402, 608 P.2d 97, 100 (1986).
136. See. eg., Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 491-92, 460 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1983)
(noting causes of divorce before financial circumstances); Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn. 191,
196, 440 A.2d 283, 285-86 (1982) (focus on adultery); Stearns v. Stearns, 4 Conn. App.
323, 326, 494 A.2d 595, 596 (1985) (court first recites facts bearing on husband's fault);
In re Marriage of Tonne, 733 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Mont. 1987) (justifying award of premari-
tal property based on wife's contribution); In re Marriage of Merry, 689 P.2d 1250, 1251-
53 (Mont. 1984) (based, in part, on husband's dissipation of assets); Kansa v. Kaasa, 181
Mont. 18, 23, 591 P.2d 1110, 1113 (1979) (justifying award of inherited property based
on wife's contribution); In re Marriage of Brown, 179 Mont. 417, 420, 587 P.2d 361, 365
(1978) (award of some inherited property justified because of wife's contribution); Ward
v. Ward, 101 A.D.2d 1006, 1006, 476 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (1984) (modifying and, as modi-
fied, affirming primarily on basis of contribution), appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 805, 498
N.E.2d 431, 506 N.Y.S.2d 867, appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504 N.E.2d 397 (1987);
Wenzel v. Wenzel, 122 Misc. 2d 1001, 1002-03, 1006, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833, 835 (Sup.
Ct. 1984) (contribution and unique fault justified unequal division for wife who was vic-
tim of brutal assault by husband); Ettinger v. Ettinger, 107 Misc. 2d 675, 676, 435
N.Y.S.2d 916, 917 (1981) (defaulting party); Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471,476-77, 353
S.E.2d 427, 431 (1987) (basing greater award to husband on basis of contribution to
wife's education instead of husband's greater need).
137. Pennybaker v. Pennybaker, 14 Ark. App. 251, 254-55, 687 S.W.2d 524, 525-26
(1985).
138. Four of the states in the study statutorily recognize the division of nonacquests.
The Arkansas statute provides that
[a] ... property [other than marital property] shall be returned to the party
who owned it prior to the marriage unless the court shall make some other
division that the court deems equitable taking into consideration those factors
enumerated in subparagraph (A) above, in which event the court must state in
1988]
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affirming the decision to award some of this property.139 The judicial
timidity to acknowledge that greater need was the occasion for these
awards fails to educate the trial court on the legislative mandate to ac-
commodate need through property division.
The cases from Connecticut in this category deserve special men-
tion."4 Connecticut is the only state in the study that authorizes the
writing its basis and reasons for not returning the property to the party who
owned it at the time of the marriage.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1985). The Connecticut statute authorizes
the court to "assign to either husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other."
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 46b-81(a) (West 1986). The Montana statute provides that the
court "shall ... finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets
belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired ... ." Mont. Code Ann.
§ 40-4-202(1) (1987). The statute directs the court to give special considerations in divid-
ing nonacquests:
In dividing property acquired prior to the marriage; property acquired by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent; property acquired in exchange for property acquired
before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, de-
vise, or descent; the increased value of property acquired prior to marriage; and
property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation, the court shall
consider those contributions of the other spouse to the marriage, including:
(a) the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker;
(b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the mainte-
nance of this property; and
(c) whether or not the property division serves as an alternative to main-
tenance arrangements.
Id. at § 40-4-202(l)(a)-(c). Wisconsin likewise provides that all property may be divided,
but provides special considerations for property that is not an acquest of the marriage:
Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during
the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have
been paid for by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property
of such party and may not be subjected to a property division under this section
except upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship
on the other party or on the children of the marriage, and in that event the
court may divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable manner.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981).
139. See, e.g., Pennybaker v. Pennybaker, 14 Ark. App. 251, 253, 687 S.W.2d 524, 526
(1985) (referring to wife's working in business); In re Marriage of Brown, 179 Mont. 417,
419, 587 P.2d 361, 363 (1978) (referring to wife's position as part time ranch hand);
Kaasa v. Kaasa, 181 Mont. 18, 20, 591 P.2d 1110, 1111 (1979) (focusing on wife's low-
paying jobs and lack of vocational training).
140. In the following Connecticut cases, the courts remanded on the issue of property
division but indicated that there was strong reason to find that a greater proportion for
wife was justified. See Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 462 A.2d 1060 (1983); Sweet v.
Sweet, 190 Conn. 657, 462 A.2d 1031 (1983); Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 460 A.2d
1302 (1983); Kroop v. Kroop, 186 Conn. 211, 440 A.2d 293 (1982); Beede v. Beede, 186
Conn. 191, 440 A.2d 283 (1982); Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 427 A.2d 432 (1980);
Bratz v. Bratz, 4 Conn. App. 504, 495 A.2d 292 (1985); Stearns v. Stearns, 4 Conn. App.
323, 494 A.2d 595 (1985); Szilagyi v. Szilagyi, 3 Conn. App. 25, 484 A.2d 469 (1984);
Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 479 A.2d 826 (1984).
By combining categories 1 and 2, the study reveals that Connecticut and Montana are
dominant in addressing need. Of Connecticut's 28 cases included in the study, the dispo-
sitions in 16, approximately 57%, reflected a concern for need; of Montana's 49 cases, 29,
approximately 50%, reflected such a concern. In contrast, of Arkansas's 12 cases, the
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consideration of fault in the property award. 4 In most of the Connecti-
cut cases approving an unequal division of property in favor of the eco-
nomically weaker spouse, the reviewing courts note the presence of
fault'42 but pay little or no attention to the greater need of one spouse.
The opinions rely on some factor other than need-namely, fault-to
dispose of the case in a way that makes more property available for the
more needy spouse. The numbers of cases from Connecticut fitting this
category suggest that courts find fault more persuasive than need as a
discretionary factor urging an unequal division of property. 14 3
3. Cases Leaving a Spouse in Need
In the categories just examined, the reviewing courts address need
either through reliance on the need factors or by relying on factors other
than those relating to future need. In many more instances, the court's
disposition simply leaves one of the parties-usually the wife-in need.
The cases reveal a fairly consistent inattention to the discretionary fac-
disposition in only 3, 25%, reflected a concern for need, and of New York's 36 cases, only
7, approximately 19%, did so.
141. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986) ("In fixing the nature and value of
the property,... the court... shall consider... the causes for the... dissolution of the
marriage .. ").
142. Eg., Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 820-21, 462 A.2d 1060, 1064-65 (1983)
(paying some attention to need, but focusing on fault); Sweet v. Sweet, 190 Conn. 657,
659-60, 462 A.2d 1031, 1033-34 (1983) (analyzing the propriety of considering fault);
Barnes v. Barnes, 190 Conn. 491, 494, 460 A.2d 1302, 1304-05 (1983) (mentioning causes
of divorce before financial circumstances); Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn. 191, 196, 440 A.2d
283, 286 (1982) (focusing on adultery); Corbin v. Corbin, 179 Conn. 622, 427 A.2d 432,
434 (1980) (noting husband's indebtedness, occasioned in part by vacation with another
woman); Stearns v. Stearns, 4 Conn. App. 323, 494 A.2d 595, 596 (1985) (factual review
highlighting fault before financial circumstances); Szilagyi v. Szilagyi, 3 Conn. App. 25,
29, 484 A.2d 469, 472 (1984) (finding fault in husband's failure to obey court orders).
The significance of fault also appears in a comparison of the treatment of fault and
need in a New York case. In Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 287-94, 472
N.Y.S.2d 110, 111-14 (1984), the court reversed an award premised, in part, on a finding
of marital fault. Id. at 294, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 115. The lower court had awarded all of the
marital property to the wife because of the marital fault. IM at 287-89, 472 N.Y.S.2d at
111. The wife, unlike the husband, had few employment prospects. The lower court,
anticipating the irrelevance of fault as a matter of law, had authorized a fairly equal
division of the marital property in the absence of fault. Id at 289, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
Evidently fault was more compelling than need in moving the trial court to an unequal
division.
143. An earlier study drew a related conclusion on the impact of fault on property
dispositions in Connecticut. In a 1976 study, the statistics revealed that in Connecticut,
where the judge may consider fault, the trial courts ordered the marital home sold at
divorce in only 16% of divorces. See Permanent Commission on the Status of Women,
State of Connecticut, Marital Dissolution: The Economic Impact on Connecticut Men and
Women 19 (1979). By comparison, in a 1977 sampling in California, where the judge
may not consider fault in the property disposition, trial courts ordered the marital home
sold in about 35% of divorces. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 78. If one assumes that
postdivorce need is similar in these states, the relevance of fault is the most likely expla-
nation for the different treatment of the marital home.
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tors related to need.144
144. Connecticut and Montana reveal the lowest percentages of cases with property
dispositions that leave the economically weaker spouse, usually the wife, in need. Only
12 of the 28 Connecticut cases, approximately 43%, and 20 of the 49 Montana cases,
approximately 41%, fit this category. In contrast, 9 of the 12 Arkansas cases, 75%, and
29 of the 36 New York cases, approximately 81%, fit this category. Although the num-
bers are too small to draw any conclusions, 2 of the 6 North Carolina cases, or 33%; and
4 of the 7 Wisconsin cases, approximately 57%, fit this category. Even the lower percent-
ages, however, reveal excessive inattention to the need factors. The citations to all the
cases in this category follow.
Arkansas: Meeks v. Meeks, 290 Ark. 563, 721 S.W.2d 653 (1986); Morrison v. Morri-
son, 286 Ark. 353, 692 S.W.2d 601 (1985); Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678
S.W.2d 348 (1984); Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982); Ford v.
Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 616 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Warren v. Warren, 12 Ark. App. 260, 675
S.W.2d 371 (1984); Lee v. Lee, 12 Ark. App. 226, 674 S.W.2d 505 (1984); Forsgren v.
Forsgren, 4 Ark. App. 286, 630 S.W.2d 64 (1982); Stout v. Stout, 4 Ark. App. 266, 630
S.W.2d 53 (1982).
Connecticut: Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 495 A.2d 704 (1985); Wolk v. Wolk, 191 Conn.
328, 464 A.2d 780 (1983); Turgeon v. Turgeon, 190 Conn. 269, 460 A.2d 1260 (1983);
Salvio v. Salvio, 186 Conn. 311,441 A.2d 190 (1982); Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528,
429 A.2d 964 (1980); Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 427 A.2d 406 (1980); Tirado v.
Tirado, 7 Conn. App. 41, 507 A.2d 470 (1986); Trubowitz v. Trubowitz, 5 Conn. App.
681, 502 A.2d 940 (1985); Levy v. Levy, 5 Conn. App. 185, 497 A.2d 430, appeal denied,
197 Conn. 813, 499 A.2d 62 (1985); Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 496 A.2d
210, appeal denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985); Caracansi v. Caracansi, 4 Conn.
App. 645, 496 A.2d 225, appeal denied, 197 Conn. 805, 499 A.2d 56 (1985); Weisbaum v.
Weisbaum, 2 Conn. App. 270, 477 A.2d 690 (1984).
Montana: In re Marriage of Voelkel, 734 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1987); In re Marriage of
Manus, 733 P.2d 1275 (Mont. 1987); In re Marriage of Singer, 731 P.2d 753 (Mont.
1986); In re Marriage of Swanson, 716 P.2d 219 (Mont. 1986); In re Marriage of Wil-
liams, 714 P.2d 548 (Mont. 1986); In re Marriage of Bell, 713 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1986); In
re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986); In re Marriage of Benner, 711 P.2d 802
(Mont. 1985); In re Marriage of Glass, 697 P.2d 96 (Mont. 1985); In re Marriage of
Ziegler, 696 P.2d 983 (Mont. 1985); In re Marriage of Hilt, 679 P.2d 783 (Mont. 1984);
Kis v. Kis, 196 Mont. 296, 639 P.2d 1151 (1982); Levandowski v. Levandowski, 630 P.2d
239 (Mont. 1981); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 628 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1981); Jones v. Jones, 620
P.2d 850 (Mont. 1980); Benjamin v. Benjamin, 189 Mont. 158, 615 P.2d 218 (1980);
Oster v. Oster, 186 Mont. 160, 606 P.2d 1075 (1980); Aanenson v. Aanenson, 183 Mont.
229, 598 P.2d 1120 (1979); Green v. Green, 181 Mont. 285, 593 P.2d 446 (1979); Jorgen-
son v. Jorgenson, 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 606 (1979).
New York- Cappiello v. Cappiello, 66 N.Y.2d 107, 485 N.E.2d 983, 495 N.Y.S.2d 318
(1985); Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 478 N.E.2d 199, 489 N.Y.S.2d 58
(1985); Miller v. Miller, 128 A.D.2d 844, 513 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1987); LeRuzic v. LeRuzic,
127 A.D.2d 940, 512 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1987); Matsuo v. Matsuo, 124 A.D.2d 864, 508
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1986); Petrie v. Petrie, 124 A.D.2d 449, 507 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1986), appeal
dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1038, 511 N.E.2d 89 (1987); Ahrend v. Ahrend, 123 A.D.2d 731,
507 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1986); McDermott v. McDermott, 119 A.D.2d 370, 507 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1986), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 1028, 511 N.E.2d 81, 517 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1987); Bid-
well v. Bidwell, 122 A.D.2d 364, 504 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1986); Neumark v. Neumark, 120
A.D.2d 502, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1986), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 899, 507 N.E.2d
1091, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1987); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 116 A.D.2d 564, 497 N.Y.S.2d
420 (1986); Griffin v. Griffin, 115 A.D.2d 587, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1985); Michalek v.
Michalek, 114 A.D.2d 655, 494 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1985), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 602, 504
N.E.2d 395 (1986); Van Housen v. Van Housen, 114 A.D.2d 411, 494 N.Y.S.2d 135
(1985); Kobylack v. Kobylack, 111 A.D.2d 221, 489 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1985); Schussler v.
Schussler, 109 A.D.2d 875, 487 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1985), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 612, 511
N.E.2d 87 (1987); Tanner v. Tanner, 107 A.D.2d 980, 484 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1985); Rubin v.
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This inattention is most glaring when the reviewing courts affirmed an
unequal division of property in favor of the economically stronger
spouse. 14 5 Even in the face of severe economic need, reviewing courts
have awarded the bulk of the marital property to the stronger spouse. 4"
Too often, a review of the relative contributions of the parties simply
overshadowed concern for postdivorce need.
147
Due to the frequency of equal divisions of marital property, the neglect
of a needy spouse was more common in cases in which the reviewing
court approved equal divisions. Instead of remanding for consideration
of the need factors and, if appropriate, an unequal division in favor of the
spouse in greater need, the reviewing courts routinely approved an equal
division of property.'48
Alimony for the economically weaker spouse sometimes accompanied
Rubin, 105 A.D.2d 736, 481 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1984); Cohen v. Cohen, 104 A.D.2d 841, 480
N.Y.S.2d 358 (1984), appeal dismissed, 64 N.Y.2d 773, 475 N.E.2d 457, 485 N.Y.S.2d
990 (1985); Wilson v. Wilson, 101 A.D.2d 536, 476 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1984), appeal dis-
missed, 63 N.Y.2d 768, 471 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1984), appeal denied, 64 N.Y.2d 607, 476
N.E.2d 1006, 487 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1985); Harness v. Harness, 99 A.D.2d 658, 472
N.Y.S.2d 234 (1984); Roth v. Roth, 97 A.D.2d 967, 468 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1983); Perri v.
Perri, 97 A.D.2d 399, 467 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1983), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 603, 460
N.E.2d 1360, 472 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1984); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 94 A.D.2d 494, 464
N.Y.S.2d 913 (1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1984);
Duffy v. Duffy, 94 A.D.2d 711, 462 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1983); Bentley v. Knight, 92 A.D.2d
638, 459 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1983); Newell v. Newell, 121 Misc. 2d 586, 468 N.Y.S.2d 814
(1983); Hebron v. Hebron, 116 Misc. 2d 803, 456 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1982); Nehorayoff v.
Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1981).
North Carolina: Andrews v. Andrews, 79 N.C. App. 228, 338 S.E.2d 809, review de-
nied, 316 N.C. 730, 345 S.E.2d 385 (1986); Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337
S.E.2d 607 (1985), review denied, 316 N.C. 195, 341 S.E.2d 585 (1986), reversed in part on
other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).
Visconsin" Overson v. Overson, 125 Wis. 2d 13, 370 N.W.2d 796 (1985); Bahr v. Bahr,
107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982); Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d 59, 318 N.W.2d
792 (1982); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 (1981).
145. See, eg., Forsgren v. Forsgren, 4 Ark. App. 286, 288, 630 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1982)
(holding unequal distribution of marital property within chancellor's discretion and will
not be disturbed so long as he sets forth reasons for making such an unequal distribution);
Ford v. Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 508-09, 616 S.W.2d 3, 4 (1981) (upholding an award to
husband of 90% of all property not owned as tenancy in common); Wolk v. Wolk, 191
Conn. 328, 331, 464 A.2d 780, 783 (1983) (referring to wife's fault; alimony to address
her greater need); Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200,
489 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (1985) (noting wife's lack of contribution to dental practice in
awarding her 25% of its value).
146. See, eg., Forsgren v. Forsgren, 4 Ark. App. 286, 288, 630 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1982)
(upholding unequal division for husband by reference to his contribution; wife suffered
from drinking problem); Ford v. Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 516, 616 S.W.2d 3, 8 (1981) (award-
ing 10% of property to wife with mental illness, with heavy focus on husband's
contribution).
147. See Forsgren v. Forsgren, 4 Ark. App. 286, 287-88, 630 S.W.2d 64, 65 (1982);
Ford v. Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 513-16, 616 S.W.2d 3, 6-7 (1981). This unequal division in
favor of the economically stronger spouse is particularly noteworthy in light of Arkansas'
presumption of equal division. See supra note 85.
148. See e.g., Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984); Russell v.
Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 628 S.W.2d 315 (1982); Weisbaum v. Weisbaum, 2 Conn. App.
270, 477 A.2d 690 (1984); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474
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a property award that ignored need.149 Usually the awards were tempo-
rary. 150 Since, however, divorce reform urged the use of property to per-
form the support function, an alimony award does not justify inattention
to need in the division of property. This study includes, for purposes of
these tabulations only, those cases in which there appeared to be suffi-
cient property to permit a property division addressing need.15' There-
fore, the reliance on alimony to address need undermines the inclusion of
need factors in the property division statutes and the message of reform
to accomplish the alimony function with a division of property.
Some of the New York cases vividly illustrate how courts have ignored
the need factors in property division and have recognized need-if at
all-through alimony. Like the other property division statutes in the
study, the New York statute clearly directs the court to consider the
spouses' future need in making the division.' 52 Despite this clear man-
date, only discussions of alimony reflect a concern for future need. In
certain cases, for example, the courts reviewed records revealing the dis-
solution of a marriage in which the wife suffered from postdivorce need
because she had little experience in the work force.' 53 Yet, in these cases,
the reviewing court either approved an equal division of property,'54
modified an unequal division against the wife to an equal division, 55 or
approved an unequal division in favor of the husband.' 56 Instead of ad-
dressing need through an unequal division of property in favor of the
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1984); McDermott v. McDermott, 123 Misc. 2d 355, 474 N.Y.S.2d 221
(1984).
149. See, e.g., Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 615-16, 496 A.2d 210, 212-
13, appealdenied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985); Roth v. Roth, 97 A.D.2d 967, 967,
468 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (1983); Duffy v. Duffy, 94 A.D.2d 711, 711-12, 462 N.Y.S.2d 240,
241-42 (1983).
150. See, e.g., Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 511, 678 S.W.2d 348, 349 (1984)
(alimony to be paid until 1990); Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 196, 628 S.W.2d 315,
316-17 (1982) (alimony to be paid until sixteen-year-old child attained majority or gradu-
ated high school, whichever came first).
151. See supra note 98 (defining "addressing need").
152. The statute directs the court to consider the parties' income, property, age, health,
"probable future financial circumstances," and "any other factor" which the court finds
"just and proper." N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(1), (2), (8), (13) (McKinney
1986).
153. See, e.g., Neumark v. Neumark, 120 A.D.2d 502, 504-05, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707
(1986) (wife "virtually unemployable"), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 899, 507 N.E.2d
1091 (1987); Griffin v. Griffin, 115 A.D.2d 587, 589, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1985) (wife
had minimal income); Antis v. Antis, 108 A.D.2d 889, 889-90, 485 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771(1985) (wife disfigured, mentally ill and had little work experience; husband's income
exceeded $49,000 annually); Roth v. Roth, 97 A.D.2d 967, 967, 468 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765(1983) (housewife in a twenty-year traditional marriage).
154. See, eg., Griffin v. Griffin, 115 A.D.2d 587, 588, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250 (1985)(remitted on another point).
155. See, e.g., Neumark v. Neumark, 120 A.D.2d 502, 502-03, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706
(1986), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 899, 507 N.E.2d 1091 (1987).
156. See, eg., Roth v. Roth, 97 A.D.2d 967, 967, 468 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (1983) (40%
award to wife not excessive).
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wife, the courts relied on alimony.157
These New York dispositions clearly suggest a reluctance to use prop-
erty division to accomplish the statutory function of addressing need.
The analyses in these cases underscore this reluctance by revealing that
the courts consider some factors appropriate to a determination of prop-
erty division and others appropriate only to a determination of alimony.
For example, although property division statutes include need factors
like age, health, and income as appropriate to the determination of the
division of property, the courts refer only to contribution in discussing
the property division portion of the awards.1" 8 The courts review the
greater need of the wife only in discussions of alimony. 59 This separa-
tion of factors and issues--contribution and property division from need
and alimony-suggests that the courts have concluded that need is not
an appropriate factor to consider in the division of property. By com-
menting on need only in relation to alimony awards, the reviewing courts
subtly instruct the lower courts that, when dividing property, they too
may continue to ignore the discretionary factors addressing future needs.
At times the instruction is not so subtle. On a number of occasions,
the analyses have discouraged more expressly the recognition of need
through property division. For example, in holding earning capacity to
be marital property, the court in O'Brien v. O'Brien 160 justified this rec-
ognition of property "not because [of need] ... but because those assets
represent the capital product of what was essentially a partnership."''
Need, in other words, is not a factor in property division. On another
occasion, the New York appellate court said:
The function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a mar-
riage ends, each of the spouses, based on the totality of the contribu-
tions made to it, has a stake in and right to a share of the marital assets
accumulated while it endured, not because that share is needed, but
157. Neumark v. Neumark, 120 A.D.2d 502, 503-04, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706-07 (1986),
appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 899, 507 N.E.2d 1091 (1987); Griffin v. Griffin, 115 A.D.2d
587, 589, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1985) (remitted on another point); Roth v. Roth, 97
A.D.2d 967, 967, 468 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (1983).
158. See eg., Neumark v. Neumark, 120 A.D.2d 502, 503, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706
(1986), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 899, 507 N.E.2d 1091 (1987); Griffin v. Griffin, 115
A.D.2d 587, 588-89, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250-51 (1985); Roth v. Roth, 97 A.D.2d 967,
967, 468 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (1983). For example, the Neumark court, commenting upon
the division of a pension, observed that it should be equally divided because of the long
marriage and "substantially equal contributions." 120 A.D.2d 502, 504, 501 N.Y.S.2d
704, 707 (1986). Instead of dividing the property unequally in favor of the needy wife,
the court modified the maintenance award by removing the time limit.
159. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 115 A.D.2d 587, 589, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1985)
(noting wife's minimal income and husband's $40,000 annual income with greater future
earning potential in reviewing maintenance award); Roth v. Roth, 97 A.D.2d 967, 967,
468 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765 (1983) (observing that needs of wife justified temporally unlimited
maintenance yet upholding an unequal division of property in favor of the husband).
160. 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
161. Id at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717-18, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (quoting Wood v. Wood,
119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1983)).
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because those assets represent the capital product of what was essen-
tially a partnership entity.162
The New York courts have undermined the use of need factors in the
property division statute in other statements as well. For example, one
court has stated that "property acquired during the marriage should be
equitably distributed upon divorce, and that alimony or maintenance
should rest largely on an actual need and ability to pay basis.,, 63 Such
analysis has diverted attention from the factors that make need appropri-
ate not only in determining alimony, but also in determining a division of
property. In conjunction with the phenomenon of decreasing alimony
awards, 1" the diversion of attention from need in the division of prop-
erty has meant that there may be nothing at dissolution that addresses
the circumstances of needy spouses. Indeed, allowing the trial courts
routinely to ignore the need factors in property division may have in-
structed them that the state has abandoned altogether the goal of accom-
modating postdivorce need.1 65
III. UNDERUTILIZATION OF NEED FACTORS: EXPLANATIONS,
CONCERNS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
A. Explanations for Underutilization
The results of the study support the thesis that courts are not relying
on the discretionary factors relating to need in making property disposi-
tions. Few cases rely on need to justify the disposition, 16 6 and many
cases leave one spouse clearly in need.167 These numbers demonstrate a
reluctance to depend on the need factors, and a synthesis of the cases
offers a number of explanations for this underutilization.
1. Preference for Equal Division
Preference for an equal division of property is the most obvious expla-
nation. Various studies confirm that the most common disposition by
the trial courts in dividing property is an equal division. 1 68 As one would
expect, the instances of equal division appear to be higher in states with
162. Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1983) (empha-
sis added) (citing Gibbons v. Gibbons, 174 N.J. Super. 107, 415 A.2d 1174 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1980), rev'd, 86 N.J. 515, 432 A.2d 80 (1981)).
163. Forcucci v. Forcucci, 83 A.D.2d 169, 171, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (1981) (cita-
tions omitted).
164. See supra note 79.
165. See infra notes 348-85 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 129, 144.
167. See supra note 144.
168. E.g., Fineman, supra note 27, at 880 (equal division of property used in the major-
ity of Wisconsin divorce cases); McGraw, supra note 79, at 481 (concluding that more
property divisions in Ohio were equal after divorce reform); L. Weitzman, supra note 30,
at 70-77 (in California, elimination of fault led to the requirement of equal divisions of
property).
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statutory presumptions of equal division.169 In this study, 7 ° another dif-
ference emerges between the cases in states with statutory presumptions
of equal division and those without this presumption. Among the states
in the study, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Wisconsin statutorily pre-
sume an equal division of property. Although the statutory presumption
of equal division in these states is strong,17 1 the presence of the need
factors should authorize the court to depart from an equal division in
order to accommodate need.17 1 Instead, the appellate courts in these
equal division states often use the discretionary factors simply to support
an equal division. 173
The preference for equal division is not confined to states with statu-
tory presumptions. The cases from the other states in the study-Con-
necticut, Montana, and New York-also reveal, to varying degrees, a
169. E.g., Fineman, supra note 27, at 880. Professor Fineman reported that based on
her sampling, judges indicated a deviation from an equal division in only 18% of stipu-
lated cases and 19% of litigated cases. Id at 880-81 & nn.235-36.
170. Because this study relies only on appealed cases, it does not attempt to draw any
conclusions by comparing the numbers of times the cases from the various states divided
property equally. The nature of appealed cases skews the instances of unequal divisions
of property. See supra note 94. Moreover, there were too few cases from North Carolina
and Wisconsin that fit the criteria of this part of the study to make reliable comparisons.
Although these reasons limit the utility of this tabulation, the cases reveal the following
use of equal divisions: Arkansas - 6 of 12 cases; Connecticut - 2 of 28; Montana - 15 of
49; New York - 12 of 36; North Carolina - 2 of 6; and Wisconsin - 3 of 7.
171. See infra notes 173, 259 and accompanying text.
172. In the states without the presumption, mention of the need factors often signals
an unequal division of property in favor of the needy spouse. Eg., Erdheim v. Erdheim,
119 A.D.2d 623, 501 N.Y.S.2d 77, appeal denied, 68 N.Y.2d 607, 498 N.E.2d 433, 506
N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1986).
173. Morrison v. Morrison, 286 Ark. 353, 356, 692 S.W.2d 601, 603.04 (1985) (justify-
ing equal division of disability benefits by reference to wife's unemployment); Asbeck v.
Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 296, 342 N.W.2d 750, 754 (1983) (justifying equal division,
including inherited property, by reference to wife's bleak employment prospects).
In fact in Arkansas and North Carolina, it is common to reverse and remand unequal
divisions of property for the failure of the trial court to make sufficient findings to uphold
the unequal award. This phenomenon is especially prevalent in North Carolina, which
has interpreted its statute strongly to favor an equal division. See White v. White, 312
N.C. 770, 776, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832-33 (1985). For examples of cases remanded because
of insufficient findings, see Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.C. App. 787, 790, 338 S.E.2d 567,
570 (1986); Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 679, 336 S.E.2d 415, 424 (1985); Little
v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12, 21, 327 S.E.2d 283, 290 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App.
372, 387, 325 S.E.2d 260, 272 (1985); Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C. App. 332, 336, 324
S.E.2d 287, 290 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 71 N.C. App. 242, 249, 322 S.E.2d 393, 398
(1984), modified and aff'd, 314 N.C. 80, 89, 331 S.E.2d 682, 688 (1985); Hinton v.
Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 673, 321 S.E.2d 161, 165 (1984); Alexander v. Alexander, 68
N.C. App. 548, 553, 315 S.E.2d 772, 776 (1984); see also Canady v. Canady, 285 Ark.
378, 383, 687 S.W.2d 833, 835 (1985). At the time of this study, in both of these states, a
decision to divide the property equally imposed a lesser requirement for findings of fact.
E.g., Ausburn v. Ausburn, 271 Ark. 330, 331, 609 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1980); Loeb v. Loeb, 72
N.C. App. 205, 217, 324 S.E.2d 33, 42, review denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393
(1985); but see Armstrong v. Armstrong, 368 S.E.2d 595 (N.C. 1988) (requiring findings
of fact for equal and unequal divisions of property).
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preference for equal division. 7 4 In these states, equal division has be-
come the norm, even without a statutory presumption.
The history of reform helps to explain the preference for equal division
of property, even in the face of statutes that direct courts to consider
need in dividing the available property. From the early stages of reform,
a debate has raged over the superiority of equal versus equitable distribu-
tion of property. 75 The debate has centered on the conflict between the
advantages of equal division on the one hand, and the undeniable eco-
nomic disparity that exists between men and women at divorce on the
other. 176
The advantages of equal distribution are clear. First and most signifi-
cant, equal division removes one source of judicial discretion; 177 the ad-
vocates of equal distribution feared that the judiciary might misuse the
discretion inherent in equitable distribution.178 Second, equal distribu-
tion reduces the need to litigate. If, after defining the property available
for distribution, a judge has no other option than to decree an equal divi-
sion, the certainty of the award may avoid the expense of litigating how
the property ought to be divided.' 79
Despite these advantages, the early recommendations issuing from the
controversy advocated equitable, rather than equal, distribution. 8 ' The
174. For example, see Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1983).
Conner cites with approval a piece of the New York statute's legislative history that rec-
ognizes a norm of equal division. The memorandum observes that at dissolution, "there
should be an equal division of family assets, unless such a division would be inequitable
under the circumstances of the particular case." Memorandum in Support of Legislation,
supra note 30; Connor, 97 A.D.2d at 96, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 489; see also Carpenter v. Car-
penter, 188 Conn. 736, 743, 453 A.2d 1151, 1155 (1982) (upholding fairly equal divison
in face of disparate circumstances); In re Marriage of Bell, 713 P.2d 552, 554-55 (Mont.
1986) (equal division).
A number of other states not included in this study have evinced a preference for equal
division by judicial construction. See, eg., Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570
(Alaska 1983); Ivancovich v. Ivancovich, 24 Ariz. App. 592, 540 P.2d 718 (1975); In re
Marriage of Freese, 226 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1975); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399,
350 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
175. E.g., Frank, An Equal Split, 71 A.B.A. J. 30 (Nov. 1985); Younger, Community
Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 211, 241-44 (1973);
Comment, Divorce and the Division of Marital Property in Arkansas-Equal or Equita-
ble?, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 671 (1982); Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules, supra note
12. See also infra notes 387-95.
176. For example, Professor Fineman advocates equitable distribution because of eco-
nomic disparities, but she recognizes the validity of the arguments of the proponents of
equal division. Fineman, supra note 27, at 820-33; see also infra note 181 (discussing
continued economic disparity between husband and wife).
177. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Note, Equitable vs. Fixed Rules, supra note 12, at 762; Comment, Equi-
table Distribution in New York, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 483, 486-90, 488 n.21 (1981).
179. Professor Glendon maintains that lawyers who want to protect large fee awards
are the only parties that benefit in a state with equitable, as opposed to equal, division.
M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 66 (1981).
180. The Task Force of Family Law and Policy rather lukewarmly endorsed equitable,
instead of equal, distribution by contrasting the virtues of equal distribution at divorce
and at the death of a spouse:
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advocates of equitable distribution focused on one concern. Despite the
advantages of equal distribution, one inescapable fact of economic and
social life remained: men and women are not equally situated at di-
vorce."' 1 This bit of realism lies at the heart of the recommendation of
equitable distribution.
Nevertheless, the choosing of sides in the controversy over equal ver-
sus equitable distribution left women's groups, for the most part, on the
side of equal distribution and men's groups on the side of equitable distri-
bution.' 82 Women's groups advocated equal distribution because the ap-
plication of equitable distribution schemes in community property states
had worked to the disadvantage of women. 8 3  Women often had re-
ceived less than half the available property under these equitable distri-
bution schemes."8 Therefore, women feared that the unbridled
Some task force members believed that a fixed equal division of property
upon divorce would not operate fairly in some cases, and that divorce courts
should be given discretion to determine a different proportion for each spouse,
based on consideration of such factors as the respective contributions (not lim-
ited to financial) each spouse made to the marriage, duration of the marriage,
economic dependency and age of the spouses. On the other hand, with respect
to property division at the death of a spouse, a fixed 50-50 formula would have
some advantages. Unlike the case of death, a divorce proceeding is a two-party
action with both spouses having an opportunity to show the respective contri-
butions they have made to the marriage. Moreover, if a probate court had to
consider and make a determination based on various factors in the marriage of a
deceased person, it would delay the settling of estates.
The Council [on the Status of Women should] bring to the attention of State
Commissions and other appropriate organizations the desirability of empowering
their courts to make discretionary divisions of the property of the spouses in matri-
monial status actions (such as separation, divorce or annulment), it being left to
local determination what types of property are to be subject to such division and
the criteria which are to govern.
Report of the Task Force, supra note 44, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
181. For example, the Bureau of the Census reports that women still earn only 68% of
the earnings of men. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Current
Population Reports, Series P-70, No. 10, Male-Female Differences in Work Experience,
Occupation, and Earnings: 1984, Table F, at 4 (1987) [hereinafter Male-Female Differ-
ences]. Moreover, the study reported that women were much more likely than men to
have interrupted their careers. Forty-seven percent of female workers, as compared to
13% of male workers, experienced interruptions. The reason most frequently cited for
the interruption among women was family responsibilities. Id. at Table A and B, at 2; see
also Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Current Population Reports,
Series P-60, No. 157, Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the
United Stater 1986 (Advance Report) table 11, p. 19 (July, 1987) (average earnings of
men - $22,308; of women - $ 11,811); Women's Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, Facts
on Women Workers 1 (1982) [hereinafter Facts on Women Workers].
182. In Wisconsin and New York, for example, women's groups fought vigorously for
equal distribution. See Foster, supra note 51, at 31 (the New York effort); Fineman,
supra note 27, at 853-72 (Wisconsin effort). In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, women's
groups advocated equitable distribution, while certain men's groups promoted equal dis-
tribution. Freed & Foster, supra note 92, at 230.
183. Younger, supra note 175, at 241-44.
184. Id; see Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
19881
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discretion of judges hearing equitable distribution actions would leave
them with less than half of the property available for division. This dis-
trust of judicial discretion resulted from not only a fear of sex discrimina-
tion, but also a fear that in the separate property states, judges
subconsciously would adhere to the old formulas that might lead to an
unequal division in favor of the party with title and to other dispositions
that would not reflect the philosophy of the new legislation. 185
Another important, but somewhat less obvious, conflict that shaped
the debate arose between instrumental and symbolic reformers.186 Advo-
cates of equal division strove for gender neutral legislation that did not
make any self-perpetuating assumptions about the economic circum-
stances of men and women at divorce. 187 The reformers preferred equal
distribution in part because of the positive symbolism involved in
presuming that property could be divided equally at divorce without
leaving one spouse, the wife, in economic need. 88
The advocates of equitable distribution, on the other hand, lobbied for
a system that would enable a judge to recognize, in an award of more
than half of the available property, the greater economic need of one
spouse at dissolution. To accomplish the reformers' goal-to make prop-
erty division the foremost means to accommodate future support
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1199-1204
(1981).
185. For example, the reformers in Wisconsin feared that the judiciary would continue
the common law rule of considering an award of one-third of the property acquired dur-
ing the marriage as an appropriate starting place in determining an award for the wife.
Fineman, supra note 27, at 806. Professor Weitzman in her study of the economic conse-
quences at divorce recited this fear as well. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 48.
There is the tacit recognition by Professor Levy that judges, accustomed to separate
property systems, might be more comfortable with the equitable distribution statutes. He
explained that the drafters of the UMDA opted for equitable distribution in part because
equitable division would be viewed as less radical than a mandatory 50%-50% division.
R. Levy, supra note 30, at 167.
186. For a discussion of instrumental versus symbolic law reform, see Fineman, supra
note 27, at 790-96. For some of her conclusions, see id. at 816-26, 875-80. Other studies
have recognized the tension between idealist reform, which urges reform premised on the
equality of the groups with which it deals, and realistic reform, which makes compensa-
tory provisions because of the inequality of the subjects. See Marcus, Reflections on the
Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New York, 42 U. Miami
L. Rev. 55, 72 (1987) (discussing "gendered and degendered approaches to law reform").
For a treatment of this tension in the labor context, see MeCloud, Feminism's Idealist
Error, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277 (1986). For classic works on the topic, see
M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1967); and Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
While noting the symbolism inherent in reform legislation, Professor Kay points out
that the no-fault movement in California did not have as one of its stated goals the
achievement of equality between men and women. Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-
Fault Divorce Law, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 291, 300-01 (1987). Other reformers, however, used
the formal equality of the family law legislation to try to justify the attempt to achieve
economic equality in other settings. Id. at 301.
187. See supra note 182.
188. See Fineman, supra note 27, at 790-96.
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need' 89-judges would have to be empowered to divide property un-
equally in favor of spouses in need of support. Indeed, the advocates of
equitable, as opposed to equal, distribution referred to the unequal posi-
tion of men and women at divorce to support their conclusion that the
law of divorce needs ways to address this inequality.'
2. Dominance of Contribution
The dominance of contribution among the discretionary factors sup-
plies another significant reason for the judicial inattention to the need
factors. As will be shown,'9 1 the attention to contribution is related
closely to the norm of equal division; together, contribution and equal
division have subverted attention from the need factors.
Equitable distribution statutes in separate property states typically list
contribution as a factor in deciding how to divide the property.'92 For
example, all of the states in this study make some reference to contribu-
tion in their property division statutes. 93
189. E.g., Fineman, supra note 27, at 886. The women's groups that lobbied for equi-
table distribution in Pennsylvania, for example, considered that equitable distribution
would enable wives to receive property awards of greater than half the property available
for distribution. Freed & Foster, supra note 92, at 230; see supra notes 30-47 and accom-
panying text (discussing the preeminence of property in the reform proposals).
190. See eg., Fineman, supra note 27, at 878-80; see also Prager, supra note 69, at 2-5
(concern for equality was focus of reformers). Professor Prager concludes that the em-
phasis on equality has blinded society to the reality that principles of sharing characterize
most marriages. See id However, Professor Rheinstein, while noting that men and wo-
men are not situated equally at divorce, posits in an earlier work that vesting judges with
discretion makes "the price of individual justice... high." Rheinstein, supra note 35, at
432.
191. See infra notes 210-22 and accompanying text.
192. Freed & Walker, supra note 13, at 486.
193. For example, the Arkansas statute provides that if an equal division is not equita-
ble, the court should consider the "contribution of each party in acquisition, preservation
or appreciation of marital property, including services as a homemaker." Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 34-1214(A)(1)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1985). In this way, the Arkansas statute explicitly rec-
ognizes financial and nonfinancial contributions.
The Connecticut statute directs the court to consider "the contribution of each of the
parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective es-
tates." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986).
Part of the Montana statute requires the court to "consider the contribution or dis-
sipation of value of the respective estates and the contribution of a spouse as a home-
maker or to the family unit." Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202(l) (1987). In dividing
nonacquests, the statute provides that "the court shall consider those contributions of the
other spouse to the marriage, including: (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a home-
maker; [and] (b) the extent to which such contributions have facilitated the maintenance
of this property." Id at § 40-4-202(l)(a)-(b).
The New York statute directs the court to consider several kinds of contributions:
In determining an equitable disposition of property . . . . the court shall
consider:
any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the
acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, includingjoint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent,
1988]
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Contribution as a discretionary factor directs the court to consider a
spouse's efforts on behalf of the marriage. Several statutory variations of
this concept exist. Some statutory references to contribution link those
efforts to the acquisition of the property. 194 Certainly "efforts" in this
context includes financial contribution. 95 Many statutes, however, also
refer to "indirect" contribution and in this way instruct the court to con-
sider nonfinancial efforts as well.196 Many statutory references to contri-
bution broaden the concept still further by referring to contribution
unrelated to the acquisition of the property.' 97 The Wisconsin statute,
for example, directs courts to consider "[t]he contribution of each party
to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party's con-
wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other
party ....
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1986).
North Carolina's statute also provides for the recognition of several kinds of
contributions:
If the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall
divide the marital property equitably. Factors the court shall consider under
this subsection are as follows:
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution
made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having
title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services,
or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker;
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help edu-
cate or develop the career potential of the other spouse;
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property
which occurs during the course of the marriage ....
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(6)-(8) (1987).
The Wisconsin statute also recognizes several kinds of contribution. It provides:
The court shall presume that all [acquests are] to be divided equally between the
parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct
after considering:
(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate eco-
nomic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care services
[and]
(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earn-
ing power of the other.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(3), (5) (West 1981).
194. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986) ("the contribution.., in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates").
195. Bachman v. Bachman, 274 Ark. 23, 621 S.W.2d 701, 703-04 (1981) (doctor
earned right in profit-sharing trust by his financial contributions). Part of the impetus for
reform was to recognize nonfinancial contribution. See supra notes 42-47 and accompa-
nying text.
196. E.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(6) ("indirect contribution... includ-
ing ... services as a spouse, parent... and homemaker"); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(7)
("indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate.., the other spouse"); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 767.255(3) ("contribution in homemaking and child care services").
197. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(6); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(7);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(3).
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tribution in homemaking and child-care services. '
No matter how broadly or narrowly a statute uses the term "contribu-
tion," contribution has a retrospective focus. For a court to determine
the effect of a spouse's contribution on the appropriate division of prop-
erty, the court must look at the history of the marriage. Unlike the need
factors, the discretionary factors related to contribution require, not an
assessment of future need, but an historical review of the marriage to
determine how to divide the property.1 99
Although contribution's retrospective focus probably has played a part
in diverting attention from the need factors,"' the frequent reference to
contribution in equitable distribution statutes clearly reflects the success
of the reform movement. One of the main goals of reform was to insure
that both parties share at divorce in the assets of the marriage. °1 Be-
cause some separate property states did not recognize nonfinancial con-
tribution in the acquisition of title, an expansive concept of contribution
in property division statutes was crucial.20 2
Analysis of the cases, however, suggests that, in one sense, the reform-
ers were too successful in promoting contribution as a discretionary fac-
tor.2"3 Contribution dominates the cases and diverts attention from
circumstances raising the need factors.2°4 Some cases concentrate on
198. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(6); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
(c)(7); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(3).
199. See supra note 27.
200. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
202. For example, in White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 774, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1985),
the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged the inequities that title theory had
worked on the homemaker, citing Leatherman v. Leatherman, 197 N.C. 618, 256 S.F.2d
793 (1979) (awarding wife who had worked closely in husband's business only her half of
the entireties property).
203. A statement by the North Carolina Court of Appeals illustrates the dominance of
contribution: "As we interpret it, the policy behind [the equitable distribution statute] is
basically one of repayment of contribution." Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 669,
321 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1984).
Nonmonetary contributions, however, continue to labor at a disadvantage in some con-
texts. For example, a New York statute entitled a spouse to a division of the appreciation
of separate property "to the extent that such appreciation [was] due in part to the contri-
butions or efforts of the other spouse." N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 236 Pt. B(l)(d)(3) (McKinney
1986). At one point, it appeared that nonmonetary contributions would not be consid-
ered in entitling a spouse to a division of the appreciation of separate property. Jolis v.
Jolis, II1 Misc. 2d 965, 979-80, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138, 146-47 (1981), aff'd, 98 A.D.2d 692,
470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1983). A later case recognized the propriety of indirect contributions
as entitling a spouse to the appreciation of separate property. Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d
299, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1985), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219
(1986).
204. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Tonne, 733 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1987) (justifying award
of premarital property based on wife's contribution); In re Marriage of Kaasa, 181 Mont.
18, 591 P.2d 1110 (1979) (justifying award of inherited property because of wife's contri-
bution); Ward v. Ward, 101 A.D.2d 1006, 476 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1984) (modifying and, as
modified, affirming disposition primarily on basis of contribution), appeal dismissed, 68
N.Y.2d 805, 498 N.E.2d 431, 506 N.Y.S.2d 867, appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504
N.E.2d 397 (1987); Wenzel v. Wenzel, 122 Misc. 2d 1001, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984)
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contribution to justify an equal division when other need factors raise the
propriety of an unequal division in favor of the party in greater need.20 5
For example, while one court noted the greater need of a wife who had
been long from the work force, it referred to her contribution to the mar-
riage to divide the property equally.20 6 Despite the presence of greater
need, the court focused on contribution. 0 7 The reliance on contribution
appears to free judges from addressing the greater need. Other opinions
rely on economic contribution to justify an unequal division in favor of
the economically stronger spouse .20  Again, although other factors in
these cases raise need and the propriety of an unequal division in favor of
the economically weaker spouse, in case after case the attention to contri-
bution overshadows the concern for need.2°9
(holding contribution and unique fault justified unequal division for wife who was victim
of brutal assault by husband); Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 353 S.E.2d 427 (1987)
(justifying award based on contribution of husband towards wife's education).
Of course, reviewing courts in this study did not consistently promote contribution
over need as the dominant consideration in the division of property. See, e.g., McPhee v.
McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 440 A.2d 274 (1982) (trial court clearly emphasized contribu-
tion most prominently, and appellate court noted, while commenting on the need of the
wife, that the statute did not give any priority to the list of factors); Kowis v. Kowis, 202
Mont. 371, 658 P.2d 1084 (1983) (unequal division of property in favor of unemployed
wife proper despite husband's argument of wife's lack of financial contributions); Lewis v.
Lewis, 198 Mont. 51, 643 P.2d 604 (1982) (wife's scant earnings suggested to appellate
court that trial court had not considered relevant factors). These cases, however, repre-
sent exceptions to the rule of suppressing concerns for need in deference to contribution
in the division of property.
205. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Alt, 708 P.2d 258 (Mont. 1985); Majauskas v. Majaus-
kas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1984); Bisca v. Bisca, 108 A.D.2d
773, 485 N.Y.S.2d 302, appeal dismissed, 66 N.Y.2d 741, 488 N.E.2d 111, 497 N.Y.S.2d
365 (1985); Ward v. Ward, 101 A.D.2d 1006, 476 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1984), appeal dismissed,
68 N.Y.2d 805, 498 N.E.2d 431, 506 N.Y.S.2d 867, appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 603, 504
N.E.2d 397 (1987); Harness v. Harness, 99 A.D.2d 658, 472 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1984).
206. Perri v. Perri, 97 A.D.2d 399, 400, 467 N.Y.S.2d 225, 228 (1983), appeal dis-
missed, 61 N.Y.2d 603, 460 N.E.2d 1360, 472 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1984).
207. Id. at 401, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
208. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 616 S.W.2d 3 (1981); Forsgren v. Forsgren,
4 Ark. App. 286, 630 S.W.2d 64 (1982); Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 496
A.2d 210, appeal denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985).
209. For example, Ford v. Ford, 272 Ark. 506, 616 S.W.2d 3 (1981), involved the
dissolution of a marriage in which the wife had spent most of her married life contribut-
ing as a homemaker until she began to suffer severe depression. By statute, see Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 34-1215 (Cum. Supp. 1985), the trial court divided the entireties property equally.
Ford, 272 Ark. at 516, 616 S.W.2d at 8. However, even in light of Arkansas's presump-
tion of an equal division, the trial court divided the rest of the property in a ratio of 90%
to 10% in favor of the husband. Id. at 516, 616 S.W.2d at 8. In lamenting the unequal
disposition against the economically weaker party, the dissent noted that in those in-
stances where women are weaker economically, they fare worse after equitable distribu-
tion as long as trial courts continue to balance the factors in the manner balanced in this
case. Id. at 519, 616 S.W.2d at 9 (Purtle, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice com-
mented, "[d]ivorced women cannot stand any more progress if this is progress." Id. at
519, 616 S.W.2d at 9 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
Likewise, in Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 496 A.2d 210, appeal denied,
197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985), the appellate court approved the distribution of 80%
of the available property to the husband, 20% to the wife. As the appellate court noted,
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The study reveals the dominance of contribution as a discretionary fac-
tor, and the relationship of contribution to equal division partially ex-
plains this preoccupation. As discussed above, many reformers lobbied
vigorously for equal, as opposed to equitable, division of property.2"'
They lobbied also for statutory references to contribution that would rec-
ognize that property interests attach by virtue of nonfinancial, as well as
financial, contributions.2 ' Nonfinancial contribution deserved recogni-
tion in the form of property rights because these efforts were as valuable
to the marriage as financial contribution. The law of property division,
these proponents argued, should assume that however parties contrib-
uted to their marriage was satisfactory to them. 2 2 This assumption quite
naturally translated into an assumption that the parties made equally val-
uable contributions to the marriage entitling them to equal shares of the
property.
The focus on contribution, then, fed the norm of equal division. Even
so, references to contribution appeared in statutes that listed other fac-
tors to consider as well-notably, factors relating to need. Nothing
about the references to contribution indicated that the court should over-
look the other factors. Nevertheless, the presence of contribution as a
discretionary factor seems to have encouraged equal divisions in the face
of need.
The analysis of a homemaker's contribution in a Wisconsin case illus-
trates this treatment. In Steinke v. Steinke,213 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin noted the presumption of equal division of property and the
compatibility of that presumption with recognizing contribution to the
marriage.214 The court also observed that the traditional homemaker,
like the wife in the case at bar, both makes contributions to a marriage
and loses ground in the job market.2"' The presence of contribution and,
because of lost ground in the job market, need would seem to recommend
an unequal division of property.216 Nevertheless, the court observed that
the trial court had based its award explicitly only on the greater contributions of the
husband, paying nominal attention to the other statutory factors. Id at 615-16, 496 A.2d
at 213. Without even commenting upon the implications for the property division, the
court simply upheld the property award and relied on the substantial alimony award to
address the greater need of the wife. Id at 615-16, 496 A.2d at 212-13; see also Forsgren
v. Forsgren, 4 Ark. App. 286, 630 S.W.2d 64 (1982) (noting lower court made unequal
distribution of property even though statute provides that marital property is to be di-
vided equally); infra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (discussing the reliance on ali-
mony rather than property division to address need).
210. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
212. See ag., American Women, supra note 42, at 47 ("each spouse makes a different
but equally important contribution [to a marriage]").
213. 126 Wis. 2d 372, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985).
214. Id. at 380-81, 376 N.W.2d at 843-44.
215. Id. at 381, 376 N.W.2d at 844 (citing Jasper v. Jasper, 107 Wis. 2d 59, 68, 318
N.W.2d 792, 797 (1982)).
216. The court in Steinke made some allowance for need but only through an award of
alimony. See id at 384, 376 N.W.2d at 847. The point, however, remains valid: insofar
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these facts justified not some accommodation of need, but an equal
division.2"'
In only one setting has contribution failed to result in equal divisions
of property: the setting of the two-career marriage. Some observers had
predicted that the reformers' focus on homemaker contribution was too
narrow and would leave unprotected those women who worked outside
the home but at less pay than their husbands.218 Several New York cases
have confirmed this prediction by abandoning contribution's norm of
equal division in the setting of two careers and awarding the greater
share of the property to the spouse with more earnings, usually the
husband.219
In these cases, the reviewing courts of New York have abandoned the
assumption that parties make equal contributions to the marriage. 2
Rather, at least one appellate court has gone so far as to assume that in
the two-career marriage, parties have agreed to share the accumulated
assets in proportion only to their financial contributions.22 1 This as-
sumption ignores a number of relevant points. First, it ignores the fact
that even in a two-career marriage, the parties continue to make a
number of contributions-both monetary and nonmonetary-to the mar-
riage. If there is a justification for assuming that parties to a traditional
marriage make equal contributions to the marriage, that assumption be-
comes no less valid when both parties work outside the home. Moreover,
the assumption that the parties agree to share the jointly-accumulated
property in proportion only to their monetary contributions assumes that
each had equal opportunity to earn a certain income. Employment sta-
tistics, however, do not justify the assumption that the wife enjoys an
as the property division was concerned, the court equated contribution and equal division
with property division and not with need. See infra notes 271-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the reliance on alimony to address need).
217. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d at 381, 376 N.W.2d at 844.
218. See supra note 46.
219. Michalek v. Michalek, 114 A.D.2d 655, 656, 494 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (1985) (divid-
ing property in proportion to earnings, though short duration of marriage appears also to
have been a factor), appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 602, 504 N.E.2d 395 (1986); Kobylack v.
Kobylack, 111 A.D.2d 221, 222-23, 489 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (1985) (dividing jointly held
property unequally in proportion to the financial contributions of the parties); Bentley v.
Knight, 92 A.D.2d 638, 639-40, 459 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937-38 (1983) (dividing the property
equally rather than in proportion to earnings of the parties to the two-career marriage but
only because the facts included a request by the husband to the wife for the wife to move
and to stop working; otherwise, the court would have assumed some kind of agreement to
divide property according to their unequal earnings).
220. In Jolis v. Jolis, 111 Misc. 2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1981), aff'd, 98 A.D.2d 692,
470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1983), for example, the court's disposition assumed equal contribu-
tions. The court recognized the wife's abandonment of a successful career to undertake
responsibility for a marital home and child rearing as contributions. See id. at 986, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 150. The court also noted the wife's role as a constant source of social
companionship for her husband. See id.
221. See, e.g., Bentley v. Knight, 92 A.D.2d 638, 639-40, 494 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938
(1983). Professor Prager discusses the sharing principles that might outweigh equality
notions in the two-career marriage in Prager, supra note 69, at 6-11.
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equal opportunity to earn an equal income.2"2 Finally, the decision to
divide property in proportion to the unequal financial contributions of
the parties ignores the fact that one party is in greater need than the
other at divorce. In response to the statutory directives to consider need
in dividing property, the spouse with less income should be entitled to
more-not less--of the property unless consideration of the other factors
warrants a different disposition. Again, in these cases contribution has
served to divert attention from need as appropriate to consideration in
the division of property.
3. Treatment of Length of Marriage
The preference for equal distribution and the related dominance of
contribution as a discretionary factor offer the most obvious explanations
for why the courts have slighted the discretionary factors related to need.
The treatment received by three other discretionary factors, length of
marriage, standard of living, and employability, also helps explain the
inattention to need.
All of the six states in the study list length or duration of the marriage
as an appropriate factor to consider when dividing the available prop-
erty. 3  The statutory reference to length of the marriage reflects a con-
cern both for rewarding contribution to the marriage and for addressing
need. On the one hand, the listing of length of marriage demonstrates a
desire to reward contribution to the marriage since the length of the mar-
riage correlates perfectly with the opportunity for contribution to it. On
the other hand, the statutory reference to duration of the marriage also
reflects a concern for postdivorce need. For example, in the setting of the
traditional housewife marriage, the length of the marriage also represents
the length of time from the work force. The longer the marriage, the
greater the likely disparity between the economic circumstances of the
husband and wife. In this sense, by listing length of marriage as a discre-
tionary factor, the legislature has authorized the court to compensate for
that need by an unequal division of property in favor of the more needy
spouse.
Because length of marriage as a discretionary factor in property divi-
sion statutes recognizes both contribution and need, courts may refer to
length of marriage to divide property in a way that reflects contribution
or in a way that addresses need. In the treatment of length of marriage,
222. See supra note 181 (earnings comparisons between men and women and the
greater numbers of job interruptions for women for family reasons). These recent statis-
tics reinforce conclusions drawn in other works. See, eg., Facts on Women Workers,
supra note 181, at 1. At least one researcher in an earlier study found that in the two-
earner family, the wife's career usually made the necessary accommodations. See J. Ber-
nard, Women and the Public Interest 191 (1971).
223. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(a)(1)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46b-81(c) (West 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202(1) (1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20
(c)(3) (1984 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(2) (McKinney 1986);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(1) (West 1981).
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however, analysis of the cases reflects an unwarranted separation: the
courts generally define the length of marriage as synonymous with op-
portunity for contribution only in decisions on how to divide the prop-
erty2 24 and define length of marriage as an indicator of need only in
decisions on alimony.225 This practice, contrary to the statute's inten-
tion, results in courts rarely awarding greater than half the property to
the wife on the basis of the length of the marriage, even when long mar-
riage has left her at an economic disadvantage.
4. Treatment of Standard of Living
Like length of marriage, standard of living is a discretionary factor
that concerns itself with postdivorce need. Four of the six states in the
study list either the phrase "standard of living"'2 26 or "station in life"
227
or the word "station" 228 among the factors relevant to the property divi-
224. See, e.g., Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 296-97, 342 N.W.2d 750, 754
(1983); see also Neumark v. Neumark, 120 A.D.2d 502, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1986) (ong
marriage linked to contribution), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 899, 507 N.E.2d 1091
(1987). The frequent mention of the short duration of the marriage as a justification for
property division illustrates that contribution is the focus when length of marriage is
used. In a number of cases in which one party was left in need, at least in comparison to
the other party, the appellate courts justified the division by referring to the short dura-
tion of the marriage. See, e.g., Cappiello v. Cappiello, 110 A.D.2d 608, 609, 488
N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (reducing wife's award from 50% to 25% in part because of the short
duration of the marriage), aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 107, 485 N.E.2d 983, 495 N.Y.S.2d 318
(1985) (per curiam); Duffy v. Duffy, 94 A.D.2d 711, 462 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1983) (equal
division modified to 75% to husband, 25% to wife, based, in part, on the short duration
of the marriage).
225. See, eg., Stout v. Stout, 4 Ark. App. 266, 630 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (1982); Neumark
v. Neumark, 120 A.D.2d 502, 504, 501 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707 (1986), appeal dismissed, 69
N.Y.2d 900, 507 N.E.2d 1091, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1987); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72,
84, 318 N.W.2d 391, 398 (1982).
226. The Wisconsin statute refers to a property division to enable "education or train-
ing to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably com-
parable to that enjoyed during the marriage." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (6) (West 1981).
227. The Arkansas statute requires an equal division "unless the court finds such a
division to be inequitable." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985). Upon
such a finding, the court shall consider, among other things, the "station in life of the
parties." § 34-1214(A)(1)(2).
228. Both the Connecticut and Montana statutes refer to "station" as appropriate to
the division. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-
4-202(1) (1987).
The statutes of neither New York nor North Carolina contain an explicit reference to
standard of living. The New York statute, however, refers to related concepts as appro-
priate to the division, such as "the income and property of each party at the time of
marriage," N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(1) (McKinney 1986), "the duration of
the marriage and the age and health of both parties," id. at § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(2), and "the
probable future financial circumstances of each party." Id. at § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(8). The
North Carolina statute refers to "[t]he income, property, and liabilities of each party at
the time the division of property is to become effective," N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(1)
(1987), and to "[t]he duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health
of both parties," id. at § 50-20(c)(3). Both states allow the court to consider other factors
it finds appropriate. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(13) (McKinney 1986);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(12) (1987).
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sion. This statutory language enables the court to use property division
to address a standard of living lowered by the dissolution z' 9 or to address
the spouses' unequal standard of living.23
The rhetoric of the cases sometimes acknowledges these statutory fac-
tors, explaining that property division should help the spouse try to
maintain the marital standard of living.23" ' The results of the cases, how-
ever, reveal a reluctance to address standard of living through a property
award.232 They demonstrate an approval of equal divisions in the face of
disparate standards of living23 3 and unequal divisions in favor of the
party with the higher standard of living.2 34 The analyses in these cases
229. In some of the Montana cases, the court addressed a lowered standard of living
through the property division. Eg., Levandowski v. Levandowski, 630 P.2d 239 (Mont.
1981); Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 603 P.2d 259 (1979). Indeed, the Montana
Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[t]he Act provides for the coordination of prop-
erty distribution and maintenance to assure that a spouse without the ability to support
herself will be maintained at a similar standard of living." Levandowski, 630 P.2d at 242.
Occasionally the opinions contain a specific reference to standard of living in discussions
of property dispositions. See, eg., Bailey, 184 Mont. at 419-20, 603 P.2d at 260 (award-
ing wife house to maintain standard of living since husband more able to purchase alter-
native housing). However, discussions of standard of living in the Montana cases, as in
the cases of all the states in the study, appear in connection with maintenance more often
than with property division. See infra note 235.
230. In Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 171-72, 711 S.W.2d 447, 453-54 (1986), the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court upheld an equal division of property by noting that the chancellor
had found that the equal division was proper because the parties would enjoy comparable
standards of living after divorce. See also Hecht v. Hecht, 199 Mont. 363, 649 P.2d 1257
(1982) (justifying unequal award for wife because, in part, of unequal employment sta-
tus); Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 420, 603 P.2d 259, 260 (1979) (finding wife needed
house to maintain standard of living).
231. See supra note 229.
232. For example, the Arkansas statute presumes an equal division but directs the
court to consider the "station in life of the parties" if it finds an equal division inequitable.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A) (Cum. Supp. 1985). The appellate courts in Meinholz v.
Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984), and Lee v. Lee, 12 Ark. App. 226, 674
S.W.2d 505 (1984), nevertheless approved an equal division despite the wife's apparently
lower station in life.
In Connecticut, the statute mandates attention to the parties' "station" without the
presumption of an equal division of property. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West
1986). Nevertheless, some Connecticut cases approve unequal divisions of property for
the husband and ignore the wife's "station" in the property division. See Wolk v. Wolk,
191 Conn. 328, 464 A.2d 780 (1983); Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 496
A.2d 210, appeal denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985). In both of these cases, the
wife received alimony awards. See Wolk, 191 Conn. at 333, 464 A.2d at 784; Eversman, 4
Conn. App. at 615-16, 496 A.2d at 213. The point remains, however, that the court did
not address "station" through the property division.
For cases from Montana and Wisconsin, see, for example, In re Marriage of Hull, 712
P.2d 1317, 1319 (Mont. 1986) (awarding slightly unequal division for husband); and Bahr
v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 318 N.W.2d 391, 394-95 (1982) (finding maintenance unrea-
sonably low because of standard of living but containing no discussion of standard of
living in relation to property award).
233. See eg., Meinholz v. Meinhlaoz, 283 Ark. 509, 513-14, 678 S.W.2d 348, 350
(1984); Lee v. Lee, 12 Ark. App. 226, 228, 674 S.W.2d 505, 506 (1984).
234. See e.g., Wolk v. Wolk, 191 Conn. 328, 333-34, 464 A.2d 780, 784 (1983);
Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 616, 496 A.2d 210, 213, appeal denied, 197
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simply overlook the impact of the disposition on the standard of living.
If the opinions treat the standard of living at all, they usually reserve it
for discussions of awards of alimony.2 35 The message from the reviewing
courts seems clear: standard of living is an appropriate consideration in
determining alimony but not in dividing property.
The Wisconsin experience is illuminating. The Wisconsin property di-
vision statute provides that the court may alter an equal division of the
property after considering "the time and expense necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-sup-
porting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed
Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Mont.
1986).
235. For example, the Arkansas property statute refers to "station in life." See Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 34-1214(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1985). Nevertheless, in Stout v. Stout, 4 Ark.
App. 266, 630 S.W.2d 53 (1982), the appellate court directed an unequal division of prop-
erty in favor of the husband despite the wife's lower standard of living. The court noted
the propriety of using alimony to "balance some inequity in the division of property." Id.
at 272, 630 S.W.2d at 56.
Likewise, the Connecticut statute directs the court to consider "station... and needs"
of the parties in addition to other factors relating to future needs. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46b-81(c) (West 1983). Moreover, the Connecticut statute makes no presumption of an
equal division. See id. Nevertheless, the cases reveal the use of alimony, and not prop-
erty division, to address the lowered standard of living. For example, in Leo v. Leo, 197
Conn. 1, 7, 495 A.2d 704, 708 (1985), the court found alimony appropriate to compensate
for the husband's higher earning capacity. The court, while noting the husband's greater
capacity, upheld an unequal division of property in favor of the husband. Id. at 8-9, 495
A.2d at 709.
Of the six states, Montana has articulated most clearly that property should perform a
support function. Except in connection with standard of living, the opinions also demon-
strate a clear preference for property division over maintenance as the means to address
the economic consequences of divorce. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnsrud, 181 Mont.
544, 549-50, 572 P.2d 902, 905 (1977). Nevertheless, when standard of living is in issue,
the analyses often conclude that maintenance, as opposed to a property division, is in
order. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 714 P.2d 548, 550, 552 (Mont. 1986) (af-
firming unequal division of property for the lawyer-husband against a wife out of the
work force; property available but court awarded temporary maintenance); Levandowski
v. Levandowski, 630 P.2d 239, 241-42 (Mont. 1981) (affirming an unequal division of
property in favor of the husband who had an earning capacity three or four times greater
than the wife's, noting the coordination with the maintenance award). Thus, the
Supreme Court of Montana also has affirmed equal divisions of property and awards of
maintenance.
Too often, the courts reserve their discussions of standard of living for the portion of
the opinion dealing with maintenance. For example, in In re Marriage of Herron, 186
Mont. 396, 608 P.2d 97 (1980), a physically disabled wife had custody of four minor
children. The court remanded an equal division of property because of the character of
the marital property, not because of her need. Id. at 407-08, 608 P.2d at 103. Further-
more, the court noted her fifteen-year absence from the work force and inability to main-
tain the standard of living of the marriage. Id. at 407, 608 P.2d at 103. This discussion,
however, appeared only in the analysis of maintenance, not of property division. Id. at
406-07, 608 P.2d at 103; see also In re Marriage of Hilt, 679 P.2d 783 (Mont. 1984)
(holding that inability of the wife to maintain her standard of living justified maintenance
award); Balsam v. Balsam, 180 Mont. 129, 589 P.2d 652 (1979) (characterizing wife's
lack of income as a maintenance argument).
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during the marriage." '236 By authorizing a division of property to accom-
modate the need for support, the statute illustrates that property, like
alimony, performs a support function. Indeed, the Wisconsin cases em-
phasize the interrelation of property division and alimony.Y Further-
more, the cases acknowledge that divorce reform expanded the discretion
of the trial court in these economic matters.238 One would therefore ex-
pect to find the appellate courts, armed with these guides, approving the
use of property to redress a lowered standard of living. Instead of recog-
nizing the support function of property and its use in connection with
standard of living, the opinions perpetuate the traditional distinction be-
tween property and alimony: property division serves to apportion prop-
erty according to contribution and alimony serves to provide any
necessary support.
As one court reasoned, the property legislation presumes that the hus-
band and wife acquired the property by their joint efforts, justifying the
statutory presumption of an equal division. 239 The court found the ra-
tionale for alimony, on the other hand, to be need and ability to pay.2 4
While the court was right in finding that the property division statute's
presumption of equal division is based on acquisition through joint ef-
forts, the court ignored the fact that the statute just as clearly makes
greater need relevant to the division. The court's analysis, therefore, un-
dercut the use of the legislation to adjust the standard of living and thus
discourages the trial courts from using property division to alleviate
need.
5. Treatment of Employability
The treatment of employability, another discretionary need factor, also
helps to explain the inattention to postdivorce need. All of the states in
the study include vocation, income, employment, or similar criteria as
appropriate considerations in division of property at divorce. The stat-
utes on division of property in Arkansas, Connecticut, and Montana re-
236. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(6) (West 1981).
237. Eg., Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 389, 376 N.W.2d 839, 847 (1985) (sub-
stantial error in property division requires reconsideration of maintenance award); Bahr
v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 80, 318 N.W.2d 391, 396 (1982) (same).
238. Fuerst v. Fuerst, 93 Wis. 2d 121, 132 n.3, 286 N.W.2d 861, 866 n.3 (1979).
239. Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 81-82, 318 N.W.2d 391, 398 (1982).
240. Id; see also Trattles v. Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d 219, 228-30, 376 N.W.2d 379, 384
(1985) (discussing standard of living only in maintenance portion of opinion).
Another case, Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 342 N.W.2d 750 (1983), under-
scores this reliance on alimony to perform the support function in the face of the standard
of living language in the property statute. In Asbeck, the court divided equally a substan-
tial estate. The court included premarital property in the division according to its statu-
tory authority. Id at 292-93, 342 N.W.2d at 752; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255 (West 1981).
Almost apologetically, the court noted the husband's retirement and explained why it
awarded inherited property instead of alimony. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d at 296, 342 N.W.2d
at 754. Since the statute makes standard of living relevant to the property disposition, the
court need not have apologized for its use of property in lieu of alimony.
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fer specifically to employability.241 The statutes of both New York and
North Carolina refer to the income of the parties as an appropriate con-
sideration,242 and the New York statute also mentions "the probable fu-
ture financial circumstances of each party." '243 Wisconsin's statute
emphasizes future income most prominently of the six by directing the
court to consider
[t]he earning capacity of each party, including educational back-
ground, training, employment skills, work experience, length of ab-
sence from the job market, custodial reponsibilities for children and
the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or train-
ing to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of liv-
ing reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. 244
Like standard of living, the reference to employability directs courts to
compare the employment capabilities of the two spouses. The less capa-
ble spouse has greater need and therefore may merit an award of greater
than half of the available property. The propriety of comparing the
spouses' employability would need no further support if it were not for
the interpretation given the term by some courts.
The listing of discretionary factors in the property division statutes
clearly contemplates a comparison of the two spouses in relation to the
factor in question. When courts focus on income, for example, they com-
pare the income of the spouses. If one spouse earns less than the other,
the results of that comparison may lead to unequal division in favor of
the spouse earning the lesser amount.2 45 Similarly, the listing of age or
health contemplates a comparison of the two spouses in relation to the
factor under analysis. The fact that one spouse is older or less healthy
than the other may warrant an unequal division of property in favor of
the older or less healthy spouse.246
The opinions of the reviewing courts, for the most part, however, do
not compare the employability of the two spouses.247 Rather, the defini-
tion that emerges from the reviewing cases suggests that employability
means ability to be employed at any income, regardless of the other
241. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1214 (A)(1)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 46b-81(c) (West Supp. 1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202(l) (1987).
242. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(1) (McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 50-20(c)(1) (1987).
243. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(8) (McKinney 1986).
244. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(6) (West 1981).
245. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 184 Mont. 418, 419-20, 603 P.2d 259, 260 (1979).
246. In upholding an unequal division of property, a North Carolina appellate court
explained that a single factor could justify an unequal division: "For example, a finding
that one party suffered chronic disability arising during the marriage, while the other was
young and healthy, might in an appropriate case support a discretionary distribution
grossly in favor of the disabled party." Andrews v. Andrews, 79 N.C. App. 228, 235, 338
S.E.2d 809, 814, review denied, 316 N.C. 730, 345 S.E.2d 385 (1986).
247. See the discussion of the use of alimony to balance disparities in income in the
Wisconsin cases infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
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spouse's employability.248 For the purpose of dividing property, the
courts seem to consider it irrelevant that one spouse is capable of being
employed only at a fraction of the income of the other spouse.
This restrictive definition of employability dominates the appellate
opinions. For example, in one case, the wife earned $8,000 per year
while the husband earned in excess of $60,000. Nevertheless, the court
upheld an equal division of property and no alimony award, making no
reference to the disparity.24 9 Perhaps even more common, and more per-
nicious in terms of its impact on property division at divorce,' is the
practice of looking at disparities only for the purpose of determining ali-
mony awards, not for the division of property.25' In New York opinions
that segregate the analyses of property division and alimony, references
to disparities between incomes appear only in the review of alimony
awards. 252 This treatment appears in other states as well 25 3 and in light
of the history of reform is especially anomalous. The reform movement
articulated the preference for property division as the means for making
the economic adjustments at divorce and deemphasized alimony statutes
248. This definition of employability, "capable of being employed at any level," is usu-
ally implicit in the cases in this section cited as illustrative. See, eg., Meinholz v.
Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 511, 678 S.W.2d 348, 349 (1984) (equal division despite great
disparity in incomes); Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 7, 495 A.2d 704, 708 (1985) (unequal
division of property for husband with higher earning capacity, using alimony to address
difference in "employability"). Oddly enough, this restrictive definition appears explicitly
in a Connecticut case in which the majority opinion adopted a definition that actually
compared the spouses' earning abilities. In McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 440 A.2d
274 (1982), the Connecticut Supreme Court construed the term in a case involving a wife
with a drinking problem who had not been employed during the marriage. The husband
had been self-employed for 25 years. 440 A.2d at 275. At the time of the hearing, the
wife had secured clerical employment but earned less than half as much as the husband.
440 A.2d at 278. The trial court had made an unequal division in favor of the husband
and found their employability roughly equal. 440 A.2d at 278. The appellate court re-
manded on the division of property and on the alimony award in part for this finding of
equal "employability." 440 A.2d at 278-79. However, a concurring justice took the op-
portunity to note that the trial court had applied the correct definition of employability.
440 A.2d at 280 (Healey, J., concurring). Employability, the justice explained, asks only
whether a spouse can be employed and does not contemplate a comparison of employ-
ment capabilities. 440 A.2d at 280 (Healey, J., concurring). By this definition, the justice
concluded that the spouses were equal in employability since the wife had recently begun
entry-level clerical work. Her employment prospects in relation to her husband's were
immaterial. 440 A.2d at 280 (Healy, J., concurring).
249. Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 504, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513-14 (1983)
(Purtle, J., dissenting); see, eg., Kis v. Kis, 196 Mont. 296, 639 P.2d 1151, 1154-55 (1982)
(upholding lower court's division of marital estate).
250. See infra notes 267-79 and accompanying text.
251. See eg., Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 5, 495 A.2d 704, 707 (1985); Griffin v. Griffin,
115 A.D.2d 587, 589, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1985); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 A.D.2d 386,
389, 470 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403.04 (1983), appeal dismissed, 62 N.Y.2d 646 (1984).
252. See, eg., Griffin v. Griffin, 115 A.D.2d 587, 589, 496 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (1985);
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 A.D.2d 386, 389, 470 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403-05 (1983), appeal dis-
missed, 62 N.Y.2d 646 (1984).
253. See, e.g., Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 7, 495 A.2d 704, 708 (1985); Levandowski v.
Levandowski, 630 P.2d 239, 241 (Mont. 1981).
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in order to reflect that preference.254 When courts in states like these
refer to income disparities only in discussions of alimony, they ignore a
significant portion of the legislative history and the statutory directives of
their property division statutes.
6. Failure to Implement the Philosophy of the Relationship of
Property Division and Alimony
As the above sections demonstrate, several explanations emerge for the
underutilization of the need factors.255 The most obvious are the norm of
254. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Wisconsin in particular developed
a preference for maintenance after the enactment of its equitable distribution statute. For
examples of theories calling for awards of maintenance, see Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis.
2d 372, 386-87, 376 N.W.2d 839, 846-47 (1985); Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200,
211-15, 343 N.W.2d 796, 802-04 (1984); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 80-83, 318
N.W.2d 391, 396-97 (1982); Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 22, 318 N.W.2d 358, 360
(1982); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 318 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1982); see
also infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
The interpretation of employability in connection with property division leads to an-
other observation. In the setting of property division, the cases demonstrate both unreal-
istic assessments of employment opportunities and the absence of evidence to support the
findings based on these opportunities. In one case, the appellate court approved the divi-
sion of property and denial of alimony based, in part, on a determination that the wife
could count on earnings as a harpist for support. Anderson v. Anderson, 191 Conn. 46,
52-54, 463 A.2d 578, 582 (1983). The dissent pointed out that the wife had been inactive
as a professional musician for twenty years and that it was unrealistic to think that she
could support herself as a musician in a changed musical environment. Id. at 61, 463
A.2d at 586 (Shea, J., dissenting). Equally troubling to the dissent, the majority allowed
the trial court to base its conclusion on evidence it characterized as mere speculation. Id.
In contrast, the dissent noted the state justified an award of alimony based on earning
capacity only after the presentation of evidence of the specific amount of income that
could be earned by the spouse allegedly failing to earn up to his or her capacity. Id.
(citing Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 190, 429 A.2d 470, 473 (1980)).
This willingness to speculate about a spouse's employability is common. In another
Connecticut case, the wife argued to the appellate court that the trial court had ignored
her lack of employability when it divided equally the marital property and awarded ali-
mony only until the child of the marriage was eighteen and the house was sold. See
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 453 A.2d 1151 (1982). The wife pointed to her
absence from the work force for twelve years while she assumed primary childcare re-
sponsibilities and to her current earnings as a waitress of only $77 per week. Id. at 743,
453 A.2d at 1155. The appellate court merely upheld the discretion of the trial court in
weighing the various statutory factors and refused to upset the award. Id. at 744, 453
A.2d at 1155. The fact that a woman has been long from the work force in the care of
children seems to have little bearing on employability. See, e.g., Schussler v. Schussler,
109 A.D.2d 875, 877, 487 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (1985) (approving an award of only one-half
the marital property and substantial but temporary alimony for a woman long out of the
work force with primary responsibility for six children), appeal dismissed, 69 N.Y.2d 822,
506 N.E.2d 537, appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 612, 511 N.E.2d 87 (1987).
In other cases, even where great disparities in the level of employability would seem
apparent, courts have remanded awards of greater than half the property for the spouse
with the lesser level of employability, reasoning that the findings were insufficient to jus-
tify the award of greater than half to the spouse with the bleaker employment picture.
See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C. App. 332, 336, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289-90 (1985); Alex-
ander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 552-53, 315 S.E.2d 772, 775-76 (1984).
255. The explanations offered in the text do not purport to be an exhaustive list. An-
other explanation for the inattention to need in property division may not be apparent.
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equal division and, related to equal division, the dominance of contribu-
tion as a discretionary factor.256 The courts' interpretations of the dis-
cretionary factors of length of marriage, standard of living, and
employability257 also help to explain the underutilization of the need fac-
tors and the resulting failure to address need through the division of
property. Although the preceding explanations are more obvious, an-
other explanation also emerges: courts fail to implement the philosophy
of the relationship between property division and alimony.
Divorce reform promoted a simple explanation for the relationship be-
tween property division and alimony: property division was to supplant
alimony if the divorcing parties had sufficient property to address ex-
isting need.258 Two components figured in this philosophy: first, prop-
erty division was a method to address postdivorce need and second,
property division was preferable to alimony to perform this task. Case
law from most of the states in this study reveals that, although these
In all of the states in this study, the reviewing courts generally defer to the discretion of
the trial courts, allowing the trial courts to weigh the factors as they deem best, while
acknowledging that the significance of any factor will vary with each case. See, e.g.,
Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 84, 643 S.W.2d 560, 561-62 (1982) (refusing to substi-
tute its judgment for chancellor's); Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 429 A.2d 964, 966
(1980) (holding must provide only some basis for award); In re Marriage of Anderson,
717 P.2d 11, 14-15 (1986) (relying on merits of case instead of any set formula); White v.
White, 312 N.C. 770, 777-78, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985) (holding appellate court need
find only rational basis for how trial court weighed factors). A New York appellate court
upheld an unequal division by explaining that the trial court need not analyze each of the
statutory factors. See Cappiello v. Cappiello, 110 A.D.2d 608, 488 N.Y.S.2d 399, aff'd,
66 N.Y.2d 107, 485 N.E.2d 983, 495 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1985) (per curiam). Likewise, in
reviewing an award, the Wisconsin Supreme Court implied that the trial court did not
have to consider all the discretionary factors. See Trattles v. Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d 219,
230, 376 N.W.2d 379, 385 (1985). This deference to the discretion of the court that
divided the property prevents the reviewing courts from instructing the trial courts on the
use of the need factors.
Moreover, the inattention to need at times may reflect a reluctance to make certain
property dispositions for reasons that are peculiar to the state. For example, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has developed a policy of trying to preserve the family ranch intact.
Several dispositions illustrate this policy. In In re Sirucek, 712 P.2d 769 (Mont. 1985),
the court approved an unequal property division in favor of the husband and a denial of
maintenance to the wife. Relying in large measure on the policy of preserving the ranch,
the court awarded the entire ranch to the husband. Id. at 775-76. The dissent lamented,
"[tihis woman, having worked 12 1/2 years for the good of her husband's estate is told
she could work for herself now. I do not see any justice in it." Id. at 776 (Sheehy, J.,
dissenting). For other examples of the policy of preserving the ranch intact, see In re
Marriage of Glass, 697 P.2d 96, 102-03 (Mont. 1985) (allowing husband to make distrib-
utive payments over 10-year period to wife with cerebral palsy); Gomke v. Gomke, 627
P.2d 395, 396 (Mont. 1981) (allowing husband to make distributive payments of wife's
interest in ranch based on recognition of "economic realities of a predominantly rural
state"); and In re Marriage of Jacobson, 183 Mont. 517, 525, 600 P.2d 1183, 1188 (1979)
(relying on policy of preserving ranch in authorizing husband's making a distributive
payment over thirty years). For the most part, the study did not treat these state-peculiar
policies.
256. See supra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 223-54 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
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states have adopted this philosophy by including need factors in their
property division statutes,"s9 they have not implemented it. These states,
like most of the equitable distribution states,"6 have at least incorporated
the idea that property division should accommodate postdivorce need.
To varying degrees, the states in this study also have adopted the sec-
ond component of the philosophy-the superiority of property division
to address need. Some of these states have acknowledged the superiority
of property division by statute.2 6' Other states recognize in their case
law the superiority of property division to provide support.262
259. See supra note 84. In the commitment to property to address need, a distinction
emerges between the cases of states with and states without a presumption of equal divi-
sion: the states with the presumption demonstrate less of a commitment to property as
support. Although the three states with presumptions of equal division-Arkansas,
North Carolina, and Wisconsin-recognize the support function of property division in
their statutes, the cases reflect a weak commitment to this idea. The presumptions of
equal divisions in these states, again, in varying degrees, are strong. See Day v. Day, 281
Ark. 261, 264, 663 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1984) ("all marital property be distributed equally
unless the court finds that division inequitable"); White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 776, 324
S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985) ("statute is a legislative enactment of public policy so strongly
favoring the equal division of marital property that an equal division is made mandatory
unless [inequitable]"); cf Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 81-82, 318 N.W.2d 391, 397
(1982) (noting maintenance decrees more flexible since they involve no presumption of
equality). The presumption of equal division probably restrains the appellate courts from
explaining how property is to perform the support function to which the statute refers.
Of the three states without the presumption, Connecticut probably least reflects the
theme of property for support. As in Krause v. Krause, 189 Conn. 570, 456 A.2d 1204
(1983), however, the Connecticut court occasionally nods to the flexibility that property
division accords the trial court.
The case law also occasionally recognizes that property should address need. The sup-
port function of property division appears in those opinions recognizing the interrelation-
ship of property and alimony. In an Arkansas opinion, for example, the appellate court
directed that the alimony award last until the property division took effect. 'Russell v.
Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 204-05, 628 S.W.2d 315, 321 (1982). In another case, the court
recognized that alimony was appropriate "to balance [the] inequity in the division of
property." Stout v. Stout, 4 Ark. App. 266, 272, 630 S.W.2d 53, 56 (1982). Some of the
Wisconsin opinions reflect the interrelationship of maintenance and property. See, e.g.,
Ondrasek v. Ondrasek, 126 Wis. 2d 469, 479, 377 N.W.2d 190, 194-95 (1985); Steinke v.
Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 388-89, 376 N.W.2d 839, 847 (1985); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d
72, 80, 318 N.W.2d 391, 396 (1982).
In North Carolina, a statute requires the trial court to make the equitable distribution
award without regard to alimony. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(f) (1987). Other North Caro-
lina statutes allow awards of permanent alimony before divorce whereas, until recent
amendments, equitable distribution awards had to follow divorce. Id. at §§ 50-16.8 and
50-21(a). Therefore, it is not unusual to find appellate opinions on equitable distribution
in isolation from discussions of alimony. Perhaps this isolation helps explain why there is
virtually no discussion of need in those portions of opinions dealing with equitable distri-
bution. See, e.g., Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 253-57, 337 S.E.2d 607, 611-13
(1985) (appellate court's roughly equal division of property slightly favored wife, who
was apparently in greater need because of eighteen-year absence from work force, but
court did not recite need as a factor), review denied, 316 N.C. 195, 341 S.E.2d 585, rev'd
in part, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).
260. See supra note 70.
261. See supra note 73.
262. The opinions of some states in the study reflect the theme more clearly than
others. Some opinions in Montana and New York clearly articulate the theme that the
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This section shows that most of the states in this study, however, fail
to indicate their implementation of this philosophy. This section demon-
strates that this failure manifests itself both in the analyses of the cases
and in their very dispositions. Further, this section reveals that in light
of the focus of the reform movement that led to the adoption of the phi-
losophy, this failure was almost inevitable.
a. Analytical Shortcomings of the Cases
The analyses in the cases reflect the failure to implement the reform
philosophy about the relationship of property division and alimony in a
number of ways. First, the cases are virtually silent about the relation-
ship of need and property division. Instead, they expound at some length
about the philosophy behind equitable distribution and, in particular,
about the relationship between contribution and property division.263
courts should use division of property instead of alimony to address need. The seminal
case in Montana for this principle is In re Marriage of Johnsrud, 181 Mont. 544, 549-50,
572 P.2d 902, 905 (1977) (remanding for redetermination of the marital estate). Also, in
Smith v. Smith, 622 P.2d 1022 (Mont. 1981), the court remanded a case in which the trial
court divided the property equally. The supreme court explained that the unequal finan-
cial positions of the parties required that the trial court try to "balance the disparity in
earnings potential through an equitable apportionment" of property and avoid reliance
on an alimony award that would end at the husband's death. Id. at 1024. Several other
Montana opinions imply in their treatment of property division and alimony that the
courts should award property in lieu of alimony where possible. See, eg., Creon v.
Creon, 195 Mont. 254, 635 P.2d 1308, 1309 (1981); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 625 P.2d
1159, 1161 (Mont. 1981).
In some of the analyses (if not in the results), the New York cases occasionally reflect
this preference for property as well. In the celebrated O'Brien case, for example, the New
York Court of Appeals defended its expansion of the concept of marital property to in-
clude earning potential. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 583-89, 489 N.E.2d 712,
715-18, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-49 (1985). In its opinion, the court noted the superiority
of property over alimony to accomplish the economic goals of divorce. See id. at 587, 489
N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49; see also Spadaro v. New York City Police Dept.
Pension Serv., 115 Misc. 2d 494, 497, 454 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (noting the
influence of the New Jersey equitable distribution statute on New York's statute). In the
course of interpreting an agreement on property division, the court observed that both
states found property division "socially more desirable than maintenance." Id. at 497,
454 N.Y.S.2d at 376; see also Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 A.D.2d 386, 391, 470 N.Y.S.2d 401,
405 (App. Div. 1983) (praising equitable distribution and the court's "elasticity to mold
an appropriate decree because what is fair and just in one circumstance may not be so in
another"), appeal dismissed, 62 N.Y.2d 646 (1984). These New York cases are consistent
with Professor Foster's explanation that the new equitable distribution act demonstrate a
preference for awards of property rather than maintenance. See Foster, supra note 51, at
40; see also Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 67, 124 (1980) (expressing hope that judges would use property to address
financial disparities between men and women). Professor Foster, however, predicted that
factors focusing on need-duration of marriage, age, and health-would be dominant in
long marriages or marriages involving the elderly or disabled. See Foster, supra note 51,
at 34. The opinions have not borne out this prediction on the division of property. See
supra note 144.
263. See, e.g., Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 234, 449 A.2d 151, 153 (1982)
(property division equitably assigns property); Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079,
465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (equitable distribution recognizes each spouse's
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The only state in the study whose courts actually discuss the relationship
between need and property division is Montana,26 the state that has
demonstrated the heaviest reliance on the need factors.265 The Montana
Supreme Court has said, in effect, that the property division statute
means what it says: property division should address need and it is supe-
rior to alimony for the task.266 Although the other states appear to rec-
ognize these themes, the absence of any explanation in the reviewing
cases relating need and equitable distribution demonstrates a failure to
implement them.
Another way the analyses reflect the failure to implement the philoso-
phy of property division is by the general lack of references to the com-
mon functions of property division and alimony-the accommodation of
postdivorce need.267 Rather, these cases perpetuate the historical distinc-
tion of property division to sever property rights and alimony to accom-
modate need.268 For example, even in a state with a property division
statute that contains need factors, one finds an appellate court observing
that the "purpose of alimony is to meet one's continuing duty to support
•.. while the purpose of property division is to unscramble the ownership
of property."26 9 Because the reviewing courts continue to label the func-
tions of alimony and property division as distinct, they encourage the
lower courts to continue to ignore factors relating to need in their prop-
erty division decisions. The lesson the reviewing courts teach is that de-
spite the presence of need factors in property division statutes, need is an
appropriate consideration only in decisions about alimony.
b. Shortcomings of Property Division Dispositions
The analyses in these cases demonstrate that the division of property
simply has not taken over the function of alimony despite occasional
statements recognizing in theory that it should.27 ° The use of property
right to assets of partnership); Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 85-86, 331 S.E.2d 682, 686
(1985) (equitable distribution presumes that parties have contributed equally to mar-
riage); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 318 N.W.2d 391, 396-97 (1982) (explaining
marriage as partnership).
264. The Montana cases contain occasional references to the relationship of property
division and need. In Vance v. Vance, 204 Mont. 267, 664 P.2d 907 (1983), the husband
contested an award to the wife of some premarital property. The court upheld the dispo-
sition, explaining that marriage was more than a business relationship and that property
awards had to compensate for the economic disadvantage women faced. See 664 P.2d at
912; see also In re Marriage of Laster, 197 Mont. 470, 643 P.2d 597, 603 (1982) (pension
held to be marital property to substitute for maintenance); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 625
P.2d 1159, 1162 (Mont. 1981) (greater need of wife justified unequal property division
which, in turn, obviated need for maintenance).
265. See supra notes 103 and 140.
266. See supra note 262.
267. See supra notes 224-25, 231-35; infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
268. Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 234, 449 A.2d 151, 153 (1982) (citation
omitted).
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 259 and 262.
[Vol. 56
PROPER TY DIVISION
division to address need and its superiority to alimony for this purpose
reflects a philosophy that these states have endorsed but not imple-
mented. The most dramatic evidence of this failure to implement comes
from the dispositions of the cases. Instead of depicting the substitution
of property division for alimony, the appealed cases reflect a continued
preference for alimony as the vehicle to address need.
The opinions of every state studied reveal this subtle preference for
alimony over property division to accommodate postdivorce need even
though the statutes of these states authorize property division for this
purpose. For example, appellate courts continue to approve alimony
awards even when there appears to be property available for distribution
that could at least lessen, if not eliminate, the need for alimony. In Ar-
kansas, where there is a statutory presumption of an equal division of
assets, it is common to find the appellate courts upholding equal divisions
of property in instances where the trial court also awarded alimony., If
the state were true to the mandate of reform, in some of the cases in
which there was sufficient property to alleviate some of the postdivorce
need, the court would choose an unequal division of property to provide
support.
This reliance on alimony also appears in states without a presumption
of equal division. In Connecticut, for example, the appellate courts rou-
tinely approve equal divisions of property and large alimony awards
when a preference for property division might recommend an unequal
division in favor of the spouse receiving alimony.272 What is even more
striking, however, are the cases in which the alimony-paying spouse re-
ceived a greater portion of the property than the alimony-receiving
spouse. 73 In these instances the courts surely have abdicated their obli-
gation to address need through property division.274
In some of the states, this preference for alimony appears for reasons
peculiar to the state. In New York, for example, the difficulty of valuing
professional practices has led, on occasion, to a reliance on alimony in-
271. See, e.g., Meinholz v. Meinholz, 283 Ark. 509, 678 S.W.2d 348 (1984); Lee v. Lee,
12 Ark. App. 226, 674 S.W.2d 505 (1984).
272. See, eg., Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 2-3, 495 A.2d 704, 706 (1985) (unequal division
for husband accompanied by alimony for wife); Levy v. Levy, 5 Conn. App. 185, 186, 497
A.2d 430, 430 (1985) (lump sum and temporary alimony awarded to wife); Caracansi v.
Caracansi, 4 Conn. App. 645, 647, 496 A.2d 225, 226 (equal division of property with
substantial lump sum alimony award), appeal denied, 197 Conn. 805, 499 A.2d 56 (1985).
273. See, e.g., Eversman v. Eversman, 4 Conn. App. 611, 615-16, 496 A.2d 210, 213,
appeal denied, 197 Conn. 806, 499 A.2d 57 (1985); Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 3, 7, 495
A.2d 704, 706, 708 (1985).
274. In addition, some of the opinions in New York also reveal a reluctance to use
property to accommodate need and a preference for alimony. See. eg., McDermott v.
McDermott, 123 Misc. 2d 355, 356-57, 474 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222-23 (1984) (roughly equal
division of property with substantial maintenance award), modified, 119 A.D.2d 370, 507
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1986); Conteh v. Conteh, 117 Misc. 2d 42, 43-44, 457 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364-
65 (1982) (awarding wife rehabilitative maintenance and finding that she would have
received a distributive award of property had she not been entitled to maintenance).
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stead of property division.275 Although the difficulty of valuation is a
proper factor to consider in making the determination on property divi-
sion,2 76 the absence of any discussion of the competing interest-using
property to avoid or eliminate a maintenance award-is significant.
The judiciary in Wisconsin has expanded the concept of alimony since
its enactment of the equitable distribution statute. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has explained that "maintenance is no longer to be based
solely on need ' 277 and has authorized its use to reward contributions to
enhanced earning capacity.27 s Since its adoption of equitable distribu-
tion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has instructed the trial courts "to
begin the maintenance evaluation with the proposition that the depen-
dent partner may be entitled to 50 percent of total earnings of both par-
ties."' 279 This attention to the law of maintenance may not have been
necessary had the courts developed the support function of property
divison.
To varying degrees,2 s0 the other states in the study likewise have devel-
oped the law of alimony in ways that have detracted from the support
function of property division. The courts on occasion have refused to
classify property as marital property and relied on alimony to compen-
sate for any "inequities." 28' On other occasions, the courts have used
alimony to avoid awarding any of a business to the spouse with the lower
income.282 One court has explained that a distributive award of property
275. See, e.g., Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 478 N.E.2d 199, 489
N.Y.S.2d 58 (1985); Hirschfeld v. Hirschfeld, 96 A.D.2d 473, 464 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1983).
276. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(5)(d)(9) (McKinney 1986).
277. In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 318 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1982).
278. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 216, 343 N.W.2d 796, 804 (1984).
279. Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 85, 318 N.W.2d 391, 398 (1982).
280. The cases from Montana reveal fewer instances of promoting maintenance at the
expense of a property division. Instead, the Montana Supreme Court clearly has directed
the trial courts to use property for support. See supra note 262. Occasionally, however,
the supreme court allows deviation from this standard. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wil-
liams, 714 P.2d 548, 558 (Mont. 1986) (upholding unequal division of property in favor
of husband despite his greater income potential and her foregone career opportunities,
but approving a maintenance award to compensate); In re Marriage of Ziegler, 696 P.2d
983, 985, 987-88 (Mont. 1985) (approving equal division and $1,750 per month mainte-
nance); Green v. Green, 181 Mont. 285, 288-89, 593 P.2d 446, 448-49 (1979) (addressing
disparity in earnings with short-term maintenance of $4000 where husband was a doctor
and wife a bartender).
281. In Day v. Day, Justice Hickman in his dissent explained that the policy of the
Arkansas courts had been to use alimony to redress any inequities in the division of
property. 281 Ark. 261, 266, 663 S.W.2d 719, 723 (1984) (Hickman, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Hickman cited Paulsen v. Paulsen, 269 Ark. 523, 601 S.W.2d 873 (1980), as an exam-
ple. See id., 663 S.W.2d at 723 (Hickman, J., dissenting). In Paulsen, the court classified
a military pension as separate property. Paulsen, 269 Ark. at 526, 601 S.W.2d at 875. In
Day, the court found that a retirement plan was marital property, which raised doubt
about a number of decisions. Day, 281 Ark. at 264-65, 663 S.W.2d at 719, 720-22.
282. See, e.g., Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 2-3, 495 A.2d 704, 706 (1985) (awarding wife
alimony and giving husband sole interest in the family's share of a business); Hirschfeld v.
Hirschfeld, 96 A.D.2d 473, 473, 464 N.Y.S.2d 789, 789 (1983) (remanding to Special
Term to reevaluate maintenance in order to avoid making a distributive award based on
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is available only if the petitioning spouse is not entitled to alimony.2"3 In
all of these examples, the focus on alimony indicates a failure to imple-
ment reform's preference for property division.
This failure to implement the philosophy of the relationship of prop-
erty division and alimony helps explain the courts' infrequent use of the
need factors to address the greater economic need of one of the parties.
When a state has chosen to implement the use of property to supplant
alimony, then the fact that divorce has left one spouse in greater need
than the other should be enough to justify an unequal division of prop-
erty. After all, except for those states requiring proof of marital fault as
grounds for alimony,2 greater need usually suffices to justify an alimony
the value of a law practice); see also L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 97-101 (analyzing
dispositions that award family businesses to the husband); supra note 255 (discussing
Montana policy of preserving the family ranch intact).
283. See e.g., Conteh v. Conteh, 117 Misc. 2d 42, 43-44, 457 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1982)
(denying wife who borrowed money for husband's medical education a distributive award
since she was entitled to rehabilitative maintenance). Decisions like this one, which make
an award of property division hinge on the unavailability of alimony, undercut the use of
the discretionary factors relating to need.
284. Most states no longer consider marital fault in dividing property or awarding
alimony. See 1987 Overview, supra note 13, at 481-93. The propriety or impropriety of
awarding alimony in most states, therefore, has no impact on determining the relation-
ship of property division and alimony. Since most states consider only economic miscon-
duct for awards of both property and alimony, evidence of other kinds of marital fault is
irrelevant to these economic matters. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-4-202(1), 40-4-
203(2) (1987) (directing courts to make decisions about property division and mainte-
nance "without regard to marital misconduct"). Moreover, fault does not complicate the
relationship of property division and alimony in states like Connecticut that consider
marital fault in determinations of both property division and alimony. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 46b-81(c) and 46b-82 (West 1986).
Marital fault, however, does further complicate the relationship of property division
and alimony in states like North Carolina. In North Carolina, the property division stat-
ute does not list fault as a consideration. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (1987). Further-
more, the North Carolina Supreme Court has construed the statute to bar consideration
of marital fault unless that fault can be characterized as economic misconduct. See Smith
v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 87-88, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985). On the other hand, grounds for
alimony require proof of marital fault. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.2 (1987).
Since both the property division and alimony statutes authorize the courts to address
need, the difference in the relevance of traditional marital fault raises questions that have
not been addressed. One difference between property division and alimony could justify
making a property division that addresses need without proof of marital fault while con-
tinuing to require such proof for an award of alimony. This justification relates to the
difference between the usual source of property division and alimony. The source of
property division generally is the property that has been acquired during the marriage.
Although recognition of nontraditional property interests, like earning capacity, is an
exception, courts as a rule divide property that the parties have acquired during the mar-
riage. In contrast, the source of awards of alimony is usually postdivorce income. Be-
cause of this difference, one could justifiably conclude that awards of property to address
need require fewer grounds than do awards of alimony. This reasoning would reconcile
requiring proof of fault in alimony awards to address need and dispensing with that re-
quirement in dividing property.
Finally, the past decade has witnessed a trend away from requiring fault in determining
the economic consequences of divorce. See 1987 Overview, supra note 13, at 487. The
studies of the aftermath of divorce reform, however, have rekindled interest in fault
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award.28 5 For the most part, however, courts have not used the need
factors to divide property unequally to address greater need.286 Rather,
the courts have used the need factors only when certain facts, like serious
health problems, exist.287 Therefore, despite the intended role of prop-
erty division statutes, the simple fact that one spouse is in greater eco-
nomic need remains insufficient to achieve an unequal division of
property.
c. Relationship Between the Reform Movement and the Failure to
Implement the Philosophy
In some ways, it is not surprising that the equitable distribution states
that recognize the use of property for support have not developed a sense
of the relationship of property division and alimony. Unlike the atten-
tion devoted to the recognition of nonfinancial contribution and the con-
grounds. See, e.g., R. Eisler, Dissolution: No-Fault Divorce, Marriage, and the Future
of Women 20-54 (1977); Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspec-
tive, 63 Or. L. Rev. 649 (1984); Prager, Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law, in
Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions 111, 123 (B. Thorne & M. Yalom eds.
1982). This study shows that courts tend to recognize need more readily when fault is
also relevant to the determination. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (dem-
onstrating this phenomenon in Connecticut). Similar observations have prompted some
to rethink the advisability of retaining traditional fault grounds in making the ecnomic
adjustments at divorce. See, e.g., Golden and Taylor, Fault Enforces Accountability, 10
Fam. Advoc. No. 2, 11, 12 (1987). But see Kay, supra note 30, at 68 (reaffirming the
commitment to no-fault divorce in determining questions of both status and economic
matters).
285. See, e.g., 2 H. Clark, supra note 17, at 441-42.
286. As stated above, only the Montana case law clearly acknowledges the use of prop-
erty to address need. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Glass, 697 P.2d 96, 103 (Mont. 1985)
(reciting with approval trial court's conclusion of law that tied end of maintenance to first
receipt of property award); supra notes 262, 264 and accompanying text. The awards
themselves show, however, that other courts use property as support even though they
may not acknowledge such a use. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 275 Ark. 193, 204-05, 628
S.W.2d 315, 321 (1982) (alimony to terminate when house sold in part because proceeds
from house would take the place of the support). In Cohen v. Cohen, 104 A.D.2d 841,
844-45, 480 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (1984), appeal dismissed, 64 N.Y.2d 773, 475 N.E.2d 457,
485 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1985), a New York appellate court acknowledged the support func-
tion of property by linking the sale of the marital home to the wife's ability to work
outside the home. The court noted that the sale of the residence would give the wife a
"cushion" until she began to generate income. Id. at 845, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court directly acknowledged the functional indentity of property
division and maintenance in Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982),
remanding that case with directions to the trial court to "consider all of the credible
evidence and provide for a fair and equitable financial division of estate and award of
maintenance, whether it be a division of estate or award of maintenance, or both." Id. at
23, 318 N.W.2d at 360 (emphasis added). On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin has explained that property division and alimony are interrelated, so that a
change in the property award requires reconsidering the alimony award. See, e.g.,
Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 389, 376 N.W.2d 839, 847 (1985); Bahr v. Bahr, 107
Wis. 2d 72, 80, 318 N.W.2d 391, 396 (1982); cf Dubicki v. Dubicki, 186 Conn. 709, 443
A.2d 1268, 1270-71 & n.2 (1982) (because of trial court's ambiguity on the point, appel-
late court had to determine whether award was alimony or property).
287. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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cept of marital property,288 the reform literature offered little guidance
on how to apply the need factors to property division. In addition, by
emphasizing the analogy of marriage to a partnership, the reformers fore-
shadowed the courts' failure to give property division its intended role in
addressing postdivorce need. Finally, the reformers all but ignored two
factors that greatly influenced the shape of the present doctrine of prop-
erty division: the finality of property division awards and the insuffi-
ciency of available property.2 89
i. The Effect of Diverted Attention
The reformer's concentration on contribution, a non-need factor, and
marital property was appropriate. In some of the separate property
states, the recognition of significant property interests at divorce was
novel.29 0 In fact, the history of equitable distribution in the separate
property states illustrates a struggle to break from title concepts to enable
the recognition of property interests.2 9 1
In addition, contribution and marital property, as compared with the
need factors, were relatively new concepts in separate property states.
The reformers had every reason to believe that judges would know how
to apply the need factors to property division. These factors, like age,
health, station, and income,292 were factors that had been common in
alimony statutes.2 93 The reformers, therefore, reasonably assumed that
judges would know that, to the extent the factors were similar, the same
considerations appropriate for alimony would be appropriate for prop-
erty division.2 9 4
288. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
289. In retrospect, divorce reform probably paid insufficient attention to alimony as
well. For example, the Task Force on Family Law and Policy made a number of specific
recommendations regarding property. See generally, Report of the Task Force, supra
note 44. In contrast, regarding alimony, the Task Force merely "invite[d] the attention
of State Commissions on the Status of Women and other interested groups to the forego-
ing principles and recommendations with a view to reexamination and appropriate revi-
sion of laws pertaining to family support obligations." Id at 13 (emphasis omitted).
290. Sharp, Equitable Distribution, supra note 27, at 196-97.
291. See supra note 203 and infra note 306 and accompanying text.
292. See Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 307(a), Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1973).
293. See id at §§ 307(a), Alternative A and 308(b), 9A U.LA. 238-39, 348 (1973).
294. For an illustration of the identity of factors for property division and for alimony,
compare the relevant Connecticut statutes. The discretionary factors in the property di-
vision statute are:
the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the
marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs
of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capi-
tal assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of
the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their re-
spective estates.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-81(c) (West 1986). Similarly, the alimony statute directs
the court to consider
the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the
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The reformers expanded the support function of property division
while continuing to recognize the support function of alimony. Despite
the changes reform wrought in the concept of alimony, the reform legis-
lation continued to acknowledge that alimony would address need where
it existed.295 In redefining alimony, the reformers recognized the goals of
rehabilitation and self-sufficiency.296 The addition of these principles as
goals, however, did not mean the end of permanent alimony where a
spouse was incapable of rehabilitation.297 Nor did the addition of self-
sufficiency dictate the end of the marital standard of living as a relevant
factor in awarding alimony.2 9 In short, alimony continued to exist as a
method for addressing postdivorce need, and the need factors in property
division statutes were to be applied as alimony factors were applied-to
address postdivorce need. The statutes issuing from reform simply rec-
ognized that property division, instead of alimony, should accommodate
need when need exists. Despite the interpretation of the significance of
no-fault divorce on reform legislation,299 nothing in property division
statutes should have led the judiciary to conclude that divorce always
means the end of one spouse's responsibility for the other.3"o
marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of
the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section
46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has
been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.
Id. at § 46b-82.
295. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
297. For an example of a postreform statute clearly authorizing support in the face of
need, see Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a)(5) (West Supp. 1988), which directs the court to "con-
sider... [t]he ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without
interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the spouse." Id.
298. For example, the UMDA provides that
if... the spouse seeking maintenance ... (1) lacks sufficient property to provide
for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appropri-
ate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment
outside the home... [then the court shall consider relevant factors, including]
the standard of living established during the marriage....
Unif. Marriage & Div. Act §§ 308(a)(1), (2), (b)(3), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1973).
In addition, see New York's recently revised reference to standard of living in its main-
tenance statute:
Except where the parties have entered into an agreement pursuant to subdivi-
sion three of this part providing for maintenance, in any matrimonial action the
court may order temporary maintenance or maintenance in such amount as
justice requires, having regard for the standard of living of the parties estab-
lished during the marriage ....
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(6)(a) (McKinney 1986).
299. See infra notes 348-80 and accompanying text; see also O'Flarity, Trends in No-
Fault-No-Responsibility Divorce, 49 Fla. B.J. 90 (1975) (noting the reduction of alimony
awards in the wake of no-fault divorce).
300. As noted above, not all observers of reform conclude that addressing need sur-
vived the reformers' efforts. See, eg., M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 52-57 (finding it
only logical that the redefinition of alimony led to the principle of self-reliance after di-
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ii. Dominance of Partnership Theory
The dominance of the partnership analogy in explaining the philoso-
phy of equitable distribution appears to be another reason why these
states largely have failed to develop any law on the relationship of prop-
erty division and alimony. Community property states traditionally rely
on the analogy of marriage to a business partnership to justify commu-
nity ownership.3' As in the business association, the marital partner,
not the parties, own the assets.3°2 Dissolution of the partnership involves
distributing those assets. Many separate property states adopting equita-
ble distribution have adopted the partnership analogy as well. For exam-
ple, of the six states studied, four of them regularly refer to the
partnership analogy to explain the concept of marital property.30 3
vorce). At least one observer rather matter-of-factly predicted the restrictive interpreta-
tion of the new alimony provisions. See Brody, California's Divorce Reform: Its
Sociological Implications, 1 Pac. L.J. 223, 228-29 (1970).
In some states, the legislative process made it clear that the statutory treatment of
alimony would work dramatic change. For example, one commentator noted in describ-
ing the New York experience, "[a]s a trade-off for an expanded amount of property avail-
able for immediate distribution, the new law de-emphasizes spousal support." Note, How
Equitable Is New York's Equitable Distribution Law?, 14 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 433,
437 (1982-83).
301. McClanahan, supra note 19, § 2:27, at 38. The origin of the partnership analogy
dates back to the Protestant Reformation. See Wadlington, Cases and Other Materials
on Domestic Relations 13 (successor ed. 1984). For other references to the partnership
analogy, see Krauskopf, supra note 59, at 165-67; Foster & Freed, Marital Property Re-
form in New York Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 Fam. LQ. 169, 170-71 (1974);
Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 Fam. L.Q. 415, 418-19 (1980); Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1169, 1255-58
(1974); Comment, Marital Property: A New Look at Old Inequities, 39 Alb. L Rev. 52,
58 (1974).
In one text, the authors distinguish between a partnership and partnership status and
find that a community property system recognizes "a partnerhsip status for each spouse."
Babcock, Freeman, Norton & Ross, supra note 79, at 568 & n.9. A true partnership
would allow absolute freedom of contract. Id.
302. This explanation of community property states assumes that the parties divide
only the acquests of the marriage. See supra note 60. Some community property states at
divorce divide not only the acquests but all the property presently owned, including prop-
erty owned before marriage. See, e.g., Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 3.63 (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1987).
303. See Weiman v. Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 449 A.2d 151, 153 (1982) (indirectly
acknowledging the analogy). New York clearly adopts the partnership analogy: "mar-
riage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as
spouse .... [U]pon dissolution of the marriage there should be a winding up of the
parties' economic affairs and a severance of their economic ties." O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66
N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1985). North Carolina's
reliance on the analogy likewise is clear. In White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d
829 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that "[e]quitable distribution reflects the idea
that marriage is a partnership enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions."
Id. at 774, 324 S.E.2d at 832. The Wisconsin Supreme Court used the partnership anal-
ogy to justify its presumption of equal division in Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372,
377, 376 N.W.2d 839, 842 (1985). See also Unif. Marriage & Div. Act prefatory note, 9A
U.L.A. 149 (1973) ("The distribution of property upon the termination of a marriage
should be treated, as nearly as possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the
dissolution of a partnership.").
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In the first stages of divorce reform, the partnership analogy served a
crucial role: it provided a vehicle for the recognition of non-financial
contributions. 3" As the North Carolina Supreme Court developed its
law of equitable distribution, for example, it turned to the partnership
analogy and found that it "entitles the homemaker spouse to a share of
the property acquired during the relationship."30 5 Perhaps without this
model, the concept of marital property would have had a still harder
time than it has in supplanting title in the separate property states. Even
with the partnership analogy, separate property states have wrestled with
theoretical difficulties in recognizing contributions other than financial
ones.3 °6 In recognizing these contributions, the partnership analogy has
provided a useful alternative to traditional property theory.
While the partnership analogy has encouraged courts to recognize
nonfinancial contributions, it has discouraged courts from implementing
the support function of property division. Because the theory underlying
a business partnership is not based on need, the partnership analogy par-
tially explains why courts have underutilized the discretionary factors
relating to need in dividing property at divorce. In the business partner-
ship, unless provided otherwise, partners share profits equally.30 7 During
the existence of the business partnership, there is also a presumption of
equal management and control.30 At its dissolution, the accounting is
based on capital contributions.30 9 In this way, the origins of the contri-
butions, not the partners' need, determine the rights under the partner-
ship.31 0 Accordingly, the business partnership focuses attention on the
past as the way to determine the rights of the partner at dissolution.31
The business partnership's perspective at dissolution, then, is retro-
spective. In contrast, the need factors, which require an assessment of
304. See, eg., Sharp, supra note 27, at 198-201 (recognizing both the utility and draw-
back of the analogy). As urged in a report by a 1963 presidential commission:
Marriage, as a partnership in which [the] spouse makes a different but equally
important contribution is increasingly recognized as a reality in this country
and is already reflected in the laws of some other countries. During marriage,
each spouse should have a legally defined, substantial right in the earnings of
the other, in the real and personal property acquired through those earnings,
and in their management. Such a right should be legally recognized as surviv-
ing the marriage in the event of its termination by divorce, annulment or death.
American Women, supra note 42, at 69.
305. White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 775, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985).
306. See, e.g., Jolis v. Jolis, 111 Misc. 2d 965, 979-81, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138, 147-48
(1981), aff'd, 98 A.D.2d 692, 470 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1983); Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d
1076, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1983); Price v. Price, 113 A.D.2d 299, 496 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1985),
aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986); Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261,
264, 663 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1984).
307. Unif. Partnership Act § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
308. Id. at § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213.
309. Id. at § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213.
310. See A. Bromberg, Crane & Bromberg on Partnership § 90, at 506-07 (1968).
311. As Professor Fineman noted, the concepts of equality and partnership "focus the




future needs, are prospective. If a state relies entirely on the partnership
analogy as its rationale for recognizing property interests at divorce, then
the retrospective focus of the analogy might divert attention from the
need factors.
One state in this study, Montana, which uses the need factors most
often,31 has cautioned against relying on a commercial analogy for mar-
riage. In upholding an award of premarital property to the wife, the
Montana Supreme Court chastised the husband for his narrow argu-
ments: "[The husband] would like to have his marriage ... treated as a
business relationship. It was not. Equitable distribution of the assets of a
marriage depends upon more than just each party's initial financial con-
tribution to the relationship." '313 The court also referred to some other
considerations, such as "occupations, amounts and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, estates, needs and opportunities for fu-
ture acquisition of capital assets and income," which relate to future
needs.314
Because the partnership analogy only partially explains the philosophy
of equitable distribution,31 5 there is nothing inconsistent with a state's
use of both the partnership analogy and a property division statute that
grants authority to accommodate need. The two have different functions
and concerns. The partnership analogy provides a theoretical basis for
recognizing nonfinancial contributions while the need factors provide a
way to accommodate postdivorce need. The partnership analogy, as ex-
plained above, has a retrospective focus, while the need factors show a
concern for future need.
In states that rely on the partnership analogy for the recognition of
property interests, however, the analogy appears to have overshadowed
the purpose underlying the need factors. The New York courts occasion-
ally use the partnership analogy to explain that need is not the basis of
equitable distribution.31 6 The courts, however, make no attempt to rec-
oncile this conclusion with the statutory presence of the discretionary
factors relating to need.3"
This danger also surfaces in some of the North Carolina appellate
312. See supra notes 103, 129 & 140 and accompanying text.
313. Vance v. Vance, 204 Mont. 267, 664 P.2d 907, 912 (1983).
314. Id
315. See infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
316. For example:
The function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a marriage
ends, each of the spouses, based on the totality of the contributions made to it,
has a stake in and right to a share of the marital assets accumulated while it
endured, not because that share is needed, but because those assets represent the
capital product of what was essentially a partnership entity.
Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (1983) (citing Gibbons
v. Gibbons, 174 N.J. Super. 107, 415 A.2d 1174 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), rev'd, 86
N.J. 515, 432 A.2d 80 (1981)).
317. Id, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 477; see also Wegman v. Wegman, 123 A.D.2d 220, 230, 509
N.Y.S.2d 342, 348 (1986) (focusing on analogy of marriage to partnership); Forcucci v.
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cases. In one of the first cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court,
the court explained the theory behind the recognition of property inter-
ests in terms of the partnership analogy."a 8 Following that explanation,
it reviewed the discretionary factors and concluded that "[a]ll of the first
eleven factors in the statute concern ... the source, availability, and use
by a wife and husband of economic resources during the course of their
marriage."''"9 Among the first eleven factors are income, property, liabil-
ities, age, and health.320 Contrary to the court's observation, these fac-
tors do not relate to the use of resources during the marriage but to need
after the marriage.3 21 When the North Carolina court characterized all
of the discretionary factors as ones concerning the history of the mar-
riage rather than factors bearing on the future of the parties, it allowed
the partnership analogy and its retrospective focus to dominate its
analysis.3 22
The partnership analogy also has detracted from the discretionary fac-
tors relating to need by focusing attention on equality. The reformers
were receptive to legislation premised on the assumption of spousal
equality. 23  Therefore, the business analogy proved serviceable. The
Uniform Partnership Act, for example, which provides for equal sharing
of profits,324 presumes equal contributions. In the marriage setting, the
analogy argues for an equal division of the available property.
The reformers, however, never promoted the business partnership as
the exact counterpart of the marriage relationship. Indeed, the emphasis
in the business partnership on equality is one reason why the business
partnership proved inadequate as a complete model. The very inclusion
of the need factors demonstrates that the reformers rejected a wholesale
adoption of the partnership model.3 25 The economic equality of the
spouses was still a goal, not a reality. Some reformers relied on the dis-
cretionary need factors to achieve this goal because these factors empow-
ered a court to depart from equal division in the face of need.
Forcucci, 83 A.D.2d 169, 171, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (1981) (finding that analogy
supports distributing property and using alimony for need).
318. Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 85-86, 331 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1985).
319. Id. at 86, 331 S.E.2d at 686 (1985) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For the
first eleven factors, see the North Carolina statute supra note 84.
320. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-20(c)(1) and (3) (1987).
321. In fact, part of the statute explicitly refers to the circumstances "at the time the
division of property is to become effective." Id. at 50-20(c)(1).
322. An outgrowth of the partnership analogy is the theory that marital property rep-
resents return on investments. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. App. 592, 595-
96, 331 S.E.2d 186, 188 (1985) (citations omitted). Again, the partnership analogy is
useful and probably necessary to classify properly certain property as marital. To view
property division solely as the occasion at which to realize returns on investments, how-
ever, discourages the use of the needs factors.
323. See Weyrauch, supra note 301, at 418-24 (discussing the impact of equality con-
cepts in marriage); see also supra notes 175-90 and accompanying text. See generally
Fineman, supra note 27.
324. Unif. Partnership Act § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1914).
325. See supra notes 307-10.
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To the extent that property legislation includes considerations relating
to need, it departs from the business partnership model and its premise of
equality. The business partnership simply has no theoretical counterpart
to these factors.326 Nevertheless, partnership theory seems to have fo-
cused the courts on equality and blinded them to the recognition of need
through property division. One Wisconsin court found that "[a] logical
expansion of this partnership concept [is] a presumption of equal division
of the marital property., 327 In another case explicating the theory of
property division, a New York court found that property "provisions ap-
pear to function coherently only under the partnership analogy" 32 and
that maintenance was the exception to the partnership analogy. Yet an-
other New York court found from the fact of a two-career marriage an
agreement that the marriage was an "equal financial partnership"3 29 and
ignored the need factors.
Of course, the greatest impact of the equality concept of the partner-
ship model occurs in those states with presumptions of equal division of
marital property. 33 ' As the cases in this study show, however, the im-
pact of the equality model is strong in states without the presumption as
well.3 3 ' In the development of the reform legislation, one point appears
lost: while marriage is akin to a business partnership, it is not a business
partnership. 332 The courts sometimes recognize that the new laws con-
tain "nonpartnership provisions. ' 333 As the New York courts have said
326. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1983), discusses the ways
the business partnership is inapposite to the theory of property division:
Absent agreement to the contrary, under the Partnership Law the rule is that,
after repayment of whatever property he brought into the partnership, i.e., con-
tributions of capital or advances, a partner is entitled to share equally in the
profits and surplus earned through the efforts of all partners with such contribu-
tions. The distribution is equal and final. Rehabilitation is unavailable. No
partner is entitled to remuneration for services rendered. A partner, therefore,
has no claim to the specific performance of services of another partner, nor to
damages for their loss, even though he may have sacrificed some of his more
lucrative skills in order to advance the interest of the partnership (e.g., by per-
forming administrative chores), thus enabling the other partner to enhance his
marketable skills.
Id. at 97-98, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 489-90 (citations omitted). See also Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis.
2d 72, 81-82, 318 N.W.2d 391, 396-97 (1982) (marriage is a true partnership, not a busi-
ness partnership).
327. Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 377, 376 N.W.2d 839, 842 (1985).
328. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 98, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 490 (1983).
329. Bentley v. Knight, 92 A.D.2d 638, 639, 459 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (1983).
330. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 144 (listing cases from all six states of the study showing an inat-
tention to need). Despite occasional recognition of the inadequacy of the partnership
model and of equal division of property, the courts continue to uphold equal division in
the face of need. See, eg., Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 100, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 491
(1983) (providing a specific example of the recognition of the inadequacy of the partner-
ship model). But see the New York cases cited supra note 144.
332. See Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 377, 376 N.W.2d 839, 842 (1985) (cita-
tions omitted).
333. Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D. 2d 88, 96, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 489 (1983).
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on several occasions: "[e]quitable distribution was based on the premise
that a marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which
both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or home-
maker."33 For the most part, however, the courts simply have failed to
develop the "other things" that marriage continues to be.
iii. Inattention to Modifiability
Neither the UMDA nor the state legislation that followed provided for
modifiability of property distributions.33 ' This omission was certainly
purposeful; after all, it was the finality of property decrees that recom-
mended property division to the reformers as the preferred mechanism
for handling the economic consequences of divorce.336 Nevertheless, the
promotion of property division as a substitute for alimony warranted
some explanation for nonmodifiability. Court-decreed alimony is almost
always modifiable;337 certainly the UMDA recognizes the modifiability
of alimony.338 Therefore, if property division is to function as support,
why should not some portion of the property division be modifiable on
proof of changed circumstances?339 As enacted, the UMDA directs that
334. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
747 (1985) (emphasis added); Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 14, 503 N.E.2d 684, 687, 511
N.Y.S.2d 219, 222 (citing O'Brien); Wegman v. Wegman, 123 A.D.2d 220, 228, 509
N.Y.S.2d 342, 347 (1986) (citing O'Brien), amended in part, 123 A.D.2d 220, 512
N.Y.S.2d 410 (1987); Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 97-99, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 489-90
(1983) (discussing this concept); Litman v. Litman, 93 A.D.2d 695, 696, 463 N.Y.S.2d
24, 25 (1983) (citing Governor's Memorandum), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 918, 463 N.E.2d 34,
474 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1984).
335. Section 316 of the UMDA provides for modifiability only of maintenance and
support. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 316, 9A U.L.A. 489-90 (1973). The Commission-
ers' comment clearly contemplates that property divisions not be modifiable: "In accord-
ance with presently existing law, the provisions of the decree respecting property
disposition may not be altered unless the judgment itself can be reopened for fraud or
otherwise under the laws of the state." Id. at comment, 9A U.L.A. 490.
A suggestion of modifiability of property decrees-at least mixed property and mainte-
nance decrees-appears in the Preliminary Analysis, the working draft of the predecessors
to the final version of the UMDA, see R. Levy, supra note 30, at 172, but does not
reappear in the legislation or literature. In a discussion of mixed alimony-property distri-
bution decrees, Professor Levy remarked:
Trial judges should have power to modify divorce decree financial provisions
without regard to what label-"alimony" award or "property distribution"-
might subsequently be applied to the specific language of the decree. The par-
ties should be permitted to preclude subsequent modification, with the acquies-
cence of the divorcing judge, only by clear and explicit language in the original
decree.
Id. (footnote omitted).
336. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
337. See 2 H. Clark, supra note 17, § 17.6, at 272-77.
338. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 316, 9A U.L.A. 489-90 (1973).
339. Only rarely have courts recognized the importance of the function of property
division and alimony on the issue of modifiability. See, e.g., Stein v. Stein, 21 Or. App.
195, 534 P.2d 222 (1975); Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477, 67 P. 508 (1902); see also supra
note 34 (discussing modifiability of property division). One approach to the issue is to
determine whether the portion of the decree in issue functions as the recognition of a
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when the property is sufficient, a judge should accommodate the future
support needs of a deserving spouse entirely with property? If circum-
stances of the spouse who received the property award change, however,
no statutory authority for modification exists, even though such author-
ity would have existed had the award been made under the maintenance
statute instead of the property division statute.
The failure to treat the absence of modifiability may have played a part
in the inattention to need factors and the failure to develop a philosophy
of the relationship of property division and alimony. Though reform
touted property division as preferable to alimony to provide support, the
nonmodifiability of property division meant that judges would lose the
power to accommodate changed circumstances by modifying the prop-
erty award.341 Perhaps the recognition of this distinction between prop-
erty division and alimony subtly has discouraged courts from using
property division to provide postdivorce support.
The nonmodifiability of property division, however, should not keep
courts from using property as support altogether. Since there usually is
far too little property to provide the total needed support, rarely, if ever,
would circumstances change to such a degree that the spouse awarded
the greater share would no longer need that share for support. Con-
versely, in cases in which the changed circumstances cause still greater
need, the court could compensate by an award of alimony if that alterna-
tive were procedurally available. In sum, though nonmodifiability makes
property division an imperfect substitute for alimony as support, the
shortcoming should not discourage courts from at least making the at-
tempt to use property division instead of alimony.
iv. Inattention to Available Property
The other matter that received insufficient attention from reformers
was the modest amount of property typically available for distribution at
divorce. Again, in retrospect, had the reformers addressed this problem,
the attention might have helped to develop use of the need factor.
The average divorcing couple has relatively few assets. 2 One study
reports that when the family's income is between $20,000 and $29,999,
share of assets accumulated during the marriage or as support. If the portion functions as
an asset distribution, then the decree should not be modifiable; if the portion functions as
support, then it should be. For an early, and still rare, recognition of determining the
function of the award in order to resolve the issue of modifiability, see Brandt v. Brandt,
40 Or. 477, 485-87, 67 P. 508, 510-I1 (1902). To appreciate the substance and not just
the form of the awards is to recognize that parties "bargain in the shadow of the law."
See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 997.
340. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 308 and comment, 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1973).
341. See supra note 32.
342. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 54-69. Professor Weitzman based her ten-year
study in part on an analysis of about 2,500 cases from court records in the period 1968-




the net value of their assets averages only $21,800.143 Moreover, this
figure usually is subsumed by the family home. 3" In the typical case,
other than the equity in the home, there simply is no property to divide
at divorce.34
5
The modest amount of property available for distribution in the aver-
age divorce deserves some commentary. The legislation promotes prop-
erty as the preeminent means of accomplishing economic adjustments at
divorce. In the great majority of cases, however, the available property is
inadequate to the task.346 Perhaps with some kind of legislative footnote
in the commentary recognizing this fact, judges might have been more
alert to this probability and its implication-that courts should try to
address need through property division but an award of spousal support
would be the rule, not the exception. Instead, the courts appear to have
abandoned altogether the effort to address need-either through prop-
erty division or alimony. In light of the clear directive in legislation like
the UMDA to try to end the relationship between the parties with prop-
erty division,347 legislative notice that the property usually would not be
adequate to the task was in order.
B. Concerns of Underutilization-the End of Responsibility?
The preceding discussion posited several explanations for the underu-
tilization of the discretionary factors relating to need. Regardless of its
cause, however, this judicial inattention raises some concerns. If needy
spouses could rely on alimony, the inattention would not be as trouble-
some. Recent studies on alimony, however, report declining alimony
awards.348 The economically weaker spouse, usually the wife, must face
these declining alimony awards without the assistance of the property
awards envisioned by the reform legislation. 49
The slighting of the need factors reinforces perhaps some unintended
343. Id. at 56.
344. Id. at 65.
345. Id. at 61-65. The fact that a court may find the equity in the home to be the only
property available for distribution has led to its own tragedy: the forced sale of the family
home. See id. at 78. The disposition of the family home has generated a number of
proposals for legislation to address this problem. See generally Comment, The Marital
Home: Equal or Equitable Distribution?, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089 (1983).
346. See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 273 Ark. 528, 623 S.W.2d 813 (1981); Bailey v. Bai-
ley, 184 Mont. 418, 603 P.2d 259 (1979).
347. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 308 and comment, 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1973).
348. See supra note 79. Also, the United States Census reported that in 1985 only
15% of ever-divorced or currently-separated women in the United States, as of spring
1986, received an award of alimony. See United States Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 152, Child
Support and Alimony: 1985 (Advance Report), p.6 (Aug. 1987). Moreover, the average
amount of alimony awarded in 1985 was only $3,733 per year, or $311 per month. Id. at
7.
349. Even if judges heed the discretionary factors, however, the problem will remain
since the average divorcing couple has little property to divide. See L. Weitzman, supra
note 30, at 55-58; supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
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inferences. Some observers interpret the decline of alimony awards as
the judiciary's conclusion that divorce always ends one spouse's responsi-
bility for the other.35° The inattention to the need factors manifests that
conclusion in another context. In states where property division statutes
address need, however, the legislatures have decided that courts may at-
tempt to meet those needs with the division of property, even if the
amount of property proves inadequate. If courts need not even make the
attempt, then the state has de facto adopted a policy that the need of the
economically weaker spouse never concerns the economically stronger
spouse. The stronger spouse need not provide support either by an
award of alimony or property division.3"' The existence of this attitude
in the alimony context also explains its presence in the context of the
division of property.
Observers have offered two reasons as the best explanations of the de-
cline in alimony awards after divorce reform: the enactment of no-fault
divorce laws and the changing economic status of women.352 The re-
formers knew that no-fault divorce would have an economic conse-
quence, but the consequence they anticipated was a loss of bargaining
power.353 The framework of fault divorce had allowed the economically
weaker spouse to contest the divorce unless the stronger spouse made
economic concessions.3 1 Without this framework, the weaker spouse
had little leverage. The reformers addressed this vulnerability by arguing
for the recognition of nonfinancial contribution.355 If reform assured
that both spouses would have property rights, then perhaps neither
would need the leverage that fault had provided.
Some of the reformers, however, did not anticipate the attendant
shift in thinking about responsibility after divorce. 3 6  Apparently,
350. Eg., L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 143-53.
351. Certainly many believe that spousal responsibility does end at divorce and that
the state should not require one spouse to provide for the economic need of the other
after divorce. See Olsen v. Olsen, 98 Idaho 10, 12-13, 557 P.2d 604, 606 (1976) (Shepard,
J., dissenting). But see Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. of Legal Stud. 35 (January
1978) (arguing that alimony continues to perform the useful economic function of com-
pensating women for the economic sacrifices that marriage often entails). This Article
does not join that debate except to consider why divorce reform should have worked a
change in philosophy about the propriety of addressing need.
352. See generally Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 55; Comment, Rehabilitative
Spousal Support" In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution
Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 493, 494-95 (1978).
353. E.g., R. Levy, supra note 30, at 165; Foster & Freed, supra note 301, at 195.
354. For the use of the defense of recrimination in fault-based divorce and its utility in
effecting settlement, see Alexander, The Follies of Divorce-A Therapeutic Approach to
the Problem, 1949 Ill. L.F. 695, 701-02. See also Kay, supra note 30, at 62 (in fault-based
divorce system, innocent spouse who wants to continue marriage can prevent divorce by
not asserting cause of action against guilty spouse).
355. See Fineman, supra note 27, at 801-03, 848-50.
356. See e.g., Prager, supra note 69, at 16-18; L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 366.
Professor Weitzman concluded that no-fault divorce "redefined marriage as a time-lim-
ited contingent arrangement." Id. at 368.
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judges3 57 and commentators 358 have deemed the demise of alimony a log-
ical concomitant of no-fault divorce.35 9 The judiciary appears to have
concluded that the availability of no-fault divorce has redefined marriage
so that spouses no longer assume that they may have commitments to the
other that survive divorce. 36' There has been little explanation of the
linkage,361 however, and some observers have questioned the connection
of no-fault divorce and the end of responsibility as illogical.
3 62
Although judges may have concluded that no-fault divorce has this
consequence, the change in divorce statutes does not appear to have had
this impact on lay attitudes toward marriage. In fact, researchers report
that people continue to have expectations of a lasting marital relationship
and continue to develop strong emotional ties to their spouses and to the
marriage.363  There appears to be little support for the assumption that
because divorce is easy, society takes marriage lightly.
The second justification for declining alimony awards-the changing
economic status of women-is premature. Women have made some
modest gains in closing the wage differential between men and women.3
357. See, e.g., Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1980) (citing law review ex-
cerpt linking no-fault divorce and the propriety of temporary maintenance awards).
358. See, e.g., M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 52-53 (linking the ease of divorce with
economic self-sufficiency).
359. The decline in alimony after no-fault divorce is well-documented. See supra note
79. One conclusion of this study is that the absence of fault in considerations on property
has had an impact in deliberations on property divisions. Of the six states in this study,
only the courts of Connecticut may freely consider fault in making divisions. See supra
note 89. Significantly, Connecticut ranks only slightly below Montana in its percentage
of cases addressing need. See supra notes 103 & 140.
360. See supra note 79.
361. The linkage of no-fault and no-responsibility appears not to be universal. The
English system, for example, assumes responsibility after divorce. See Glendon, Property
Rights upon Dissolution of Marriage and Informal Unions, in The Cambridge Lectures:
1981, 245, 246-48 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy, eds. 1982). Professor Glendon, however,
finds the American system better than that of the English. See id. at 248. In fact, the
thesis of another work by Professor Glendon is that economic equality and other factors
may make separate property principles more compatible with current lifestyles than mar-
ital property principles. Glendon, Is There a Future for Separate Property?, 8 Fam. L.Q.
315, 326-27 (1974).
362. " 'No-fault' divorce has no logical relationship to the legal attributes of responsi-
bility during marriage and upon its termination by divorce or death. It does not follow
from the availability of easy divorce ... that the institution of marriage has been deval-
ued." Haskell, The Premarital Estate Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 415,
432 (1979).
363. See, e.g., L. Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage In England 1500-1800, at 7-9,
18-28 (1977). Professor Glendon, giving credit to Stone, characterizes the modern mar-
riage as both intense and fragile. M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 28-29; see also Clark,
The New Marriage, 12 Willamette L.J. 441, 443 (1976) ("For many people [marriage] is a
refuge from the coldness and impersonality of contemporary existence."); Goode, World
Revolution and Family Patterns, in Family in Transition: Rethinking Marriage, Sexuality,
Child Rearing, & Family Organization 47, 56 (A. & J. Skolnick 2d ed. 1977) (marital
relationship restores "emotional balance" that is absent in many employment situations);
Thornton & Freedman, Changing Attitudes Toward Marriage and Single Life, 14 Fam.
Plan. Perspectives 297, 300 (1982) (reporting expectations for lasting marriages).
364. See 1 J. Morgan, K. Dickinson, J. Dickinson, J. Benus & G. Duncan, Five Thou-
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The wage differential, however reduced, remains; a woman earns about
sixty cents to a man's dollar.36 5 Furthermore, there is no evidence that
the gap is closing. 3 6 6 Indeed, the facts of married life tend to compound
the disparity. The wife often continues to trade off career quality to as-
sume a greater role in meeting family responsibilities. 367 At divorce she
may be financially dependent and may never fully compensate the fore-
gone career opportunities.368 The fact that women have primary or ex-
clusive responsibility for child care after divorce in nine out of ten cases
makes these statistics even more dire.3 69 Studies reveal that child sup-
port awards generally are too low to meet reasonable needs.3 70 More-
over, although Congress and state legislatures are trying to remedy
enforcement problems,37' the fact remains that the child support awards,
which generally are inadequate in the first place, are difficult to
enforce.372
In sum, neither explanation offered for lower alimony awards-no-
fault divorce and economic reform-justifies the decline. The decline
nevertheless continues. Moreover, the presence of these attitudes in the
property division context compounds the inequities. Rather than provid-
ing relief by using property awards to address need, judges routinely ig-
nore the discretionary factors relating to need in dividing property.
Although some may question whether the state ever should have im-
posed responsibility after divorce on the economically stronger spouse,
nothing has changed to justify a reversal. No-fault divorce is not related
sand American Families-Patterns of Economic Progress: An Analysis of the First Five
Years of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 336 (1974).
365. Male-Female Differences, supra note 181, at 4 (comparative table of earnings per
hour). Another report calculated that in 1980 a woman with a college degree earned less
salary than a man with one to three years of secondary education. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Special Demographic Analyses, CDS-80-8, American Women:
Three Decades of Change 21 (1983).
366. See Barrett, Women in the Job Market: Occupations Earnings, and Career Oppor-
tunities, in The Subtle Revolution 33-35, (R. Smith ed. 1979) (concluding that the dispar-
ity has in fact widened with respect to certain occupations in recent decades).
367. See M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 130-32.
368. See icL
369. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 358. As Professor Weitzman points out, equal
division of property in the divorcing family of two children distributes one-half to one
person, and one-half to the other three people. Id. Professor Glendon reports that for
the past twenty years, divorced fathers retained custody in only about ten percent of the
cases. See M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 87.
370. !Kg., Wishik, supra note 79, at 94-98 (reporting that the average award in Ver-
mont for 1982-83 was $23.50 per week per child).
371. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. III
1985) (requiring states to promulgate specific remedies to enhance their enforcement of
child support).
372. The average payment due women with court-ordered child support in 1985 was
$2,390; the average amount received was $I,350, or 56% of the amount awarded. See
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Special
Studies, Series P-23, No. 152, Child Support and Alimony: 1985 (Advance Report), p.6
(Aug. 1987). See generally D. Chambers, Making Fathers Pay (1979) (describing the
problems of child support enforcement).
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logically to responsibility after marriage, and economic equality does not
characterize the typical marriage.373 Divorce often leaves women in need
of support and in worse economic positions than men. The question
raised by these economic facts of life is whether they argue for further
reform to help insure that some mechanism exists to address postdivorce
need.
The answer has many facets, and only one is offered here as a spring-
board for considering additional reform. The state has an interest in rec-
ognizing spouses' continuing responsibility to provide for need where
need exists.374 That interest is best illustrated by considering the impact
of no such recognition. If divorce ends responsibility, then one's only
safeguard against economic devastation in the event of divorce is the pur-
suit of individual career goals.37 5 If divorce always ends one spouse's
responsibility for the other, then the states have discouraged the making
of sacrifices for the marriage and have encouraged individual pursuits.
The law in this way may set or strengthen a norm that it would not
choose to foster.376 Yet, a scheme that ends responsibility at divorce
makes those sacrifices economically foolhardy. The history of alimony
and the inadequacy of property awards under the new statutes implicitly
carry this message. Indeed, commentators already have noted a trend
towards the maximizing of personal goals at the expense of the family.
377
Allowing courts to ignore the need factors in property division statutes
reinforces this message. The states at least should not discourage those
spouses who wish to make personal sacrifices for the good of the
family.37 s
373. Professor Prager predicts that sharing principles will continue to characterize
two-career families even when economic parity exists between husbands and wives. See
Prager, supra note 69, at 6-14. If this thesis proves true, then as she maintains, responsi-
bility should continue. Id.
374. Indeed, the channelling of spouses to maximize their individual career potentials
is a subtle but pernicious interference in freedom of choice. If wives and husbands have
no assurance of postdivorce support in case of need, then that uncertainty might force
both spouses to maximize careers, have fewer children, and shorten or eliminate mater-
nity and paternity leaves. See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition,
the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1033, 1036 (1972); Glendon, supra note 44, at 78-81.
375. See Prager, supra note 69, at 12 (describing the danger of a scheme which "pun-
ishes conduct of accommodation and compromise"); see also L. Weitzman, supra note 30,
at 369-77. Professor Weitzman concluded that "one's own career is the only safe invest-
ment." Id. at 376 (emphasis in original).
376. For a discussion of this concern, see M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 125-38. Pro-
fessor Glendon, however, is skeptical about any positive impact of public law on the
family. Id. at 138-40. Compare generally Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983) (criticism of efforts at reform
in the area of family law).
377. See Goode, Individual Investments in Family Relationships Over the Coming De-
cades, 6 The Toqueville Review No. 1, 73-79 (1984); see also C. Lasch, Haven in a Heart-
less World: The Family Besieged 35-36, 166 (1977) (characterization of current family
interactions as similar to relationships in the work place).
378. See, e.g., Haskell, supra note 362, at 427 (maintaining that responsibility of finan-
cial support strengthens emotional support as well). For a thoughtful inquiry into altru-
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The states should enact and enforce legislation that recognizes that a
majority of its citizens bring a commitment to marriage that includes
responsibility in the face of postdivorce need. For those people who disa-
gree with this view of marriage, the developing law of antenuptial agree-
ments allows them the option to contract out of any continuing
responsibility. 79 A body of statutory law authorizing antenuptial provi-
sions dealing with property already exists,3"' and an increasing number
of states recognize provisions limiting and eliminating alimony.3", Use
of these laws enables the state to accommodate postdivorce need and
those who disagree with continuing responsibility.
C. Recommendations for Increased Use of Need Factors
in Property Division
This Article considers the experience of the need factors in property
division statutes as reflected in the appealed cases of six states whose
statutes contain a comprehensive list of the need factors. Although the
property division statutes in these states, like most states, authorize
courts to consider need in dividing the available property, the cases
demonstrate a general underutilization of these factors. This section of-
fers recommendations to encourage the use of the need factors and une-
qual divisions of property to accommodate need.382 The first is
ism in the family, see Olsen, supra note 376. Professor Olsen explains that the altruism in
the family as currently conceived fosters a sexual heirarchy and the domination of wo-
men. It at 1505. She does not conclude, however, that there should be no altruism in
the family. Rather, she concludes that various dichotomies have hindered human devel-
opment and that altruism should characterize the market as well as all members of the
family. Id. at 1560-78.
379. For example, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, §§ 3(a)(l) & (4), 9B
U.L.A. 373 (1983), recognizes as proper content for antenuptials the determination of
property rights and the elimination of spousal support. The Act recognizes only limited
attacks on enforceability. l& at § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376. Professor Glendon advocates en-
forcing antenuptials unless the provisions affect children or spouses who have been af-
fected by raising children. See Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L
Rev. 1553, 1567 (1984); see also Freed and Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An
Overview, 19 Fam. L.Q. 331, 438 (1986) (noting the evolving acceptance of antenuptials);
Comment, For Better or for Worse ... But Just in Case, Are Antenuptial Agreements
Enforceable? 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 531 (analyzes antenuptial agreements in light of con-
temporary realities and argues that they should enjoy a presumption of validity when
certain conditions are met).
380. Many state statutes on equitable distribution provide for the enforcement of ante-
nuptial property provisions. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d) (1987); Wis. Star. Ann.
§ 767.255 (11) (West 1981). The Wisconsin statute directs that the court presume that
the agreement is equitable. Wis. Stat. § 767.255(11). The UMDA recognizes the en-
forceability of an antenuptial agreement by directing consideration of the agreement in
the Act's list of discretionary factors. Unif. Marriage & Div. Act. § 307(a) Alternative A,
9A U.L.A. 238 (1973).
381. See, eg., Unif. Premarital Agreement Act § 3(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1983). New
York's antenuptial statute recognizes provisions on the "amount and duration of mainte-
nance" if the agreement was fair at execution and is not unconscionable at final judgment.
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 Pt. B(3)(3) (McKinney 1986).
382. Because this Article focuses on disparate spousal needs, it does not treat the many
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addressed to the judiciary; the remaining are addressed to the
legislatures.
1. Appellate Recognition of the Relationship Between Property
Division and Alimony
Many of the above conclusions follow from comparing the experience
in Montana with those of the other states in the study. As reported in
Part II, among the states with enough cases to be statistically significant,
Montana reveals the highest percentage of cases with dispositions ad-
dressing need and with analyses explicitly utilizing need factors.383 In
addition to the results of the cases, the most noteworthy difference be-
tween the Montana cases and the cases from the other five states is the
explanation in the Montana cases of the relationship between property
division and alimony. Although the statutes of all six states recognize a
relationship between property division and alimony,3 84 only in the Mon-
tana cases do the appellate courts acknowledge and expound on the rela-
tionship. The Montana Supreme Court has said, in effect, that the
statute means what it says-property, if available, is to perform the role
of alimony and, if possible, take its place.385 That recognition may mean
an unequal division of property in favor of the needy spouse, or, as is
possible in Montana, an award of non-marital property to the nontitled
spouse.386 The results in the other states lead to the conclusion that un-
reform issues that children raise. Professor Glendon advocates property reform based on
a "children-first principle." Glendon, supra note 379, at 1559. This principle would,
where children are or have been concerned, classify property, not as marital or separate,
but as "family." Id.
One consideration affecting both spousal support and child custody and support is the
disposition of the marital home. Property division statutes treat the marital home in a
variety of ways. Some expressly provide for a delay of sale. See, e.g., Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. § 3-6A-06 (1984) (providing for possession of home for up to three
years from the time of divorce). Statutes that merely refer to the need of the home by the
custodial parent have been interpreted in a number of ways, some states requiring imme-
diate division, others recognizing the propriety of delay. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30,
at 84-86; Comment, supra note 345, at 1097-1104. Commentators have recommended
that statutes require delay of the sale of the family home where the facts involve minor
children. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 385. The English courts, for example,
recognize need by delaying the sale of the home. See Comment, supra note 345, at 1107-
10.
An even more fundamental concern is the inadequacy of child support awards. As
Professor Weitzman records, a man rarely pays more than one-third of this income to
support his former wife and his children, leaving two-thirds for one person and one-third
for two or more. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 34. This fact, in combination with
others, leads to the conclusion that judges should award more child support. Id. at 391-
92.
383. See supra notes 103-09, 112, 129, 140 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
386. The Montana statute provides that the court shall "finally equitably apportion
between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both, however and
whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or
both." Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202(1) (1987).
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less the reviewing courts clarify the relationship, lower courts will not
use the factors relating to need.
2. Equitable Versus Equal Distribution
A necessary corollary to the Montana experience is the reliance on
equitable rather than equal distribution. Although all the states in the
study have revealed some timidity in using the need factors, the results
suggest more reluctance in the equal division states.3"' Moreover, when
reviewing courts in equal division states have upheld unequal divisions,
the facts, for the most part, have revealed extraordinary circum-
stances.38 Although the property division statutes of these states would
allow unequal divisions for need, simple need has riot caused the courts
to deviate from the norm of equal division.
The recommendation of equitable, as opposed to equal, division raises
a number of fears, only some of which will be summarized here. One
such fear is a distrust of discretion. Some of the motivation for divorce
reform was a distrust of discretion,3" 9 and equitable division certainly
injects a great deal of discretion into the apportionment. Another fear
stems from the belief that equal division promotes private settlements. 39°
One scholar cynically concludes that the most vocal advocates of equita-
ble distribution are lawyers in family practice because the uncertainty of
equitable distribution would multiply the billable hours necessary to de-
cide matters of property.3 91 For these and other reasons, after years of
evaluating the reform, some commentators continue to advocate equal
division of property.392 Others believe, however, that none of these fears
overshadows the reality of economic need of one spouse at divorce.
A laudable goal of proponents of equal division is to discourage stereo-
types.3 93 Legislation that provides for equal division of property, for ex-
ample, assumes that men and women have made equal contributions to
its acquisition. Legislation mandating equal division also implies that the
spouses' work should be valued equally. Even this noble reason, how-
ever, fails to justify equal division. The feminization of poverty39 com-
pels the conclusion that addressing need is more important than the
387. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
389. See Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, 6 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. 225, 227-29 (1939); see also Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of
Marriage and Informal Unions, in Cambridge Lectures, supra note 361, at 247-50, supra
note 178 and accompanying text.
390. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 64.
391. See Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriage and Informal Unions,
in Cambridge Lectures, supra note 361, at 249.
392. Eg., M. Glendon, supra note 179, at 63-64; L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 384-
87; Younger, supra note 175, at 241-44.
393. Cf McCloud, supra note 186, at 299 (describing this fear in the setting of employ-
ment legislation).
394. For references to the phrase, see for example, Ehrenreich & Piven, The Feminiza-
tion of Poverty, Dissent (Spr. 1984), and New York City Council, The Feminization of
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symbolism inherent in rule equality. If further reform will lead to more
unequal divisions of property in favor of the spouse with need, then the
effort is surely worthwhile, despite the abandonment of the rhetoric of
equality.395
3. All Property Versus Dual Property
Another conclusion that the Montana experience suggests raises the
distinction between "all property" and "dual property" statutes. 396 "All
property" statutes divide all the property of the marriage, regardless of
when and how acquired. Dual property statutes divide only the acquests
of the marrriage. One feature that partially may explain Montana's
greater attention to need in property division is its all property provi-
sion.3 97 The conclusion should not be surprising. Judges usually face the
division of scant resources. In light of this scarcity, a judge may be reluc-
tant to divide the small pool of available property any way other than
equally. In this way, the judge attempts to leave something for each
party. Increasing the pool enables the judge to order an unequal division
and still leave some property for the party with less need. In future re-
form, legislatures should consider increasing the pool of property to be
Poverty: An Analysis of Poor Women in New York City (June 14, 1984); see also supra
note 6.
395. See Fineman, supra note 27, at 792; Prager, supra note 69, at 2-6. The realization
that rule equality does not insure result equality is not a new one. See supra note 186.
This recognition also appears in a classic feminist work. See B. Friedan, It Changed My
Life 325-26 (1976). The equal division of marital property, for example, reflects only rule
equality, not result equality, in light of contemporary socioeconomic factors. Since wo-
men continue to make more career sacrifices in marriage, an equal division of property
achieves an unequal result. Women often leave the marriage less able to earn and must
consume the divided property to support themselves. Likewise, gender-neutral alimony
statutes appear to operate equally in terms of burdens on husbands and wives. To the
extent, however, that judges make their decisions based on assumptions that men and
women have equal job opportunities, the statutes operate unequally. A number of critics
urge that in the next period of reform, drafters should take care to insure equality of
result. See, eg., Fineman, supra note 27, at 791; see generally K. Ferguson, Self, Society,
and Womankind: The Dialectic of Liberation (1980); Johnston, supra note 374, at 1070-
88, 1090; cf McCloud, supra note 186, at 283 (propounding the same thesis in the setting
of employment legislation).
396. The virtues of an all property versus a marital property scheme is an example of
an important feature of property division on which this Article does not focus. Much of
the early debate following the first proposals of the committee drafting the proposed legis-
lation that eventually became the UMDA centered on the desirability of dividing all the
property owned by either party, however and whenever acquired, versus the desirability
of confining the pool of property to such property acquired during the marriage, exclud-
ing property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent. In fact, the all-property-versus-
marital-property debate prompted the controversial rejection by the Family Law Section
of the American Bar Association of the original version of the UMDA. Rheinstein, supra
note 35, at 429. Indeed, this controversy led to the alternative versions that compromise
the final version of § 307. See Unif. Marriage & Div. Act § 307 Alternatives A and B, 9A
U.L.A. 238-39 (1973); Kay, supra note 30, at 48.
397. See supra note 386; see, e.g., In re Marriage of White, 708 P.2d 267, 269 (Mont.
1985) (affirming award of premarital funds to wife, noting that the court did not have to
return the parties to their premarital positions).
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divided in order to encourage judges to address need.398
4. Clarification of the Significance of Standard of Living,
Employability, and Income-Producing Capability
A few other suggested changes to property division statutes focus on
encouraging use of the discretionary factors. One is to increase the im-
portance of the marital standard of living as a relevant factor. As re-
ported, the statutes of all the states in the study except New York and
North Carolina refer to standard of living or station as relevant to the
division of property.3 99 The results in all the states except Montana,
however, reveal the repeated failure to attempt to address an unequal
standard of living through property division.' Divorce and its disrup-
tion surely increase the living expenses of the once-intact family. That
fact of life, however, should not mean that only one of the spouses, usu-
ally the wife, bears the decreased standard of living.
Those states with references to standard of living in their property di-
vision statutes recognize, in theory, that property division can equalize
the economic impact of divorce. The results of the cases, however, indi-
cate a judicial reluctance to honor the theory. In order to encourage the
judiciary to give effect to the references to standard of living in property
division statutes, the legislatures should make these provisions more ex-
plicit. The provision on standard of living also should require that where
resources cannot maintain the marital standard of living for both parties,
the parties should share the reduction equally."1 This requirement,
which appears in the family law of other countries," 2 has a number of
virtues. Last, besides the inherent fairness of equalizing the impact of the
398. Expanding the pool of property to encourage attention to need involves far more
than the controversy over all property versus dual property systems. As legislatures and,
through their constructions of the statutes, courts expand the pool of property, they in-
crease the likelihood of unequal divisions of property to address need. Certainly, how a
state defines its pool of property available for distribution determines in large measure
how fairly the property distribution will operate. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 94, at 273.
Because of the focus of this Article, the discussion does not treat, except tangentially, the
definition of marital property.
399. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
400. Again, the Montana cases suggest that attention to standard of living does, in-
deed, make a difference. Unlike the other states, the Montana Supreme Court repeatedly
has used standard of living to uphold unequal awards and occasionally to reverse equal
awards of property. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
401. This recommendation also appears in the New York Task Force Report on Wo-
men in the Courts (1986), reprinted in 15 Fordham Urb. LJ. 11, 80 (1986-87) [hereinaf-
ter New York Task Force], in relation to maintenance but not to the division of property.
A study of Vermont cases after reform legislation likewise prompted a recommendation
to equalize postdivorce standard of living. See Wishik, supra note 79, at 100.01.
402. See, e.g., Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriage and Informal
Unions, in Cambridge Lectures, supra note 361, at 248 (describing the English goal "of
putting the parties in the position they would have been in if the marriage had not broken
down"). Professor Weitzman also reports that the English system seeks to leave the par-




divorce on the standard of living, reference to the marital standard of
living also provides an objective standard, removing some of the unpre-
dictability of equitable awards.
Like standard of living, employability or the ability to earn income is a
factor that is included in the state statutes of the study.403 If courts inter-
preted employability as they do other discretionary factors, they would
compare the spouses' abilities to earn income in deciding how to divide
the property.' The cases, however, reveal a reluctance to draw this
comparison. Another recommendation, therefore, is to direct the courts,
by specific statutory language, to compare the spouses' income-earning
ability. That clarification should encourage judges to award more prop-
erty to the spouse with less earning ability. A further recommendation,
already implemented in some states,405 is to direct the courts to consider
the extent to which a spouse's earning capacity has been affected by
homemaking responsibilities that precluded or curtailed employment
outside the home. A property award compensating for the resulting une-
qual earning capacity would address some of the need occasioned by
divorce.40
6
Another consideration that would encourage courts to divide property
in accordance with postdivorce need is statutorily to raise the question
whether the property allocated is income-producing. None of the states
included in this study lists as a discretionary factor the nature of the
property as income-producing or not.4°7 Even without such a specific
reference, the Montana Supreme Court on a number of occasions has
directed attention to the character of the property." 8 This direction may
403. See supra note 84.
404. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.255(6) (West 1981). This property division statute al-
lows the court to deviate from an equal division after considering
[t]he earning capacity of each party, including educational background, train-
ing, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market,
custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to
acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-sup-
porting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the
marriage.
Id.
406. The New York Task Force recommended that the homemaker's reduced earning
capacity figure in property division and maintenance. New York Task Force, supra note
401, at 80. Although the legislature enacted some of the recommendations, it has not yet
incorporated the suggestion on reduced earning capacity.
One commentator concludes that courts should recognize lost opportunities as a factor
under provisions recognizing contribution as a homemaker. Foster, supra note 51, at 45-
47; see also Beninger & Smith, Career Opportunity Cost: A Factor in Spousal Support
Determination, 16 Fam. L.Q. 201, 207-12 (1982) (recognizing this factor in maintenance
discussions).
407. Again, although there is no specific reference to the character of the property,
courts could have considered that factor as a logical component of other listed factors,
such as available income, value of property, and opportunity for future acquisitions of
capital assets and income.
408. In In re Marriage of Edwards, 699 P.2d 67, 71 (Mont. 1985), the court explained
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have contributed to the number of divisions of property in Montana rec-
ognizing postdivorce need.
The above recommendations offer some ways to encourage the use of
need factors in property division statutes.' Even if legislatures follow
all these recommendations, however, need might persist. In the first
place, the danger exists that judicial interpretations might ignore the stat-
utory directives.41 0 Furthermore, even with interpretations consistent
with the legislative directives, the average family owns little property.41'
The available pool of assets to be divided might not accommodate
postdivorce need. Because of the prevalence of insufficient property at
divorce, legislatures must scrutinize their alimony statutes and interpre-
tations of them as well. Alimony statutes also may require amendment
in ways that focus on the existence of need at divorce.
Nevertheless, the effort to encourage the recognition of need in prop-
erty division is important. In the first place, all the reasons that prompted
the reformers of the 1960's to offer property as the superior vehicle to
address the economic consequences of divorce remain valid.412 Property
awards, unlike alimony, give a measure of independence to the recipient.
These awards, not contingent on remarriage or the life of either spouse,
offer more opportunity for financial planning. Except in the cases of
that the reference in the maintenance statute to sufficient property to meet needs means
income-producing property. See also In re Marriage of Rolfe, 699 P.2d 79, 83 (Mont.
1985) (chastising lower court for awarding household goods to wife and income-produc-
ing property to husband); In re Marriage of Laster, 197 Mont. 470, 643 P.2d 597, 601
(1982) (maintenance justified because property was not income-producing); In re Mar-
riage of Herron, 186 Mont. 396, 408, 608 P.2d 97, 103 (1980) (party can become "prop-
erty poor" if property is income-consuming).
409. Several of the recommendations to amend property division statutes apply equally
to alimony statutes. For example, increased emphasis on standard of living and the shar-
ing of a decreased standard of living might help judges equalize the disparate impact of
divorce. See supra note 401 and accompanying text. Another property recommendation
pertinent to alimony awards is the consideration of whether property allocated is income-
producing. See supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
Analysts of the poverty of divorce conclude that legislatures need to give renewed at-
tention to alimony. Many of the conclusions suggest that the legislatures tailor provi-
sions to accommodate the special needs of certain groups. For example, legislatures
should take special precautions to make certain that statutes address the needs of the
custodial parent with young children and direct full support to maximize long-range em-
ployment prospects. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 390-91; Fineman, supra note 27,
at 832-33, 886. Another group in need of special protection is older housewives who have
been married long but have not developed a career out of deference to their family
responsibilties and husbands' careers. L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 380-81.
410. The most obvious example is the thesis of this study: while statutes in these states
make need relevant to the division of property, the courts do not use property as the
means to address this need. At the conclusion of an earlier study in California, the au-
thor recommended that need factors be added to the list of discretionary factors in Cali-
fornia's statute. Seal, supra note 79, at 15. As this Article demonstrates, the presence of
need factors does not necessarily make a difference.
411. See L. Weitzman, supra note 30, at 54-58; supra notes 342-47 and accompanying
text.
412. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
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some distributive awards, the property award ends some of the contact
between the spouses. If the award is not subject to modification, the
property award also reduces litigation. In the second place, the failure to
use the need factors in property division suggests that one spouse's re-
sponsibility for the other always ends at divorce. By ignoring the need
factors, the judiciary imposes a policy of no responsibility in states whose
statutes recognize the possibility of one spouse's continued responsibility
for the other's need. The reforms suggested avoid this problem by mak-
ing property statutes that purport to provide for need actually perform
that function.
CONCLUSION
Divorce reform promoted the division of property as a substitute for
alimony whenever the spouses have sufficient property to accommodate
postdivorce need. The property division statutes of most states (certainly
of the states selected for this study) reflect the influence of the reformers.
These states direct that both alimony and property division awards may
address postdivorce need where it exists. Not only do property division
and alimony share a support function, but in many states it also is clear
that property division is preferable to alimony to address need. There-
fore, when sufficient property exists, courts should divide the property in
a way that will obviate the need for alimony. Need factors in property
division statutes explicitly authorize courts to use the division of prop-
erty to accommodate this need by an unequal award of property in favor
of the more needy spouse.
Although identifying the relationship between property division and
alimony may be simple, courts have not implemented it. This study con-
firms the failure of courts to use the discretionary factors relating to need
and the resulting failure to divide property unequally in favor of the
more needy spouse.
A number of factors explain these failures. The preference for equal
division of property accounts in large measure for the failure to divide
property unequally in favor of the more needy spouse. Likewise, the une-
ven attention that courts give to various statutory factors in the property
division statutes and the restrictive definitions of other factors also ac-
count for the inattention to need. Finally, the cases are noteworthy for
their absence of analysis of the relationship between need and property
division. The reviewing courts frequently justify a disposition by explain-
ing the role of contribution, a non-need factor, in recognizing property
rights at divorce. In contrast, they give no guidance to the lower courts
on the role of property division in addressing need.
The routine failure to use the discretionary factors relating to need,
however, suggests a more basic impediment-the lack of consensus on
what constitutes need for the purposes of property division. For exam-
ple, the hypothetical in the Introduction describes a couple who left the
marriage with unequal incomes. Because of their ages and work experi-
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ence, the wife realistically will never earn an income comparable to the
income the husband will enjoy. Does the wife therefore have postdivorce
need?
On the face of the property division statutes, the answer is yes. To the
credit of reformers, most states have adopted equitable distribution stat-
utes that direct comparison of the postdivorce finances of both spouses.
The statutes allow courts to award unequal divisions of property to ad-
dress the weaker financial position of one spouse.
According to the current interpretations of property division statutes,
however, the answer is no. This study focused on states that authorize
addressing need through a division of property. In case after case where
spouses displayed unequal financial pictures at divorce, usually because
of unequal incomes, the lower court failed to use property division to
address the inequality. Furthermore, the reviewing court upheld the dis-
position. Thus, although these statutes as currently enacted authorize a
court to divide property unequally in favor of the spouse with greater
need, the courts routinely make some other disposition.
These conflicting answers suggest that states must examine what they
want to accomplish at divorce. Perhaps the upheaval of divorce reform
seduced courts and legislatures into thinking that they could escape this
task. The changes introduced by divorce reform may have lulled courts
and legislatures into thinking that they would not have to define need
because no need would exist. Perhaps courts and legislatures envisioned
that expanded concepts of marital property and its division at divorce
would save them from the difficult task of deciding what "need" means
in the aftermath of divorce reform, particularly in the aftermath of no-
fault divorce.
The division of property, especially as currently interpreted, does not
avoid the task. Rather, the conflicting signals the legislatures and the
courts are sending through property division law demand a clear defini-
tion of need.
The property division statutes of most states, like the statutes in this
study, list factors relating to need as appropriate considerations in deter-
mining property rights. This list of factors reflects the premise that
spouses may have continuing responsibilities to each other after divorce
because of one spouse's greater need. The judicial gloss on these statutes,
however, ignores this premise. Rarely do the courts divide property un-
equally in favor of the more needy spouse, usually the wife, simply be-
cause she has a greater postdivorce need than the husband.
Two steps are in order to make property awards under these statutes
reflect the premise of the legislation. First, states should empower com-
mittees or task forces to grapple with the state's definition of need. Does
economic inequality at divorce constitute need? If the answer is no, fur-
ther action is not required. Current interpretations of property division
statutes reflect this conclusion. If the answer is yes, as this Article ar-
gues, then the state needs to take further action. In some states, legisla-
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tive commentary to the existing statutes may provide solutions. In
others, some combination of amendments such as this Article and other
commentary suggest may be necessary to reorient the judiciary to the
proper role of property division in addressing postdivorce need.
Not all states may choose to recognize continuing responsibility after
divorce. The choice, however, should be a conscious one. Those states
that purport to address need with property division statutes have chosen
to recognize that one spouse's responsibility to the other does not always
end at divorce. The judiciary's interpretations of these statutes should
reflect this choice.
